Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)

U.S. Supreme Court

Crowell v. Benson No. 19 Argued October 20, 21, 1931 Decided February 23, 1932285 U.S. 22ast|>*

285 U.S. 22 CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
course of study
1. In virtue of its world power to alter or revise the maritime law, Congress may provide that, where employees in nautical employment are disabled or die from accidental injuries arising out of or in the course of their employment upon the navigable waters of the United States, their employers shall pay reasonable compensation, without regard to fault as the causal agent of wound, and be thereby relieved from other indebtedness. P. 285 U. S. 39 .
2. The Longshoremen ‘s and Harbor Workers ‘ Compensation Act, which provides a schema for compensation in the class of cases above described, applicable if recovery “ through workmen ‘s recompense proceedings may not validly be provided by State law, ” upheld as to substantive provisions. P. 285 U. S. 22 .
3. The classifications of disabilities and beneficiaries and the amounts of compensation provided in the Act not being excessive, the Act in those respects is consistent with the due action article of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 285 U. S. 41 -42 .
4. The difficulty of ascertaining actual damages justifies the fixate of standard compensation in such an Act at figures reasonably approximating probable damages. Id .
5. Considerations respecting the relation of victor and servant, which sustain workmen ‘s recompense laws of the States against objections under the due process article of the Fourteenth Amendment, are applicable to the substantial provisions of this Act of Congress, tested by the due process article of the Fifth Amendment. Id .
6. Claims for compensation under the above-mentioned Act are filed with administrative officers called deputy commissioners, who “ shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions in deference of such claim. ” They may issue subpoenas which are enforceable through contempt proceedings in federal courts. In investigating page 285 U. S. 23 and hearing claims they, are not to be bound by the common law or statutory rules of tell, except equally provided in the Act, but are to proceed in such manner “ as to best ascertain the rights of the parties. ” Hearings are to be public and reported stenographically, and records are to be made for which the Commission created by the Act must provide by regulation. Orders for compensation are to become final in 30 days. When compensation ordered is not paid, a supplementary order may be made declaring the sum in default, and judgment for that come may be entered in a federal court if the ordain “ is in accord with police. ” Review of such judgment may be had as in suits for damages at coarse law. The Act further provides that, if a recompense ordering is “ not in accord with law, ” it may be suspended or set aside, in solid or in contribution, through injunction proceedings against the deputy commissioner who made it ; and besides that beneficiaries of such an rate, or the deputy commissioner, may have it enforced in a federal court if the woo determines that the ordering “ was made and served in accordance with law. ”
Held :
( 1 ) As the claims are governed by the maritime law and within the admiralty jurisdiction, trial by jury is not required by the Seventh Amendment. P. 285 U. S. 45 .
( 2 ) The Act reserves to the admiralty courts full moon world power to pass upon all questions of jurisprudence, including the office to deny effect to an administrative receive which is without evidence or reverse to the indisputable character of the attest, or where the learn was inadequate, unfair, or arbitrary. In this regard it, satisfies due work and attempts no intervention with the judicial exponent in admiralty and maritime cases. Pp. 285 U. S. 46, 285 U. S. 49 .
( 3 ) As regards questions of fact, the Act does not expressly preclude the court, in proceedings to set aside an arrange as not in accordance with law, from making its own examination and determination of facts whenever that is deemed necessity to enforce constitutional rights ; and, as the Act is to be construed to support, rather than to defeat it, no such limitation should be implied. P. 285 U. S. 46 .
( 4 ) apart from built-in rights to be enforced in court, the Act contemplates that, in cases within its horizon, the findings of a deputy commissioner on questions of fact respecting injuries to employees shall be final examination if supported by evidence. P. 285 U. S. 46 .
( 5 ) so circumscribed, the use of the administrative method acting for determining facts ( assuming due notice and opportunity to be heard and that findings are based upon testify ) is reproducible with ascribable process page 285 U. S. 24 and is not an unconstitutional invasion of the discriminative ability. Pp. 285 U. S. 47, 285 U.S. 51 .
( 6 ) The Act requires a public listening, and that all proceedings upon a particular call shall be shown in the record and open to challenge and opposing evidence ; facts known to the deputy commissioner but not put in evidence will not support a recompense regulate. P. 285 U. S. 48 .
( 7 ) The provision that the deputy commissioner shall not be bound by the rules of evidence applicable in a woo or by technical rules of routine is compatible with due action provided the significant rights of the parties be not infringed. Id .
( 8 ) Equipping the admiralty courts with power of injunction, for enforcing the standards of nautical law as defined by the Act, is consistent with Art. III of the Constitution. P. 285 U. S. 49 .
( 9 ) Where the question of fact relates to either of the two fundamental and jurisdictional conditions of the codified, namely, ( a ) occurrence of the injury upon navigable waters of the United States, and ( b ) universe of the relation of master and handmaid, the finding of the deputy commissioner is not conclusive, but the question is determinable de novo by the court on wax pleadings and proof in a suit for an injunction, in which the court is not confined to the evidence taken and criminal record made before the deputy commissioner. The codified is susceptible of this construction, and must be thus construed to avoid unconstitutionality. Pp. 285 U. S. 54, 285 U. S. 62 .
( 10 ) In amending and revising the maritime law, Congress can not reach beyond the constitutional limits of the admiralty and nautical jurisdiction. P. 285 U. S. 55 .
( 11 ) Congress has no general assurance to amend the maritime law indeed as to establish liability without fault in nautical cases regardless of especial circumstances or relations — in this exemplify, the relation of master and handmaid. P. 285 U. S. 56 .
7. As respects the might of Congress to provide for determinations of fact otherwise than through the exercise of the judicial power reposed by the Constitution in the courts of the United States, a clear distinction exists between cases arising between the Government and early persons which, by their nature, do not require discriminative determination ( though they may be susceptible of it ) and cases of private right, that is, of the liability of one person to another under the law as defined. P. 285 U. S. 50 .
8. proper alimony of the federal judicial ability in enforcing constituent restrictions precludes a ability in Congress to substitute for constitutional courts, in which the judicial power of the United foliate 285 U. S. 25 States is vest, an administrative agency for the concluding determination of facts upon which the enforcement of the constituent rights of the citizen count. P. 285 U. S. 56 .
9. A State, on the other hand, may distribute its powers as it sees paroxysm, provided entirely that it acts systematically with the essential demands of due serve and does not transgress restrictions of the Federal Constitution applicable to department of state authority. P. 285 U. S. 57 .
10. The office of Congress to change the procedure of the courts of admiralty would not justify lodging in an administrative policeman final examination decisiveness of facts upon which the built-in rights of individuals are dependent. P. 285 U. S. 61 .
11. In deciding upon the robustness of an Act of Congress, involve must be had to substance, quite than form. P. 285 U. S. 53 .
12. Where the validity of an Act of Congress is drawn in interview or where a serious doubt of its constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that the court will first ascertain whether a construction of the Act is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided. P. 285 U. S. 62 .
13. A announcement in a codified that if any of its provisions, or the application thereof to any persons or circumstances, shall be found unconstitutional, the validity of the remainder of the codified and the applicability of its provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected evidences an intention that no implication from the terms of the Act which would render them invalid should be indulged. P. 285 U. S. 63 .
45 F.2d 66, affirmed .
Certiorari, 283 U.S. 814, to review a decree which affirmed a decree of the District Court, 33 F.2d 137 ; 38 id. 306, enjoining the enforcement of an award of compensation made by a deputy commissioner under the Longshoremen ‘s and Harbor Workers ‘ Compensation Act. page 285 U. S. 36
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the public opinion of the Court .
This suit was brought in the District Court to enjoin the enforcement of an award made by petitioner Crowell, as Deputy Commissioner of the United States Employees ‘ Compensation Commission, in favor of the suer Knudsen and against the respondent Benson. The award was made under the Longshoremen ‘s and Harbor Workers ‘ Compensation Act ( Act of March 4, 1927, c. 509, 44 Stat. 1424, U.S.C. Tit. 33, §§ 901-950 ), and rested upon page 285 U. S. 37 the witness of the deputy commissioner that Knudsen was injured while in the hire of Benson and performing service upon the navigable waters of the United States. The plaintiff alleged that the award was contrary to law for the cause that Kundsen was not at the time of his wound an employee of the plaintiff, and his claim was not “ within the legal power ” of the Deputy Commissioner. An better complaint charged that the Act was unconstitutional upon the grounds that it violated the due serve clause of the Fifth Amendment, the planning of the Seventh Amendment as to trial by jury, that of the Fourth Amendment as to unreasonable search and seizure, and the provisions of Article III with respect to the judicial baron of the United States. The District Judge denied motions to dismiss and granted a hearing de novo upon the facts and the jurisprudence, expressing the impression that the Act would be invalid if not construed to permit such a earshot. The case was transferred to the admiralty docket, answers were filed presenting the return as to the fact of employment, and, the evidence of both parties having been heard, the District Court decided that Knudsen was not in the employment of the petitioner and restrained the enforcement of the award. 33 F.2d 137 ; 38 F.2d 306. The decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals ( 45 F.2d 66 ) and this Court granted writs of certiorari. 283 U.S. 814 .
The motion of the cogency of the Act may be considered in relative to ( 1 ) its provisions defining substantial rights and ( 2 ) its adjective requirements .
first. The Act has two limitations that are fundamental. It deals entirely with recompense in respect of disability or death resulting “ from an wound occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States ” if recovery “ through workmen ‘s compensation proceedings page 285 U. S. 38 may not validly be provided by State jurisprudence, ” and it applies only when the relation of passkey and handmaid exists. § 3. [ Footnote 1 ] “ Injury, ” within the codified, “ means accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, ” and the term “ employer ” means one “ any of whose employees are employed in nautical employment, in solid or in share, ” upon such navigable waters. § 2 ( 2 ) ( 4 ). Employers are made liable for the requital to their employees of order recompense “ regardless of fault as a lawsuit for the injury. ” § 4. The liability is exclusive, unless the employer fails to secure payment of the recompense. § 5. The employer is required to furnish appropriate aesculapian and early treatment. § 7. The compensation for temp or permanent disability, sum or overtone, according to the statutory categorization, and, in case of the death of the employee, is fixed, being based upon official percentages of average weekly wages, and the persons to whom payments are to be made are designated. §§ 6, 8, 9, 10. Employers must secure the requital page 285 U. S. 39 of recompense by procuring policy or by becoming self-insurers in the manner stipulated. § 32. failure to provide such security is a misdemeanor. § 38 ( 33 USCA § 938 ) .
As the Act relates entirely to injuries occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States, it deals with the nautical law, applicable to matters that fall within the admiralty and nautical legal power ( Const. Art. 3, § 2 ; Nogueira v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 281 U. S. 128, 281 U. S. 138 ), and the cosmopolitan authority of the Congress to alter or revise the nautical law which shall prevail throughout the country is beyond dispute. [ Footnote 2 ] In limiting the application of the Act to cases where recovery “ through workmen ‘s compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State jurisprudence, ” the Congress obviously had in view the decisions of this Court with respect to the telescope of the exclusive authority of the national legislature. [ Footnote 3 ] The propriety page 285 U. S. 40 of providing by federal codified for compensation of employees in such cases had been expressly recognized by this Court, [ Footnote 4 ] and, within its sphere, the codified was designed to accomplish the like general determination as the Workmen ‘s Compensation Laws of the states. [ Footnote 5 ] In defining page 285 U. S. 41 meaty rights, the Act provides for convalescence in the absence of fault, classifies disabilities resulting from injuries, fixes the range of compensation in sheath of disability or death, and designates the classes of beneficiaries. In position of federal might to alter and revise the maritime law, there appears to be no room for expostulation on constitutional grounds to the initiation of these rights, unless it can be found in the due action clause of the Fifth Amendment. But it can not be said that either the classifications of the codified or the extent of the recompense provided are excessive. In view of the difficulties which inhere in the ascertainment of actual damages, the Congress was entitled to provide for the payment of amounts which would reasonably approximate the probable damages. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Cram, 228 U. S. 70, 228 U. S. 84 ; compare Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 346, 230 U. S. 348. liability without blame is not unknown to the nautical law, [ Footnote 6 ] and, page 285 U. S. 42 apart from this fact, considerations are applicable to the meaty provisions of this legislation, with obedience to the relative of master and handmaid, like to those which this Court has found sufficient to sustain workmen ‘s compensation laws of the states against objections under the due march article of the Fourteenth Amendment. New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 ; Mountain Timber Company v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219 ; Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U. S. 503 ; Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial Board, 255 U. S. 144 ; Madera Sugar Pine Company v. Industrial Accident Commission, 262 U. S. 499, 262 U. S. 501, 262 U. S. 502 ; Sheehan Company v. Shuler, 265 U. S. 371 ; Dahlstrom Metallic Door Company v. Industrial Board, 284 U.S. 594. See Nogueira v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., above, at pp. 281 U. S. 136, 281 U. S. 137 .
Second. The objections to the procedural requirements of the Act refer to the extent of the administrative agency which it confers. The government of the Act — “ except arsenic otherwise specifically provided ” — was given to the United States Employees ‘ Compensation Commission, [ Footnote 7 ] which was authorized to establish compensation districts, appoint deputy commissioners, and make regulations. §§ 39, 40. Claimants must give written comment to the deputy commissioner and to the employer of the injury or death within thirty days thereafter ; the deputy commissioner may excuse failure to give such poster for satisfactory reasons. § 12. If the employer contests the right to compensation, he is to file notice to that impression. § 14 ( d ). A claim for compensation must be filed with page 285 U. S. 43 the deputy commissioner within a prescribed time period, and it is provided that the deputy commissioner shall have full agency to hear and determine all questions in esteem to the claim. §§ 13, 19 ( a ). Within ten days after the claim is filed, the deputy commissioner, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commission, must notify the employer and any other person who is considered by the deputy commissioner to be an concern party. The deputy commissioner is required to make, or cause to be made, such investigations as he deems to be necessary, and upon application of any matter to party must rate a hearing, upon poster, at which the claimant and the employer may present evidence. Employees claiming compensation must submit to checkup examination. § 19. In conducting investigations and hearings, the deputy commissioner is not bound by coarse law or statutory rules of evidence, or by technical or ball rules or operation, except as the Act provides, but he is to proceed in such manner “ as to best ascertain the rights of the parties. ” § 23 ( a ). He may issue subpoenas, administer oaths, compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, the product of documents or early testify or the lead of depositions, and may do all things conformable to law which may be necessary to enable him effectively to discharge his duties. Proceedings may be brought before the appropriate federal court to punish for misbehavior or contumacy as in case of contempt. § 27. Hearings before the deputy commissioner are to be public and reported stenographically, and the Commission is to provide by rule for the homework of a record. § 23 ( bel ). [ Footnote 8 ] Compensation orders are to be filed in the office of the deputy commissioner, and copies must be sent page 285 U. S. 44 to the claimant and employer. § 19. The Act provides that it shall be presumed, in the absence of solid evidence to the contrary, that the claim comes within the provisions of the Act, that sufficient notice of claim has been given, that the injury was not occasioned entirely by the intoxication of the hurt employee, or by the froward intention of such employee to injure or kill himself or another. § 20. A recompense order becomes effective when filed, and, unless proceedings are instituted to suspend it or set it apart, it becomes final at the termination of thirty days. § 21 ( a ). If there is a change in conditions, the order may be modified or a newly rate made. § 22. In case of nonpayment for thirty days in the payment of compensation, application may be made to the deputy commissioner for a auxiliary club declaring the total in nonpayment. Such an holy order is to be made after investigation, notice, and hearing, as in the shell of claims. Upon filing a certified copy of the auxiliary order with the clerk of the federal court, as stated, judgment is to be entered for the sum declared in nonpayment, if such auxiliary order “ is in accord with law. ” review of the judgment may be had as in civil suits for damages at common law, and the sagacity may be enforced by writ of execution. § 18 .
The Act further provides that, if a compensation order is “ not in accordance with law, ” it
“ may be suspended or set aside, in whole or in part, through injunction proceedings, mandatary or differently, brought by any party in pastime ”
against the deputy commissioner making the order and instituted in the federal District Court for the judicial zone in which the injury occurred. [ Footnote 9 ] Payment is not to be stayed pending such proceedings unless, on hearing after notice, the court allows the persist on evidence page 285 U. S. 45 showing that the employer would otherwise digest irreparable price. § 21 ( bacillus ). Beneficiaries of awards or the deputy commissioner may apply for enforcement to the federal District Court, and, if the court determines that the holy order “ was made and served in accord with law, ” obedience may be compelled by writ of injunction or other proper process. § 21 ( speed of light ). [ Footnote 10 ]
As the claims which are topic to the provisions of the Act are governed by the nautical law as established by the Congress, and are within the admiralty jurisdiction, the expostulation raised by the answering ‘s pleading as to the correct to a trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment is unavailing ( Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441, 46 U. S. 459, 46 U. S. 460 ), and that, under the Fourth Amendment, is neither explain nor recommend. The early objections as to procedure invoke the due work clause and the planning as to the judicial power of the United States .
( 1 ) The controversy under the ascribable process article of the Fifth Amendment relates to the decision of questions of fact. Rulings of the deputy commissioner upon questions of law are without finality. so army for the liberation of rwanda as foliate 285 U. S. 46 the latter are concerned, wide opportunity is afforded for their decision by the union courts through proceedings to suspend or to set aside a recompense ordering, 21 ( b-complex vitamin ), by the necessity that sagacity is to be entered on a auxiliary order declaring default entirely in case the order follows the police ( § 18 ), and by the provision that the consequence of injunction or other process in a proceeding by a benefactive role to compel obedience to a compensation holy order is dependent upon a determination by the court that the order was legally made and served. § 21 ( hundred ). furthermore, the codified contains no express limitation attempting to preclude the motor hotel, in proceedings to set aside an regulate as not in accord with police, from making its own examination and determination of facts whenever that is deemed to be necessity to enforce a built-in right properly asserted. See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 253 U. S. 289 ; Ng Fung Ho. v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 259 U. S. 284, 259 U. S. 285 ; Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U. S. 43, 262 U. S. 50 ; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 280 U. S. 443, 280 U. S. 444 ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 283 U. S. 600. As the codified is to be construed so as to support, quite than to defeat it, no such restriction is to be implied. Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 264 U. S. 390 .
apart from cases involving constitutional rights to be appropriately enforced by proceedings in woo, there can be no doubt that the Act contemplates that as to questions of fact, arising with respect to injuries to employees within the horizon of the Act, the findings of the deputy commissioner, supported by tell and within the scope of his authority, shall be final examination. To hold differently would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, adept, and cheap method acting for dealing with a classify of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examen and determination by an administrative agency particularly assigned to that job. page 285 U. S. 47 The object is to secure within the order limits of the employer ‘s liability an immediate probe and a fathom practical opinion, and the efficacy of the plan depends upon the finality of the determinations of fact with regard to the circumstances, nature, extent, and consequences of the employee ‘s injuries and the sum of recompense that should be awarded. And this finality may besides be regarded as extending to the decision of the question of fact whether the injury
“ was occasioned entirely by the poisoning of the employee or by the willful purpose of the employee to injure or kill himself or another. ”
While the exclusion of compensation in such cases is found in what are called “ coverage ” provisions of the Act ( § 3 ), the interview of fact calm belongs to the chew over act of administration, for the case is one of use within the telescope of the Act, and the cause of the injury sustained by the employee american samoa well as its character and effect must be ascertained in applying the provisions for compensation. The use of the administrative method for these purposes, assuming due notification, proper opportunity to be heard, and that findings are based upon evidence, falls easily within the principle of the decisions sustaining exchangeable procedure against objections under the ascribable march clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. [ Footnote 11 ]
The codified provides for notice and listen, and an award made without proper notice, or desirable opportunity page 285 U. S. 48 to be heard, may be attacked and set aside as without robustness. The protest is made that, as the deputy commissioner is authorized to prosecute such inquiries as he may consider necessary, the award may be based wholly or partially upon an ex-husband parte probe and upon stranger sources of information, and that the hear may be merely a formality. The legislative act, however, contemplates a public listen, and regulations are to require “ a record of the hearings and early proceedings before the deputy commissioners. ” § 23 ( b ). This implies that all proceedings by the deputy commissioner upon a detail claim shall be appropriately set forth, and that whatever facts he may ascertain and their sources shall be shown in the commemorate and be open to challenge and opposing testify. Facts conceivably known to the deputy commissioner, but not put in evidence then as to permit scrutiny and contest, will not support a compensation order. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 227 U. S. 93 ; The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 264 U. S. 263 ; United States v. Abilene & Southern Railway Co., 265 U. S. 274, 265 U. S. 288. An award not supported by attest in the record is not in accord with police. But the fact that the deputy commissioner is not bound by the rules of testify which would be applicable to trials in court or by technical rules of procedure ( § 23 ( a ) ), does not invalidate the continue, provided solid rights of the parties are not infringed. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 194 U. S. 44 ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., above ; Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 253 U. S. 117, 253 U. S. 131 ; United States v. Abilene & Southern Railway Co., above ; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, above, at phosphorus. 280 U. S. 442 .
( 2 ) The competition based upon the discriminative ability of the United States, as extended “ to all Cases of admiralty page 285 U. S. 49 and nautical legal power ” ( Const. Art. III ), presents a distinct question. In Murray ‘s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 59 U. S. 284, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Curtis, said :
“ To avoid misconstrual upon so grave a submit, we think it proper to state that we do not consider congress can either recall from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subjugate of a courtship at the common police, or in equity, or admiralty ; nor, on the early hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which, from its nature, is not a topic for judicial determination. ”
The question in the instant case, in this expression, can be deemed to relate alone to determinations of fact. The booking of legal questions is to the same motor hotel that has jurisdiction in admiralty, and the mere fact that the court is not described as such is unimportant. Nor is the provision for injunction proceedings, § 21 ( b ), outdoors to protest. The Congress was at shore leave to draw upon another arrangement of routine to equip the court with suitable and adequate means for enforcing the standards of the maritime police as defined by the Act. The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443, 53 U. S. 459, 53 U. S. 460. Compare Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, above, at p. 264 U. S. 388. By codified and rules, courts of admiralty may be empowered to grant injunctions, as in the lawsuit of restriction of liability proceedings. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 273 U. S. 207, 273 U. S. 218. See besides Marine Transit Corporation v. Dreyfus, 284 U. S. 263, decided January 4, 1932. The Congress did not attempt to define questions of law, and the generalization of the description leaves no doubt of the intention to reserve to the Federal court fully authority to pass upon all matters which this Court had held to fall within that category. There is thus no try to interfere with, but rather provision is made to facilitate, the exercise by the court of its legal power page 285 U. S. 50 to deny consequence to any administrative line up which is without evidence, or “ reverse to the incontestable character of the evidence, ” or where the hear is “ inadequate, ” or “ unfair, ” or arbitrary in any respect. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville R. Co., above, at pp. 227 U. S. 91, 227 U. S. 92 ; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, above .
As to determinations of fact, the distinction is at once apparent between cases of secret correctly and those which arise between the government and persons subject to its assurance in joining with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments. The Court referred to this eminence in Murray ‘s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., above, pointing out that
“ there are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper. ”
thus the Congress, in exercising the powers confided to it, may establish “ legislative ” courts ( as distinguished from “ constitutional courts in which the discriminative power conferred by the Constitution can be deposited ” ) which are to form part of the government of territories or of the District of Columbia, [ Footnote 12 ] or to serve as extra tribunals
“ to examine and determine assorted matters, arising between the government and others, which, from their nature, do not require discriminative determination and however are susceptible of it. ”
But
“ the mode of determining matters of this class is completely within congressional control. Congress may reserve to itself the office to decide, may delegate that power to executive officers, or may commit it to judicial tribunals. ”
Ex page 285 U. S. 51 parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U. S. 438, 279 U. S. 451. Familiar illustrations of administrative agencies created for the decision of such matters are found in joining with the practice of the congressional exponent as to interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, populace health, the facilities of the station office, pensions, and payments to veterans. [ Footnote 13 ]
The present case does not fall within the categories good described, but is one of secret right, that is, of the liability of one person to another under the law as defined. But, in cases of that kind, there is no necessity that, in decree to maintain the necessity attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by judges. On the coarse law side of the federal courts, the care of juries is not only deem appropriate, but is required by the Constitution itself. In cases of equity and admiralty, it is historic practice to call to the aid of the courts, without the consent of the parties, masters, and commissioners or assessors, to pass upon certain classes of questions, as, for exercise, to take and state an account or to find the sum of damages. While the reports of masters and commissioners in such cases are basically of an advisory nature, it has not been the practice to disturb their findings when they are properly based upon tell, in the absence of errors of jurisprudence, [ Footnote 14 ] page 285 U. S. 52 and the parties have no right to demand that the woo shall redetermine the facts thus found. In admiralty, juries were anciently in manipulation not lone in condemnable cases, but apparently in civil cases besides. [ Footnote 15 ] The Act of February 26, 1845 ( c. 20, 5 Stat. 726 ), purporting to extend the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal District Courts to certain cases arising on the Great Lakes, gave the right to “ trial by jury of all facts put in issue in such suits, where either party shall require it. ” After the decision in the character of The Genesee Chief, above, holding that the federal District Courts possessed cosmopolitan legal power in admiralty over the lakes, and navigable waters connecting them, under the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 ( chapter 20, § 9, 1 Stat. pp. 76, 77 ), this Court regarded the Enabling Act of 1845 as “ disused and of no effect, with the exception of the article which gives to either party the right of trial by jury when requested. ” The Eagle, 8 Wall. 15, 75 U. S. 25. And this provision, the woo said, was “ rather a mood of exercising jurisdiction than any solid part of it. ” See R.S. 566, U.S.C., Tit. 28, § 770. [ Footnote 16 ] Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the impression of the court in the case of The Genesee Chief, above, referring to this necessity, thus broadly stated the authority of Congress to change the routine in courts of admiralty : page 285 U. S. 53
“ The office of Congress to change the mode of proceeding in this respect in its courts of admiralty will, we suppose, barely be questioned. The Constitution declares that the judicial exponent of the United States shall extend to ‘all cases of admiralty and maritime legal power. ‘ But it does not direct that the court shall proceed according to ancient and established forms, or shall adopt any other imprint or manner of commit. The accord defines the subjects to which the jurisdiction may be extended by Congress. But the extent of the power, deoxyadenosine monophosphate well as the manner of go in which that legal power is to be exercised, like the power and commit in all the other courts of the United States, are subject to the regulation of Congress, except where that exponent is limited by the terms of the Constitution, or by necessary implication from its linguistic process. In admiralty and nautical cases, there is no such limitation as to the mode of proceed, and Congress may therefore, in cases of that description, give either party right field of trial by jury, or modify the practice of the motor hotel in any other respect that it deems more conducive to the administration of department of justice. ”
It may besides be noted that while, on an invoke in admiralty cases, “ the facts, equally well as the law, would be subjected to review and retrial, ” this Court has recognized the power of the Congress “ to limit the effect of an appeal to a review of the jurisprudence as applicable to facts last determined below. ” The Francis Wright, 105 U. S. 381, 105 U. S. 386 ; The Connemara, 108 U. S. 352, 108 U. S. 359. Compare Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 533, 272 U. S. 536, 272 U. S. 537 .
In deciding whether the Congress, in enacting the codified under review, has exceeded the limits of its authority to prescribe procedure in cases of injury upon navigable waters, respect must be had, as in early cases where constituent limits are invoked, not to mere matters of form, but to the meaning of what is required. page 285 U. S. 54 The codified has a limited lotion, being confined to the relative of chief and handmaid, and the method acting of determining the questions of fact, which arise in the routine of making compensation awards to employees under the Act, is necessary to its effective enforcement. The Act itself, where it applies, establishes the bill of the employer ‘s liability, therefore leaving open for determination the questions of fact as to the circumstances, nature, extent, and consequences of the injuries sustained by the employee for which compensation is to be made in accordance with the appointed standards. Findings of fact by the deputy commissioner upon such questions are close analogous to the findings of the sum of damages that are made according to familiar practice by commissioners or assessors, and the reservation of full moon authority to the court to deal with matters of law provides for the appropriate exercise of the discriminative function in this classify of cases. For the purposes stated, we are unable to find any constitutional obstacle to the action of the Congress in availing itself of a method shown by have to be substantive in regulate to apply its standards to the thousands of cases involved, therefore relieving the courts of a most serious charge while preserving their complete authority to insure the proper application of the law .
( 3 ) What has been said frankincense army for the liberation of rwanda relates to the decision of claims of employees within the horizon of the Act. A different question is presented where the determinations of fact are fundamental or “ jurisdictional ” [ Footnote 17 ] in the common sense that their universe is a condition precedent to the operation of the statutory dodge. These fundamental page 285 U. S. 55 requirements are that the injury occurs upon the navigable waters of the United States, and that the relative of dominate and servant exists. These conditions are indispensable to the application of the codified not entirely because the Congress has sol provided explicitly ( § 3 ), but besides because the exponent of the Congress to enact the legislation turns upon the universe of these conditions .
In amending and revising the maritime law, [ Footnote 18 ] the Congress can not reach beyond the constituent limits which are built-in in the admiralty and maritime legal power. [ Footnote 19 ] Unless the injuries to which the Act relates occur upon the navigable waters of the United States, they fall outside that jurisdiction. [ Footnote 20 ] not only is navigability itself a interrogate of fact, as waters that are navigable in fact are navigable in law, [ Footnote 21 ] but, where navigability is not in quarrel, the vicinity of the wound, that is, whether it has occurred upon the navigable waters of the United States, determines the universe of the congressional might to create the liability prescribed by the legislative act. [ Footnote 22 ] Again, it page 285 U. S. 56 can not be maintained that the Congress has any general authority to amend the nautical police so as to establish liability without fault in maritime cases, careless of particular circumstances or relations. It is unnecessary to consider what circumstances or relations might permit the imposition of such a indebtedness by amendment of the maritime jurisprudence, but it is manifest that some suitable choice would be required. In the present exemplify, the Congress has imposed indebtedness without fault only where the relation back of dominate and handmaid exists in maritime employment, and, while we hold that the Congress could do this, the fact of that relation is the pivot of the legislative act, and, in the absence of any other justification, underlies the constitutionality of this portrayal. If the person injured was not an employee of the person sought to be held, or if the injury did not occur upon the navigable waters of the United States, there is no background for an assertion that the person against whom the proceed was directed could constitutionally be subjected, in the absence of fault upon his separate, to the liability which the legislative act creates .
In relation to these basic facts, the interrogate is not the ordinary one as to the propriety of provision for administrative determinations. Nor have we just the doubt of due process in relation to notice and listening. It is, rather, a question of the allow sustenance of the union discriminative exponent in requiring the honoring of constitutional restrictions. It is the question whether the Congress may substitute for constituent courts, in which the judicial world power of the United States is vested, an administrative representation — in this example, a individual deputy commissioner [ Footnote 23 ] — for the final examination decision of the universe of the facts upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen count. The recognition of page 285 U. S. 57 the utility and convenience of administrative agencies for the investigation and determination of facts within their proper province, and the accompaniment of their authorized action, does not require the conclusion that there is no limitation of their use, and that the Congress could wholly oust the courts of all determinations of fact by vesting the authority to make them with finality in its own instrumentalities or in the executive department. That would be to sap the discriminative power as it exists under the federal Constitution, and to establish a government of a bureaucratic character foreigner to our system wherever fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law .
In this view of the doubt, the irrelevance of department of state statutes and citations from state of matter courts as to the distribution of state powers is apparent. A state of matter may distribute its powers as it sees burst, provided only that it acts systematically with the necessity demands of due serve and does not transgress those restrictions of the Federal Constitution which are applicable to state of matter authority. [ Footnote 24 ] In relative to the federal government, we have already noted the inaptness to the portray inquiry of decisions with respect to determinations of fact, upon evidence and within the authority conferred, made by administrative agencies which have been created to aid in the performance of governmental functions, and where the mode of decision is within the control of the Congress, as, for example, in the proceedings of the Land Office pursuant to provisions for the inclination of public lands, of the authorities of the Post Office in relation to postal privileges, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue with respect to taxes, and of the Labor Department as to the foliate 285 U. S. 58 entrance fee and exile of aliens. Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, above. [ Footnote 25 ] Similar considerations apply to decisions with respect to determinations of fact by boards and commissions created by the Congress to assist it in its legislative process in governing assorted transactions subject to its authority, as, for exercise, the rates and practices of interstate carriers, the legislature therefore being able to apply its standards to a host of instances which it is impracticable to consider and legislate upon directly and the action being none the less legislative in character because taken through a subordinate body. [ Footnote 26 ] And where administrative bodies have been appropriately created to meet the exigencies of sealed classes of cases and their action is of a judicial character, the interview of the finality of their administrative findings of fact by and large arises where the facts are clearly not jurisdictional [ Footnote 27 ] and the setting of inspection as to such facts has been determined by the applicable legislation. none of the decisions of this classify touch the question which is presented where the facts involved are jurisdictional, [ Footnote 28 ] or where the question concerns the proper exercise of the judicial might of the United States in enforcing constitutional limitations .
even where the subject lies within the general agency of the Congress, the propriety of a challenge by judicial proceedings of the determinations of fact deemed to be jurisdictional, as underlying the assurance of administrator officers, has been recognized. When proceedings are taken against a person under the military police, and enlistment is denied, the consequence has been tried and determined de novo upon habeas corpus. In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, 137 U. S. 154, page 285 U. S. 59 137 U. S. 155. See besides In rhenium Morrissey, 137 U. S. 157, 137 U. S. 158 ; Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U. S. 11, 155 U. S. 20. While, in the administration of the public kingdom system, questions of fact are for the consideration and judgment of the Land Department and its decision of such questions is conclusive, it is equally true that, if lands
“ never were public property, or had previously been disposed of, or if Congress had made no provision for their sale, or had reserved them, the department would have no legal power to transfer them. ”
This Court has held that
“ matters of this kind, disclosing a wish of jurisdiction, may be considered by a court of jurisprudence. In such cases, the objection to the apparent reaches beyond the action of the special court, and goes to the universe of a subject upon which it was competent to act. ”
Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 104 U. S. 641. In such a lawsuit, the invalidity of the patent may be shown in a collateral proceed. Polk v. Wendell, 9 Cranch. 87 ; Patterson v. Winn, 11 Wheat. 380 ; Minter v. Crommelin, 18 How. 87 ; Morton v. Nebraska, 21 Wall 660, 88 U. S. 675 ; baronial v. Union River Logging Railroad, 147 U. S. 165, 147 U. S. 174. The wonder whether a issue is a “ book ” or a “ periodic ” has been reviewed upon the testify received in a suit bring to restrain the Postmaster General from acting beyond his authority in excluding the publication from baby buggy as second class mail matter. Hitchcock v. Smith, 34 App. D. C. 521, 530-533 ; id., 266 U.S. 54, 59 [ argumentation of advocate — omitted ]. [ Footnote 29 ] foliate 285 U. S. 60
In cases brought to enforce constitutional rights, the discriminative baron of the United States inevitably extends to the independent determination of all questions, both of fact and law, necessity to the performance of that supreme serve. The encase of confiscation is demonstrative, the ultimate conclusion about constantly depending upon the decisions of questions of fact. This court has held the owner to be entitled to
“ a fairly opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial court for decision upon its own autonomous opinion as to both jurisprudence and facts. ”
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, above. See besides Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U. S. 43, 262 U. S. 50 ; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, above ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 283 U. S. 600. jurisdiction in the administrator to order deportation exists only if the person arrested is an alien, and while, if there were legal power, the findings of fact of the executive department would be conclusive, the claim of citizenship “ is therefore a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact, ” both in the statutory and the constitutional sense, and a writ of habeas principal will issue “ to determine the condition. ” Persons claiming to be citizens of the United States “ are entitled to a judicial determination of their claims, ” said this Court in Ng Fung Ho v. White, above, at p. 259 U. S. 285, and, in that sheath, the cause was remanded to the Federal District Court “ for test in that woo of the question of citizenship. ”
In the present exemplify, the argument that the Congress has constituted the deputy commissioner a factfinding court is futile, as the contention makes the indefensible assumption that the constitutional courts may be page 285 U. S. 61 deprived in all cases of the decision of facts upon evidence even though a built-in properly may be involved. mention is besides made to the power of the Congress to change the procedure in courts of admiralty, a power to which we have alluded in dealing with the officiate of the deputy commissioner in passing upon the compensation claims of employees. But when fundamental rights are in motion, this Court has repeatedly emphasized “ the difference in security of judicial over administrative action. ” Ng Fung Ho v. White, above. even where issues of fact are tried by juries in the federal courts, such trials are under the constant supervision of the trial evaluate. In a trial by jury in a federal motor hotel, the judge is “ not a bare moderator, ” but “ is the governor of the trial ” for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct angstrom well as of determining questions of law. Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U. S. 91, 283 U. S. 95. In the federal courts, test by jury
“ is a trial by a jury of 12 men in the presence and under the supervision of a judge empowered to instruct them on the law and to advise them on the facts, and ( except on acquittal of a criminal charge ) to set aside their verdict, if, in his opinion, it is against the law or the testify. ”
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 1 174 U. S. 3, 174 U. S. 14. Where testimony in an fairness lawsuit is not taken before the court, the continue is still constantly subject to the woo ‘s operate. And while the commit of obtaining the aid of masters in chancery and commissioners in admiralty may be regarded, as we have pointed out, as furnishing a certain analogy in relation back to the convention authority of the deputy commissioner in making what is virtually an assessment of damages, the proceedings of such masters and commissioners are always subject to the steering of the court, and their reports are basically advisory, a distinction of controlling importance when questions of a fundamental character are in publish. page 285 U. S. 62
When the robustness of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a unplayful doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal number rationale that this Court will beginning ascertain whether a construction of the codified is reasonably possible by which the motion may be avoided. [ Footnote 30 ] We are of the public opinion that such a structure is permissible, and should be adopted in the clamant case. The Congress has not expressly provided that the determinations by the deputy commissioner of the fundamental or jurisdictional facts as to the vicinity of the injury and the being of the sexual intercourse of maestro and servant shall be final. The finality of such determinations of the deputy commissioner is predicated primarily upon the planning, § 19 ( a ), that he “ shall have fully power and authority to hear and determine all questions in respect of such claim. ” But “ such claim ” is the claim for compensation under the Act, and, by its denotative provisions, is that of an “ employee, ” as defined in the Act, against his “ employer. ” The fact of use is an all-important condition precedent to the right to make the claim. The early provision upon which the argument rests is that which authorizes the federal motor hotel to set aside a compensation decree if it is “ not in accord with law. ” § 21 ( bel ). In the absence of any planning as to the finality of the determination by the deputy commissioner of the jurisdictional fact of employment, the codified is clear to the construction that the court, in determining whether a recompense holy order is in accordance with law, may determine the fact of employment which underlies the operation of the legislative act. And, to remove the question as to robustness, we think that the legislative act should be so construed. Further, the Act expressly requires that, foliate 285 U. S. 63 if any of its provisions is found to be unconstitutional, “ or the applicability thereof to any person or circumstances ” is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and “ the applicability of such provision to other persons and circumstances ” shall not be affected. § 50. We think that this requirement clearly evidences the intention of the Congress not only that an express provision found to be unconstitutional should be disregarded without disturbing the remainder of the codified, but besides that any implication from the terms of the Act which would render them invalid should not be indulged. This provision besides gives assurance that there is no irreverence of the function of the Congress in sustaining the determinations of fact of the deputy commissioner where he acts within his agency in passing upon compensation claims while denying finality to his conclusions as to the jurisdictional facts upon which the valid application of the codified depends .
Assuming that the federal woo may determine for itself the universe of these fundamental or jurisdictional facts, we come to the question : upon what record is the decision to be made ? There is no provision of the codified which seeks to confine the court in such a sheath to the phonograph record before the deputy commissioner or to the attest which he has taken. The redress which the legislative act makes available is not by an solicitation or by a writ of certiorari for a review of his decision upon the record before him. The rectify is “ through injunction proceedings mandate or differently. ” § 21 ( b ). The interview in the instant encase is not whether the deputy commissioner has acted improperly or randomly as shown by the record of his proceedings in the path of administration in cases contemplated by the legislative act, but whether he has acted in a lawsuit to which the codified is inapplicable. By providing for injunction proceedings, the Congress obviously contemplated a courtship as in equity, and, in such page 285 U. S. 64 a suit, the plaintiff would have full opportunity to plead and prove either that the injury did not occur upon the navigable waters of the United States or that the relation back of master and servant did not exist, and hence that the case lay outside the horizon of the codified. As the question is one of the constitutional authority of the deputy commissioner as an administrative representation, the court is under no obligation to give system of weights to his proceedings pending the determination of that question. If the court finds that the facts existed which gave the deputy commissioner jurisdiction to pass upon the call for recompense, the injunction will be denied insofar as these fundamental questions are concerned ; if, on the reverse, the court is satisfied that the deputy commissioner had no legal power of the proceedings before him, that determination will deprive them of their effectiveness for any determination. We think that the necessity independence of the exercise of the discriminative power of the United States in the enforcement of built-in rights requires that the federal motor hotel should determine such an issue upon its own record and the facts elicited before it .
The controversy is made that there are early facts besides the vicinity of the injury and the fact of employment which discipline the action of the deputy commissioner. That competition in any aspect could not avail to change the result in the instantaneous sheath. But we think that there is a clear differentiation between cases where the vicinity of the injury takes the case out of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, or where the fact of employment being absent there is lacking under this legislative act any footing for the imposition of liability without fault, and those cases which fall within the admiralty and nautical legal power and where the relation of maestro and handmaid in nautical employment exists. It is in the latter field that the provisions for compensation apply, and that, for the reasons stated in the earlier separate of this opinion, the determination foliate 285 U. S. 65 of the facts relating to the circumstances of the injuries received, angstrom well as their nature and consequences, may appropriately be subjected to the scheme of administration for which the Act provides .
It can not be regarded as an deterioration of the mean efficiency of an administrative means that it is confined to its proper sphere, but it may be observed that the instances which permit of a challenge to the application of the legislative act, upon the grounds we have stated, appear to be few. Out of the many thousands of cases which have been brought before the deputy commissioners throughout the area, a review by the courts has been sought in only a small issue, [ Footnote 31 ] and an inconsiderable proportion of these appear to have involved the question whether the injury occurred within the maritime legal power or whether the relation of employment existed .
We are of the opinion that the District Court did not err in permitting a test de novo on the issue of employment. Upon that publish, the witnesses who had testified before the deputy commissioner and other witnesses were heard by the District Court. The writ of certiorari was not granted to review the detail facts, but to pass upon the question of principle. With regard to the facts, the two courts below are in treaty, and we find no reason to disturb their decisiveness .
Decree affirmed .
* together with No. 20, Crowell, Deputy Commissioner, and Knudsen v. Benson .
[ Footnote 1 ]
Section three of the Act as to “ Coverage ” provides :
“ Sec. 3. ( a ) compensation shall be account payable under this Act in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States ( including any dry dock ) and if convalescence for the disability or death through workmen ‘s compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law. No recompense shall be account payable in deference of the disability or death of — ”
“ ( 1 ) A master or member of a gang of any vessel nor any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any humble vessel under eighteen tons internet ; or ”
“ ( 2 ) An officer or employee of the United States or any means thereof or of any State or extraneous government, or of any political subdivision thereof. ”
“ ( boron ) No compensation shall be collectible if the injury was occasioned entirely by the poisoning of the employee or by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another. ”
[ Footnote 2 ]
Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441, 46 U. S. 457, 46 U. S. 458 ; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 88 U. S. 577 ; Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527, 130 U. S. 556, 130 U. S. 557 ; In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1, 14 U. S. 14 ; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398, 207 U. S. 404 ; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 234 U. S. 62 ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 244 U. S. 214, 244 U. S. 215 ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 253 U. S. 160 ; State of Washington v. Dawson, 264 U. S. 219, 264 U. S. 227, 264 U. S. 228 ; Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 264 U. S. 386, 264 U. S. 38 .
significant illustrations of the exercise of this authority are the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 ( 9 Stat. 635 ; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 273 U. S. 207, 273 U. S. 213 -215 ) ; the Seamen ‘s Act of 1915 ( 38 Stat. 1185 ; Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 247 U. S. 372, 247 U. S. 381, 247 U. S. 384 ) ; the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 ( 41 Stat. 1000 ; Morse Drydock & Repair Co. v. Northern Star, 271 U. S. 552, 271 U. S. 555, 271 U. S. 556 ) ; and the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 ( 41 Stat. 988 ), incorporating, in relation back to seamen, the Federal Employers ‘ Liability Act into the nautical law of the United States. 41 Stat. 1007 ; Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, above ; Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 271 U. S. 35 ; Panama R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U. S. 557, 271 U. S. 559, 271 U. S. 560 ; Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U. S. 142, 278 U. S. 147. See U.S.C., titles 33 and 46 .
[ Footnote 3 ]
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 ; Washington v. Dawson, 264 U. S. 219 ; Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U. S. 449. For decisions since the passage of the Act in interrogate, see Messel v. Foundation Co., 274 U. S. 427 ; Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U. S. 142 ; London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Industrial Commission, 279 U. S. 109, 279 U. S. 125 ; Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U. S. 222 .
The application of submit Workmen ‘s Compensation Acts has been sustained where the work of the employee has been deemed to have no direct relative to seafaring or commerce, and the mathematical process of the local law “ would work no material bias to the essential features of the general maritime law. ” Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, 257 U. S. 242 ; Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, 257 U. S. 477 ; Millers ‘ Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U. S. 59, 270 U. S. 64 ; Sultan Railway & Timber Co. v. Department of Labor, 277 U. S. 135, 277 U. S. 137 ; Baizley Iron Works v. Span, above, at pp. 281 U. S. 230, 281 U. S. 231. See besides Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109 .
[ Footnote 4 ]
Washington v. Dawson, 264 U. S. 219, 264 U. S. 227, where the court said :
“ Without doubt, Congress has power to alter, amend, or revise the maritime law by statutes of general application embodying its will and opinion. This might, we think, would permit act of a general Employers ‘ Liability Law or general provisions for compensating hurt employees, but it may not be delegated to the respective states. ”
[ Footnote 5 ]
The Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, in reporting upon the proposed measure, said ( Sen.Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 16 ) :
“ The committee deems it unnecessary to comment upon the advanced change in the relative between employers and employees establishing systems of recompense as distinguished from liability. about every state in the Union has a recompense jurisprudence through which employees are compensated for injuries occurring in the course of their employment without respect to negligence on the depart of the employer or conducive negligence on the part of the employee. If longshoremen could avail themselves of the benefits of State compensation laws, there would be no juncture for this legislation ; but, unfortunately, they are excluded from these laws by cause of the character of their employment ; and they are not alone eject, but the Supreme Court has more than once held that Federal legislation can not, constitutionally, be enacted that will apply State laws to this occupation. ( Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 ; Washington v. Dawson, 264 U. S. 219. ) ”
The House Committee, in its report, made the adopt statement ( House Rep. No. 1767, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 20 ) :
“ The principle of workmen ‘s compensation has become then securely established that simple judge would seem to require that this classify of maritime workers should be included in this legislation. .. . ”
“ The placard as amended, consequently, will enable Congress to discharge its debt instrument to the nautical workers placed under their jurisdiction by the Constitution of the United States by providing for them a police whereby they may receive the benefits of workmen ‘s compensation and frankincense afford them the like remedies that have been provided by legislation for those killed or injured in the course of their employment in about every state in the Union. ”
[ Footnote 6 ]
See, e.g., The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 189 U. S. 169 ; The Iroquois, 194 U. S. 240, 194 U. S. 241, 194 U. S. 242. In Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Zernecke, 183 U. S. 582, 183 U. S. 586, the Court said :
“ Our jurisprudence affords examples of legal liability without demerit, and the privation of property without fault being attributable to its owner. The law of deodands was such an case. The personification of the ship in admiralty law is another. ”
See Holmes, “ The Common Law, ” pp. 26-29 ; The China, 7 Wall. 53, 74 U. S. 67, 74 U. S. 68 ; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 93 U. S. 105 -108 ; Homer Ramsdell Transp. Co. v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 182 U. S. 406, 182 U. S. 413, 182 U. S. 414. As to the basis of general average contribution, see Ralli v. Troop, 157 U. S. 386, 157 U. S. 394, 157 U. S. 395 .
[ Footnote 7 ]
This Commission was created by the Act of September 7, 1916, c. 458, § 28, 39 Stat. 748, U.S.C., Tit. 5, § 778 .
[ Footnote 8 ]
In the regulations promulgated by the Commission in the form of instructions to deputy commissioners, provision was made for findings of fact. Report, United States Employees ‘ Compensation Commission, for fiscal year ending June 30, 1930, p. 64. See Howard v. Monahan, 33 F.2d 220 .
[ Footnote 9 ]
In the District of Columbia, the proceedings are to be instituted in the Supreme Court of the District .
[ Footnote 10 ]
The United States Employees ‘ Compensation Commission estimates that the number of employees who at times are engaged in employments covered by the Act is in overindulgence of 300,000. reputation for fiscal year ending June 30, 1931, p. 66. The Commission states that 138,788 cases have been closed during the four years that the law has been in operation. Id., p. 69. During the end fiscal year, the injuries reported under the Act numbered 28,861, of which 156 were “ fatal ” cases. The total act of cases disposed of during that class, including those bring forth from the preceding years, was 30,489, of which there were 13,261 “ nonfatal ” cases which caused no personnel casualty of time, and 4,067 of such cases in which the duration of disability did not exceed seven days. recompense payments were completed in 11,776 cases. Hearings held by deputy commissioners during the fiscal year number 1,217, of which 905 involved recompense payments. At the end of the fiscal class, there were 102 cases pending in federal District Courts wherein the plaintiffs asked review of recompense orders. Id., 68-70 .
[ Footnote 11 ]
Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685, 166 U. S. 695 ; Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 258 U. S. 147 ; Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S. 568, 260 U. S. 580 ; Silberschein v. United States, 266 U. S. 221, 266 U. S. 225 ; Virginian Railway Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658, 272 U. S. 663 ; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 280 U. S. 442 ; International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U. S. 291, 280 U. S. 297 ; Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 281 U. S. 369 ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 281 U. S. 600. See besides Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Glidden, 284 U. S. 151 ; New York Central R. Co. v. White, above, at pp. 243 U. S. 194, 243 U. S. 207, 243 U. S. 208 ; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, above, at phosphorus. 343 U. S. 233 .
[ Footnote 12 ]
American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 26 U. S. 546 ; Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 261 U. S. 442 -444 ; Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U. S. 693, 272 U. S. 700 .
[ Footnote 13 ]
Virginian Railway Co. v. United States, above ; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, above ; International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, above ; Phillips v. Commissioner, above ; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 198 U. S. 263 ; United States v. Babcock, 250 U. S. 328, 250 U. S. 331 ; Burfenning v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 163 U. S. 321, 163 U. S. 323 ; Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 104 U. S. 109 ; Houston v. St. Louis Packing Co., 249 U. S. 479, 249 U. S. 484 ; Passavant v. United States, 148 U. S. 214, 148 U. S. 219 ; Silberschein v. United States, 266 U. S. 221, 266 U. S. 225 .
[ Footnote 14 ]
As to masters in chancery, see Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U. S. 136, 125 U. S. 149, 125 U. S. 150 ; Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617, 128 U. S. 666, 128 U. S. 667 ; Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U. S. 512, 129 U. S. 523, 129 U. S. 524 ; Davis v. Schwartz, 155 U. S. 631, 155 U. S. 636 .
As to commissioners in admiralty, see The Cayuga ( C.C.A. 6th ), 59 F. 483, 488 ; La Bourgogne ( C.C.A. 2d ), 144 F. 781, 782, 783 ; The North Star ( C.C.A. 2d ), 151 F. 168, 177 ; Western Transit Co. v. Davidson S.S. Co. ( C.C.A. 6th ), 212 F. 696, 701 ; P. Sanford Ross, Inc. v. Public Service Corp. ( C.C.A. 3d ), 42 F.2d 79, 80 .
[ Footnote 15 ]
4 Chr. Robinson ‘s Admiralty Reports, p. 74, note ; Black Book of the Admiralty ( Twiss ‘ Ed. ) vol. 1, pp. 49, 53, 245 ; 1 Abbott on Shipping ( 5th Am. Ed. ) pp. 283, 284 ; 1 Benedict ‘s Admiralty ( 5th Ed. ) p. 304, note .
[ Footnote 16 ]
As to the effect of the verdict of the jury in such cases, see The western States, 159 F. 354, 358, 359 ; Sweeting v. The western States, 210 U.S. 433 ; The Nyack, 199 F. 383, 389 ; 1 Benedict ‘s Admiralty ( 5th Ed. ) p. 305 .
[ Footnote 17 ]
The condition “ jurisdictional, ” although frequently used, suggests analogies which are not complete when the citation is to administrative officials or bodies. See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Humboldt Steamship Co., 224 U. S. 474, 224 U. S. 484. In relative to administrative agencies, the wonder in a given case is whether it falls within the setting of the authority validly conferred .
[ Footnote 18 ]
This ability is distinct from the authority to regulate interstate or extraneous commerce, and is not limited to cases arising in that commerce. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 53 U. S. 452 ; The Commerce, 1 Black 574, 66 U. S. 578, 66 U. S. 579 ; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 74 U. S. 640, 74 U. S. 641 ; Ex parte Boyer, 109 U. S. 629, 109 U. S. 632 ; In rhenium Garnett, 141 U. S. 1, 141 U. S. 15 ; London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Industrial Commission, 279 U. S. 109, 279 U. S. 124 .
[ Footnote 19 ]
The Belfast, above ; Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, above ; The Genesee Chief, above, at p. 459 of 12 How., 13 L. Ed. 1058 ; 1 Benedict ‘s Admiralty ( 5th Ed. ) § 32, p. 47.

[ Footnote 20 ]
Cleveland Terminal & V. R. Co. v. Cleveland Steamship Co., 208 U. S. 316 ; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, above, at pp. 234 U. S. 59, 234 U. S. 60 ; Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Co., 259 U. S. 263, 259 U. S. 273 ; Washington v. Dawson, above, at pp. 264 U. S. 227, 264 U. S. 235 ; Nogueira v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 281 U. S. 128, 281 U. S. 133, 281 U. S. 138 .
[ Footnote 21 ]
The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 77 U. S. 563 ; United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 270 U. S. 56 ; United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64, 283 U. S. 76, 283 U. S. 77 ; Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 283 U. S. 452 .
[ Footnote 22 ]
Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Co., above ; Washington v. Dawson, above ; Nogueira v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., supra ; 1 Benedict ‘s Admiralty, 5th ed., § 29, pp. 41, 42, note .
[ Footnote 23 ]
See Report of United States Employees ‘ Compensation Commission for fiscal class ending June 30, 1931, pp. 108, 109 .
[ Footnote 24 ]
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210, 211 U. S. 225 ; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cole, 251 U. S. 54, 251 U. S. 56 ; Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S. 40, 271 U. S. 42 .
[ Footnote 25 ]
Supra, note 13
[ Footnote 26 ]
See Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U. S. 370 .
[ Footnote 27 ]
Freund, “ administrative Powers Over Persons and Property, ” § 154, p. 293 .
[ Footnote 28 ]
Id., § 153, pp. 291-293 .
[ Footnote 29 ]
Where the doctrine of personal liability of an officer for acting without jurisdiction is applied, courts have received evidence to show the jurisdictional blemish. frankincense in Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100, an action was brought against the members of a town board of health who had killed a horse in obedience to an order of the commissioners on catching diseases among domestic animals, acting under the allege authority of the state Legislature. The ordering recited that the animal had been examined and was adjudged to have the glanders. The estimate before whom the encase was tried “ found the cavalry had not the glanders, ” but declined to rule against the defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court sustained exceptions, holding that
“ The fact as to the cavalry having the disease was exposed to probe in the present action, and, on the find that it did not have it, the plaintiff was entitled to a opinion that the defendants had failed to make out their justification. ”
Id., p. 548. See besides Pearson v. Zehr, 138 Ill. 48, 51, 52, 29 N.E. 854 .
[ Footnote 30 ]
Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, above, at phosphorus. 264 U. S. 390 ; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Boone, 270 U. S. 466, 270 U. S. 471, 270 U. S. 472 ; Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U. S. 331, 275 U. S. 346 ; Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 275 U. S. 148 ; Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S. 573, 279 U. S. 577 .
[ Footnote 31 ]
Supra, eminence 10
fmx
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS, dissenting .
Knudsen filed a claim against Benson under § 19 ( a ) of the Longshoremen ‘s and Harbor Workers ‘ Compensation Act, March 4, 1927, c. 509, 44 Stat. 1424. Benson ‘s answer denied, among other things, that the relation back of employer and employee existed between him and the claimant. The evidence introduced before the deputy page 285 U. S. 66 commissioner, which occupies 78 pages of the print record, was directed largely to that exit, and was conflicting. The deputy commissioner found that the claimant was in Benson ‘s hire at the clock time of the injury, and filed an order for compensation under § 21 ( a ). Benson brought this proceeding under § 21 ( bel ) to set aside the order. The District Judge transferred the suit to the admiralty side of the court and held a test de novo, refusing to consider upon any aspect of the lawsuit the record before the deputy commissioner. On the testify introduced in court, he found that the relation of employer and employee did not exist, and entered a decree set aside the compensation regulate. 33 F.2d 137, 38 F.2d 306. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the rule. 45 F.2d 66. This Court granted certiorari. 283 U.S. 814. In my opinion, the decree should be reversed, because Congress did not authorize a trial de novo .
The primary question for consideration is not whether Congress provided, or validly could provide, that determinations of fact by the deputy commissioner should be conclusive upon the District Court. The interview is : upon what record shall the District Court ‘s review of the order of the deputy commissioner be based ? The courts below held that the respondent was entitled to a trial de novo ; that all the attest introduced before the deputy commissioner should go for nothing ; and that respondent should have the privilege of presenting newfangled, and even wholly different, evidence in the District Court. Unless that holding was decline, the judgment below obviously can not be affirmed .
first. The initial question is one of construction of the Longshoremen ‘s Act. The Act does not, in terms, declare whether there may be a test de novo either as to the issue whether the relation back of employer and employee existed at the time of the injury or as to any other issue, tried or triable, before the deputy commissioner. It provides, by § 19 ( a ), that “ the deputy commissioner shall page 285 U. S. 67 have full office and authority to hear and determine all questions in respect of ” a title ; by § 21 ( a ), that the recompense order made by the deputy commissioner “ shall become effective ” when filed in his function, and ,
“ unless proceedings for the abeyance or setting away of such order are instituted as provided in section ( bel ) of this §, shall become concluding. .. ; ”
and, by § 21 ( b ), that ,
“ if not in accordance with law, a recompense ordain may be suspended or set aside, in unharmed or in separate, through injunction proceedings. .. instituted in the Federal zone court. .. . ”
The phrase in § 21 ( boron ) supply that the order may be set apart “ if not in accord with jurisprudence ” was adopted from the statutory provision, enacted by the like Congress, for review by the Circuit Courts of Appeals of decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals. [ Footnote 2/1 ] This Court has settled that the phrase, as used in the tax legislative act, means a review upon the record made before the Board. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 283 U. S. 600. The Compensation Commission has systematically construed the Longshoremen ‘s Act as providing for finality of the deputy commissioners ‘ findings on all questions of fact ; [ Footnote 2/2 ] and care page 285 U. S. 68 has been taken to provide for formal hearings appropriate to that intention. Compare Brown v. United States, 113 U. S. 568, 113 U. S. 571 ; Mason v. Routzahn, 275 U. S. 175, 275 U. S. 178. The lower federal courts, except in the case at legal profession, have uniformly construed the Act as denying a test de novo of any offspring determined by the deputy commissioner ; have held that, in respect to those issues, the inspection afforded must be held upon the commemorate made before the deputy commissioner ; and that the deputy commissioner ‘s findings of fact must be accepted as conclusive if supported by evidence, unless there was some irregularity in the go before him. [ Footnote 2/3 ] closely all the state page 285 U. S. 69 courts have construed the state of matter workmen ‘s compensation laws, as limiting the judicial review to matters of law. [ Footnote 2/4 ] Provisions in other federal statutes, similar to page 285 U. S. 70 those here in question, creating, assorted administrative tribunals, have besides been treated as not conferring the right to a judicial trial de novo. [ Footnote 2/5 ] page 285 U. S. 71
The safeguards with which Congress has surrounded the proceedings before the deputy commissioner would be without meaning if those proceedings were to serve merely as an inquiry preliminary to a contest in the courts. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Specific provisions of the Longshoremen ‘s Act make clear that it was the aim of Congress to expedite the relief afforded. With a see to obviating the delays incident to discriminative proceedings, the Act substitutes an administrative court for the court, and, besides providing for notice and opportunity to be heard, endows the proceedings before the deputy commissioner with the customary incidents of a judicial hear. It prescribes that the parties in interest may be represented by advocate, § 19 ( five hundred ) ; that the attendance of witnesses and the page 285 U. S. 72 production of documents may be compelled, § 27 ( a ) ; that the hearings shall be public, and that they shall be stenographically reported, § 23 ( b-complex vitamin ) ; that there shall be made “ a record of the hearings and early proceedings before the deputy commissioners, ” § 23 ( bacillus ) ; that “ the deputy commissioner shall have fully power and assurance to hear and determine all questions in respect of ” a claim, § 19 ( a ) ; and that his order shall become final after thirty days, unless a proceed is filed under § 21 ( b-complex vitamin ), charging that it is “ not in accordance with law. ” procedure of this character, alternatively of expediting stand-in, would entail useless expense and delay if the proceedings before the deputy commissioner were to be repeated in court and the case tried from the begin, at the choice of either party. The stopping point that Congress did not sol intend is confirmed by character to the legislative history of the Act. [ Footnote 2/7 ] Compare Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 242 U. S. 490. page 285 U. S. 73
irregular. nothing in the codified warrants the construction that the right to a trial de novo which Congress has concededly denied as to most issues of fact determined by the deputy commissioner has been granted in respect to the exit of the universe of the employer-employee relation. The terminology which is held sufficient to foreclose the veracious to such a test on some issues forecloses it as to all. Whether the peculiar sexual intercourse which the fact of employment is asserted to bear to the system of the codified and to the constitutional assurance under which it was passed might conceivably have induced Congress to provide a special method of review upon that question, it is not necessary to inquire. For Congress expressly declared its intention to put, for purposes of revue, all the issues of fact on the same footing, by conferring upon the deputy commissioner “ full office to hear and determine all questions in deference of such claim, ” subject alone to the power of the court to set aside his order “ if not in accordance with law. ”
The hypnotism that “ such title ” may be construed to mean only a claim within the horizon of the Act seems to me without meaning. logically applied, the suggestion would leave the deputy commissioner powerless to hear or determine any issue of assert nonliability under the Act. For nonexistence of the employer employee relation is alone one of many grounds of nonliability. therefore, there is no indebtedness if the injury was occasioned entirely by the poisoning of the employee ; or if the injury was ascribable to the froward purpose of the employee to foliate 285 U. S. 74 hurt or kill himself or another ; or if it did not arise “ out of or in the course of employment ” ; or if the employer was not engaged in maritime employment in unharmed or in partially ; or if the hurt person was the employee of a subcontractor who has secured requital of compensation ; or if the go is brought against the incorrectly person as employer ; or if the disability or death is that of a master or a member of the crew of any vessel ; or if it is that of a person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any belittled vessel under eighteen tons net ; or if it is that of an officer or employee of the United States or any means thence ; or if it is that of an military officer or employee of any express, or alien politics, or any political subdivision thereof ; or if recovery for the disability or death through workmen ‘s compensation proceedings may be validly provided by submit law. And obviously there is no liability if there was in fact neither disability nor death. It is not reasonable to suppose that Congress intended to set up a factfinding court of first case, sheared of power to find a parcel of the facts required for any decisiveness of the shell ; or that, in enacting legislation designed to withdraw from litigation the bang-up bulk of maritime accidents, it contemplated a procedure whereby the same facts must be doubly litigated before a stevedore could be assured the benefits of compensation .
The circumstance that Congress provided, in § 21 ( b ), of the Act, for review of orders of the deputy commissioner by injunction proceedings is urged as indicative mood of an intention that in such proceedings the plaintiff should have wide opportunity to plead and prove any facts showing that the case lay outside the horizon of the legislative act. But by this reasoning, again, many early questions besides those referred to by the Court would be open to retrial upon newly, and different, testify. The simple answer is that on bills in fairness to set aside orders of a federal page 285 U. S. 75 administrative board there is no test de novo of issues of fact determined by that court. As stated in Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 280 U. S. 443, concerning orders of the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act :
“ A proceeding under § 316 of the Packers and Stockyards Act is a judicial recapitulation, not a trial de novo. The validity of an decree of the Secretary, like that of an rate of the Interstate Commerce Commission, must be determined upon the record of the proceedings before him — save as there may be an exception of issues presenting claims of constituent right, a matter which need not be considered or decided now. [ Footnote 2/8 ] ”
In the follow-up of the quasi discriminative decisions of these federal administrative tribunals the placard in equity serves the purpose which at common law, and under the rehearse of many of the states, is performed by writs of certiorari. [ Footnote 2/9 ] It presents to the reviewing court the record of the proceedings before the administrative court in order that determination may be made, among early things, whether the authority conferred has been by rights exercised. [ Footnote 2/10 ] Neither upon bill in equity in the federal page 285 U. S. 76 courts nor writ of certiorari in the states is it the practice to permit fresh evidence to be offered in the reviewing motor hotel. There is no foundation for the hypnotism that Congress intended to provide otherwise in the Longshoremen ‘s Act .
Third. It is said that the provision for a test de novo of the universe of the employer employee sexual intercourse should be read into the Act in order to avoid a good constitutional doubt. It is true that, where a codified is equally susceptible of two constructions, under one of which it is intelligibly valid and under the other of which it may be unconstitutional, the court will adopt the erstwhile construction. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 116 U. S. 269 ; Knights Templars ‘ Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U. S. 197, 187 U. S. 205 ; Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 118, 250 U. S. 122 ; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Boone, 270 U. S. 466, 270 U. S. 471, 270 U. S. 472. But this Act is not equally susceptible to two constructions. The court may not, in order to avoid holding a legislative act unconstitutional, engraft upon it an exception or early provision. Butts v. Merchants ‘ & Miners ‘ Transportation Co., 230 U. S. 126, 230 U. S. 133 ; The Employers ‘ Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 207 U. S. 500 -502 ; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 100 U. S. 99 ; United States v. Fox, 95 U. S. 670, 95 U. S. 672, 95 U. S. 673 ; United States page 285 U. S. 77 v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 92 U. S. 221. Compare Illinois Central R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514, 203 U. S. 529 ; Cella Commission Co. v. Bohlinger, 147 F. 419, 423, 424. Neither may it do indeed to avoid having to resolve a constitutional doubt. To hold that Congress conferred the right to a trial de novo on the issue of the employer employee relation seems to me a remake of the legislative act and not a structure of it .
Fourth. Trial de novo of the issue of the universe of the employer employee sexual intercourse is not required by the due march article. That clause normally does not even require that parties shall be permitted to have a discriminative court pass upon the weight of the testify introduced before the administrative body. See Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 U.S. 594. The findings of fact of the deputy commissioner, the Court now decides, are conclusive as to most issues if supported by attest. yet, as to the publish of employment, the Court holds not merely that such findings may not be declared final, but that it would create a unplayful constitutional doubt to construe the Act as committing to the deputy commissioner the childlike function of collecting the evidence upon which the woo will ultimately decide the write out .
It is suggested that this exception is required as to issues of fact involving claims of built-in right. For reasons which I shall subsequently discuss, I can not believe that the issue of employment is one of built-in right. But even assuming it to be thus, the conclusion does not follow that test of the issue must consequently be upon a record made in the District Court. That the affair of collecting evidence may be committed to an administrative court is settled by a host of cases, [ Footnote 2/11 ] and page 285 U. S. 78 supported by persuasive analogies, none of which justify a eminence between issues of constitutional correctly and any others. haunt to administrative remedies may be made a condition precedent to a discriminative earshot. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Solum, 247 U. S. 477, 247 U. S. 483, 247 U. S. 484 ; First National Bank of Greeley v. Board of County Commissioners, 264 U. S. 450, 264 U. S. 454, 264 U. S. 455 ; United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U. S. 474. This is thus even though a party is asserting privation of rights secured by the Federal Constitution. First National Bank of Greeley v. Board of County Commissioners, above. In federal equity suits, the remove of evidence on any issue in open motor hotel did not become common until 1913, [ Footnote 2/12 ] compare 224 U. S. page 285 U. S. 79 Corp, v. James, 272 U. S. 701 ; and in admiralty, it was not required by the rules of this Court until 1921. [ Footnote 2/13 ] Compare The P. R.R. No. 35, 48 F.2d 122. On appeals in admiralty, far proof is now taken by a mission. [ Footnote 2/14 ] As was said concerning a similar court in Washington ex-wife rel. Oregon Railroad & Navigation Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510, 224 U. S. 527, the function of the deputy commissioner is like that of a master in chancery who has been required to take testimony and report his findings of fact and conclusions of law. Compare Los Angeles Brush Corporation v. James, above ; Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U. S. 512, 129 U. S. 524, 129 U. S. 525 ; Armstrong v. Belding Bros. & Co., 297 F. 728, 729. The holding that the dispute between the procedure prescribed by the Longshoremen ‘s Act and these historic methods of hearing attest transcends the limits of congressional office when applied to the emergence of the universe of a relation back of employment, as distinguished from that of the circumstances of an injury or the universe of a relation of colony, seems to me without initiation in reality. surely there is no dispute to the litigant. page 285 U. S. 80
even in respect to the question, discussed by the Court, of the finality to be accorded administrative findings of fact in a civil subject involving monetary liability, I see no reason for making special exception as to issues of constitutional correct unless it be that, under certain circumstances, there may arise difficulty in reaching conclusions of law without consideration of the tell a well as the findings of fact. See Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 280 U. S. 443. Compare Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287. The adequacy of that argue need not be discussed. For, as to the issue of employment, no such difficulty can be urged. Two decades of experience in the states testify to the appropriateness of the administrative march as applied to this issue, vitamin a well as all others, in workmen ‘s recompense controversies .
Fifth. Trial de novo of the universe of the employer employee relative is not required by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution. The mere fact that the Act deals lone with injuries arising on navigable waters, and that, independently of legislation, such injuries can be redressed alone in courts of admiralty, [ Footnote 2/15 ] obviously does not preclude Congress from denying a trial de novo. For the Court holds that it is compatible with the concession of power under Article III to deny a test de novo as to most of the facts page 285 U. S. 81 upon which rest the allowance of a title and the amount of compensation. Its holding that the Constitution requires a trial de novo of the issue of the employer employee sexual intercourse is based on the relative which that fact bears to the statutory scheme propounded by Congress, and to the constitutional agency under which the Act was passed. The argument is that being of the sexual intercourse of employer and employee is, as a matter of substantive law, essential to the application of the codified, because the world power of Congress to enact the legislation turns upon its universe, and that, whenever the question of constitutional exponent depends upon an issue of fact, that publish must, as a matter of operation, be determinable independently upon evidence impertinently introduced in a court. [ Footnote 2/16 ] Neither proposition seems to me well founded .
Whether the power of Congress to provide compensation for injuries occurring on navigable waters is limited to cases in which the employer employee relation exists has not so far been passed upon by this Court, and was not argued in this case. I see no justification for assuming, under those circumstances, that it is therefore limited. page 285 U. S. 82 Without doubt the son “ employee ” was used in the Longshoremen ‘s Act in the sense in which the common jurisprudence defines it. But that definition is not immutable, and no provision of the Constitution confines the application of liability without blame to instances where the relation back of employment, as so specify, exists. [ Footnote 2/17 ] Compare Louis Pisitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U. S. 112, 274 U. S. 116. Whether an individual is an employer or an independent contractor depends upon criteria much subtle and uncertain of lotion, [ Footnote 2/18 ] criteria which have been developed, by processes page 285 U. S. 83 of judicial ejection and inclusion, largely since the borrowing of the Constitution [ Footnote 2/19 ] and with address, for the most character, to considerations foreign to industrial accident litigation. It is not to be assumed that Congress, having ability to amend and revise the nautical law, is prevented from modifying those criteria and enlarging the liability imposed by this Act so as to embrace all persons who are engaged or engage themselves in the work of another, including those nowadays designated as autonomous contractors. In the Longshoremen ‘s Act itself, Congress, far from declaring the relation of headmaster and handmaid essential in all cases to the application of the codified, provided expressly that a contractor shall be apt to employees of a subcontractor who has failed to secure payment of recompense. § 4 ( a ) of the Act. State Workmen ‘s Compensation Laws about constantly contain provisions for liability either to freelancer contractors or to their employees, sometimes absolute and sometimes conditioned upon default option by the immediate employer ; [ Footnote 2/20 ] and these provisions page 285 U. S. 84 appear to have been uniformly uphold. [ Footnote 2/21 ] I can not doubt that, evening upon the scene of the evidence taken by the District Court, Congress might have made Benson apt to Knudsen for the injury which he sustained .
Sixth. even if the constituent power of Congress to provide compensation is limited to cases in which the page 285 U. S. 85 employer-employee relative exists, I see no footing for a competition that the abnegation of the right to a trial de novo upon the issue of employment is in any manner insurgent of the independence of the federal judicial world power. nothing in the Constitution, or in any prior decision of this Court to which attention has been called, lends support to the doctrine that a judicial find of any fact involved in any civil proceeding to enforce a monetary liability may not be made upon evidence introduced before a properly constituted administrative court, or that a decision so made may not be deemed an autonomous judicial decision. Congress has repeatedly exercised assurance to confer upon the tribunals which it creates, be they administrative bodies or courts of circumscribed legal power, the might to receive testify concerning the facts upon which the exert of federal world power must be predicated, and to determine whether those facts exist. The might of Congress to provide by legislation for indebtedness under certain circumstances subsumes the world power to provide for the determination of the universe of those circumstances. It does not depend upon the absolute universe in reality of any fact .
It is true that, therefore far as Knudsen is concerned, validation of the universe of the employer employee relation back is necessity to recovery under the Act. But under the definition laid down in lord v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U. S. 165, 147 U. S. 173, 147 U. S. 174, that fact is not jurisdictional. It is quasi jurisdictional. The being of a relation of employment is a question going to the applicability of the substantive jurisprudence, not to the legal power of the court. legal power is the power to adjudicate between the parties concerning the subject-matter. Compare Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, 140 U. S. 268. obviously, the deputy commissioner had not only the power but the duty to determine whether the employer employee relation existed. When a punctually appoint court has legal power page 285 U. S. 86 of the parties and of the subject matter, that jurisdiction is not impaired by errors, however grave accent, in applying the substantive law. Dennison v. Payne, 293 F. 333, 341. Compare Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611, 270 U. S. 617 ; Marin v. Augedahl, 247 U. S. 142, 247 U. S. 149 ; Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 291, 263 U. S. 305 -307. This is truthful of tribunals of especial a well as of those of general jurisdiction. It is true of administrative, ampere well as of judicial, tribunals. If errors in the application of police may not be made the basis of collateral attack upon the decision of an administrative court, once that decisiveness has become final, no “ jurisdictional ” defect can compel the freelancer follow-up in motor hotel, upon lineal review, of the facts affecting such applicability .
The “ judicial power ” of Article III of the Constitution is the might of the federal government, and not of any inferior court. There is in that article nothing which requires any controversy to be determined as of first example in the federal District Courts. The legal power of those courts is discipline to the restraint of Congress. [ Footnote 2/22 ] Matters page 285 U. S. 87 which may be placed within their legal power may alternatively be committed to the state courts. If there be any controversy to which the judicial might extends that may not be subjected to the conclusive decision of administrative bodies or union legislative courts, it is not because of any prohibition against the decline of the legal power of the federal District Courts as such, but because, under certain circumstances, the constitutional prerequisite of due march is a prerequisite of discriminative serve. An accretion of precedents, already referred to, [ Footnote 2/23 ] has established that in civil proceedings involving page 285 U. S. 88 property rights determination of facts may constitutionally be made otherwise than judicially ; and, necessarily, that tell as to such facts may be taken outside of a court. I do not conceive that Article III has properly any digest upon the doubt presented in this sheath .
Seventh. The cases cited by the Court in support of its conclusion that the codified would be invalid if construed to deny a test de novo of issues of fact affecting the being of the employer employee relation seem to me irrelevant. Most of those decisions dealt with tribunals exercising functions generically different from the function which Congress has assigned to the deputy commissioners under the Longshoremen ‘s Act, and no question rise analogous to that now presented .
By the Longshoremen ‘s Act, Congress created factfinding and fact-gathering tribunals, supplementing the courts and intrusted with power to make initial determinations in matters within, and not outside, ordinary judicial horizon. The determination of these administrative bodies is to withdraw from the courts, subject to the power of judicial review, a class of controversy which experience has shown can be more effectively and efficiently handled in the first gear example by a limited and adept court. The proceedings of the deputy commissioners are endowed with every solid safeguard of a judicial hear. Their conclusions are, as a matter of right, open to reexamination in the courts on all questions of law ; and, we assume for the purposes of this discussion, may be open flush on all questions of the weight of the evidence .
The administrative bodies in the cases referred to by the Court, on the contrary, are in no sense fact-gathering page 285 U. S. 89 or factfinding tribunals of first example. They are tribunals of final repair within the oscilloscope of their assurance. Their concern is with matters normally outside of judicial competence — the deportation of aliens, the enforcement of military discipline, the grant of farming patents, and the use of the mails — matters which are within the might of Congress to commit to conclusive administrator determination. Compare Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U. S. 438, 279 U. S. 451. Their procedure may be compendious and frequently is. [ Footnote 2/24 ] With deference to them, the officiate of the courts is not one of revue but basically of control-the routine of keeping them within their statutory assurance. [ Footnote 2/25 ] page 285 U. S. 90 No method acting of judicial review of the administrative action had been provided by Congress in any of the cases cited, and the interview of the power to confine recapitulation to the administrative record consequently did not arise. In each encase, the Court held that, if the administrative officeholder had acted outside his assurance, the ad-lib jurisprudence supplied a redress, and that respite could be had, according to the nature of the shell, on bill in equity or habeas corpus. [ Footnote 2/26 ] page 285 U. S. 91 The motion decided in each font was that Congress should not be taken, in the absence of specific provision, to have intended to subject the individual to the uncontrolled action of a public administrative officer. See american School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 187 U. S. 110. No comparable issue is presented here .
reliance is besides placed, as exemplifying of the necessary independence of the federal judicial power, upon the decision in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287. [ Footnote 2/27 ] That sheath, however, involved lone the question page 285 U. S. 92 of the scope of review, upon the administrative record, in confiscation cases. It held that the reviewing court must have power to weigh the attest upon which the administrative court entered the ordain. It decided nothing concerning the right to a trial de novo in court, and the public opinion made no mention to such a trial. It could not have decided anything as to the effect of Article III of the Constitution. For the font came here from the highest woo of the state, arose under the Fourteenth Amendment, and did not relate to the legal power of the lower federal courts. furthermore, in no event, can the issues presented in the review of rate orders alleged to be confiscatory, which involve unmanageable questions of blend law and fact, be deemed analogue to those presented in the review of workmen ‘s recompense awards. [ Footnote 2/28 ] Compare the issues in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, above, with that in Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 U.S. 594 .
Whatever may be the propriety of the rule permitting limited follow-up in a trial court of alleged “ jurisdictional page 285 U. S. 93 facts ” passed upon by administrative bodies having differently concluding jurisdiction over matters by rights committed to them, I find no warrant for extending the doctrine to other and different administrative tribunals whose identical function is to hear evidence and make initial determinations concerning those matters which it is sought to reexamine. Such a doctrine has never been applied to tribunals by rights analogous to the deputy commissioners, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Secretary of Agriculture acting under the Packers and Stockyards Act, and the alike. [ Footnote 2/29 ] Logically applied, it would badly impair the integral administrative procedure. [ Footnote 2/30 ]
Eighth. No good reason is suggested why all the tell which Benson presented to the District Court in this cause could not have been presented before the deputy commissioner, nor why he should have been permitted to try his lawsuit provisionally before the administrative court and then to retry it in the District Court upon extra evidence theretofore withheld. To permit him to do so violates the good principle that administrative remedied must beginning be exhausted before resorting to the court, imposes unnecessary and burdensome expense upon the other party, and cripples the effective administration of the Act. Under the prevail rehearse, by which the judicial review has been confined to questions of law, the proceedings before the deputy commissioners page 285 U. S. 94 have proved for the most part uncontroversial, [ Footnote 2/31 ] and relatively few cases have reached the courts. [ Footnote 2/32 ] To permit a contest de novo in the District Court of an issue tried, or triable, before the deputy commissioner will, I fear, badly hamper the effective administration of the Act. The prestige of the deputy commissioner will necessarily be lessened by the opportunity of relitigating facts in the courts. The number of oppose cases may be largely increased. perseverance in controversy will be encouraged. And since the advantage of prolong litigation lies with the party able to bear heavy expenses, the determination of the Act will be in separate defeated. [ Footnote 2/33 ]
In my opinion, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeal should be reversed, and the encase remanded to the District Court, sitting as a court of equity, for consideration and decisiveness upon the record made before the deputy commissioner .
MR. JUSTICE STONE and MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS join in this opinion .
[ Footnote 2/1 ]
tax income Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 110 :
“ Sec. 1003. ( a ) The Circuit Courts of Appeals and the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia shall have exclusive legal power to review the decisions of the board. .. . ”
“ ( bel ) Upon such follow-up, such courts shall have baron to affirm or, if the decisiveness of the display panel is not in accord with law, to modify or reverse the decision of the board, with or without remanding the character for a rehear as justice may require. ”
[ Footnote 2/2 ]
This opinion was expressed in regulations promulgated by the Commission, under authority conferred by § 39 ( a ), in the shape of instructions to deputy commissioners, dated September 28, 1927 ; and it was repeated in the Commission ‘s report at the conclusion of the first class of its administration of the Act. Report of United States Employees ‘ Compensation Commission, for fiscal year ending June 30, 1928, p. 33. See besides id., June 30, 1929, p. 77 ; id., June 30, 1930, pp. 63-64 ; id., June 30, 1931, p. 71. The instructions to deputy commissioners, elaborated December 10, 1927, and May 15, 1928, required that the commemorate of proceedings and findings of fact be prepared, and the proceedings be conducted, in consonance with this view of the jurisprudence .
[ Footnote 2/3 ]
The question of judicial follow-up under the Act has been passed upon by the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, deoxyadenosine monophosphate well as the Fifth ; by a District Court in the Sixth Circuit ; and by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, under the Act of May 17, 1928, c. 612, 45 Stat. 600. Pocahontas Fuel Co. v. Monahan, 41 F.2d 48, 49 ( C.C.A. 1st ), affirming 34 F.2d 549, 551, 1929 A.M.C. 1336 ( D.C.Me. ) ; Joyce v. United States Deputy Commissioner, 33 F.2d 218, 219 ( D.C.Me. ) ; Jarka Corporation v. Monahan, 48 F.2d 283, 284 ( D.C.Mass. ) ; Booth v. Monahan, 56 F.2d 168 ( D.C.Me. ) ; Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Locke, 50 F.2d 81, 82 ( C.C.A. 2d ) ; Travelers Insurance Co. v. Locke, 56 F.2d 443 ( D.C.S.D.N.Y. ) ; Calabrese v. Locke, 56 F.2d 458 ( D.C.S.D.N.Y. ) ; W. J. McCahan Sugar Refining & Molasses Co. v. Norton, 43 F.2d 505, 506 ( C.C.A. 3d ), affirming 34 F.2d 499 ( D.C.E.D.Pa. ) ; Independent Pier Co. v. Norton, 54 F.2d 734 ( C.C.A. 3d ) ; Baltimore & Carolina S.S. Co. v. Norton, 40 F.2d 271, 272 ( D.C.E.D.Pa. ) ; Merchants ‘ & Miners ‘ Transp. Co. v. Norton, 32 F.2d 513, 515 ( D.C.E.D.Pa. ) ; Jarka Corporation v. Norton, 56 F.2d 287 ( D.C.E.D.Pa. ) ; Frank Marra Co. v. Norton, 56 F.2d 246 ( D.C.E.D.Pa. ) ; Wheeling Corrugating Co. v. McManigal, 41 F.2d 593, 594, 595 ( C.C.A. 4th ) ; Obrecht-Lynch Corporation v. Clark, 30 F.2d 144, 146 ( D.C.Md. ) ; Keyway Stevedoring Co. v. Clark, 43 F.2d 983 ( D.C.Md. ) ; Kranski v. Atlantic Coast Shipping Co., 56 F.2d 166 ( D.C.Md. ) ; Chesapeake Ship Ceiling Co. v. Clark ( D.C.Md. ), decided May 22, 1930 ( oral impression ) ; Goble v. Clark, 56 F.2d 170 ( D.C.Md. ) ; Michigan Transit Corporation v. Brown, 56 F.2d 200 ( D.C.W.D.Mich. ) ; Northwestern Stevedoring Co. v. Marshall, 41 F.2d 28, 29 ( C.C.A. 9th ) ; Gunther v. United States Employees ‘ Compensation Commission, 41 F.2d 151, 153 ( C.C.A. 9th ) ; Grays Harbor Stevedore Co. v. Marshall, 36 F.2d 814, 815 ( D.C.W.D.Wash. ) ; Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 42 F.2d 1010, 1011 ( D.C.W.D.Wash. ) ; Tood Dry Docks, Inc. v. Marshall, 49 F.2d 621, 623 ( D.C.W.D.Wash. ) ; Grays Harbor Stevedore Co. v. Marshall, 36 F.2d 814 ( D.C.W.D.Wash. ) ; Rothschild & Co. v. Marshall, 56 F.2d 415 ( D.C.W.D.Wash. ), reversed on other grounds, 44 F.2d 546 ( C.C.A. 9th ) ; Lea Mathew Shipping Corporation v. Marshall, 56 F.2d 860 ( D.C.W.D.Wash. ) ; Griffiths & Sprague Stevedoring Co. v. Marshall, 56 F.2d 665 ( D.C.W.D.Wash. ) ; W. R. Grace & Co. v. Marshall, 56 F.2d 441 ( D.C.W.D.Wash. ) ; Nelson v. Marshall, 56 F.2d 654 ( D.C.W.D.Wash. ) ; Grant v. Marshall, 56 F.2d 654 ( D.C.W.D.Wash. ) ; Zurich General Accident & Liability Co. v. Marshall, 56 F.2d 652 ( D.C.W.D.Wash. ) ; Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporation v. Solberg, 56 F.2d 607 ( D.C.W.D.Wash. ). Compare Lake Washington Shipyards v. Brueggeman, 56 F.2d 655 ( D.C.W.D.Wash. ) ; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hoage, 46 F.2d 837 ( App.D.C. ) ; Hoage v. Murch Bros. Const. Co., 50 F.2d 983, 984 ( App.D.C. ). See besides the follow decisions by district courts in the Fifth Circuit : Showers v. Crowell, 46 F.2d 361 ( W.D.La. ) ; Howard v. Monahan, 31 F.2d 480, 481 ( S.D.Tex. ) ; id., 33 F.2d 220, 221 ( S.D.Tex. ). Compare T. J. Moss Tie Co. v. Tanner, 44 F.2d 928 ( C.C.A. 5th ) ; Houston Ship Channel Stevedoring Co. v. Sheppeard, 57 F.2d 259, 1931 A.M.C. 1605 ( S.D.Tex. ) .
[ Footnote 2/4 ]
The Court has been referred to no case arising under the state Workmen ‘s Compensation Laws recognizing a right to trial de novo in court. numerous decisions declare administrative findings of fact to be conclusive. The follow decisions all deal with controversies concerning the universe of a relation of employment. Hillen v. Industrial Accident Commission, 199 Cal. 577, 580, 250 P. 570 ; York Junction Transfer & Storage Co. v. Industrial Accident Commissioners, 202 Cal. 517, 521, 261 P. 704 ; Index Mines Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 82 Colo. 272, 275, 259 P. 1036 ; Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Wilson, 36 Ga. App. 784, 138 S.E. 246 ; Taylor v. Blackwell Lumber Co., 37 Idaho, 707, 721, 218 P. 356 ; Cinofsky v. Industrial Commission, 290 Ill. 521, 525 125 N.E. 286 ; Franklin Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 Ill. 329, 334, 129 N.E. 811 ; A. E. Norris Coal Co. v. Jackson, 80 Ind. App. 423, 425, 141 N.E. 227 ; Murphy v. Shipley, 200 Iowa, 857, 859, 205 N.W. 497 ; Churchill ‘s Case, 265 Mass. 117, 119, 164 N.E. 68 ; Hill ‘s Case, 268 Mass. 491, 493, 167 N.E. 914 ; Matter of Dale v. Saunders Brothers, 218 N.Y. 59, 63, 112 N.E. 571 ; Federal Mining & Smelting Co. v. Thomas, 99 Okl. 24, 26, 225 P. 967 ; Oklahoma Pipe Line Co. v. Lindsey, 113 Okl. 296, 298, 241 P. 1092 ; Belmonte v. Connor, 263 Pa. 470, 472, 106 A. 787 .
[ Footnote 2/5 ]
( a ) Interstate Commerce Commission : Act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, § 1, 36 Stat. 539 ; see Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 227 U. S. 92 ; United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 235 U. S. 314, 235 U. S. 320, 235 U. S. 321 ; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. United States, 245 U. S. 463, 245 U. S. 466, and other cases collected in I. L. Sharfman, “ The Interstate Commerce Commission II, ” pp. 384-393, 417 et seq. ; Act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, § 13, 36 Stat. 539, 555 ; Act of March 1, 1913 ; c. 92, 37 Stat. 701, 703. See Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 280 U. S. 444 newton .
( bacillus ) Federal Trade Commission : Act of September 26, 1914, c. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719, 720 ; see Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S. 568, 260 U. S. 579, 260 U. S. 580 ; Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade Assn., 273 U. S. 52, 273 U. S. 63 ; Arkansas Wholesale Grocers ‘ Assn. v. Federal Trade Commission, 18 F.2d 866, 870, 871 ; Gregory Hankin, “ finality of the Federal Trade Commission ‘s Findings as to Facts, ” 23 Mich.L.Rev. 233, 262-267 ; Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, § 11, 38 Stat. 730, 735 ( applicable besides in allow cases to Interstate Commerce Commission and Federal Reserve Board ) ; see Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., above ; International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U. S. 291, 280 U. S. 297 .
( hundred ) Federal Power Commission : Act of June 10, 1920, c. 285, § 20, 41 Stat. 1063, 1074 .
( five hundred ) United States Shipping Board : Act of September 7, 1916, c. 451, §§ 29, 31, 39 Stat. 728, 737, 738 ; see Isthmian Steamship Co. v. United States ( S.D.N.Y. ), 53 F.2d 251, decided December 7, 1931 ; compare United States Nav. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U. S. 474, decided February 15, 1932 .
( e ) Secretary of Agriculture : Act of August 15, 1921, c. 64, §§ 315, 316, 42 Stat. 159, 168 ; see Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 280 U. S. 443, 280 U. S. 444 ; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 258 U. S. 512 ; Act of August 15, 1921, c. 64, § 204, 42 Stat. 159, 162 ; Act of June 10, 1930, c. 436, §§ 10, 11, 46 Stat. 531, 535 .
( fluorine ) Board of Tax Appeals : Act of February 26, 1926, c. 27, § 1003 ( a ), 44, Stat. 9, 110 ; see Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 283 U. S. 600 .
( gigabyte ) Grain Futures Commission : Act of September 21, 1922, c. 369, § 6 ( b ), 42 Stat. 998, 1002 .
( henry ) District of Columbia Rent Commission : Act of October 22, 1919, c. 80, Title 2, § 108, 41 Stat. 297, 301 ; see Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 256 U. S. 158 ; Killgore v. Zinkhan, 51 App.D.C. 60, 274, F. 140, 142 .
In instances in which Congress intended to permit the introduction of extra tell in the District Court, it has indeed provided in express terms. See, e.g., Act of February 18, 1922, c. 57, § 2, 42 Stat. 388, 389 ( 7 USCA § 292 ). Compare the provision for review of reparation orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, 313, 36 Stat. 539, 554, and of orders for the payment of money by the Shipping Board. Act of September 7, 1916, c. 451, § 30, 39 Stat. 728, 737 .
[ Footnote 2/6 ]
Compare Freund, “ administrative Powers Over Persons and Property, ” p. 279 .
[ Footnote 2/7 ]
Two bills providing workmen ‘s compensation for longshoremen and harbor workers were before the Congress at the same time. H.R. 9498, which was first reported favorably to the House, declared in terms, §§ 22, 24, that “ the decisiveness of the deputy commissioner shall be final as to all questions of fact and except arsenic provided in § 24 as to all questions of police. ” This bill was abandoned by the House in favor of S. 3170, in order that some legislation on the subject, under what was regarded as an emergency, might be passed at that school term. H.D., 69th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 16, platinum. 2, pp. 139-141. Although the differences between the two bills were minutely examined in the hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, no citation was made to any change in the provisions for review of recompense orders, but, on the contrary, it was affirmatively stated the Senate bill besides enacted administrative finality upon questions of fact. Id., platinum. 2, p. 200. The like statement was made in the Senate hearings. Id., platinum. 1, pp. 53, 66. The bill was reported to the House as having been amended to “ conform substantially ” to the bill theretofore reported. H.Rep., No. 1767, 69th Cong., 1st pot. Both in this report and in the brief debates in both houses, the circular was described as designed to prevent the delay and injustice incident to litigation, and as affording to maritime workers the lapp remedies as those provided in state workmen ‘s compensation laws. See 67 Cong. Rec. 10614 ; 68 Cong. Rec. 5410-5414, 5908. The submit Workmen ‘s recompense Statutes have, about universally, been construed to provide for concluding administrative determination of questions of fact, including the fact of the being of an use. See 285 U.S. 22 fn2/4| > note 4, above .
[ Footnote 2/8 ]
Congress has incorporated by mention the provisions for reappraisal of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission in authorizing judicial reappraisal of certain orders of the Federal Power Commission and the Shipping Board, as it did in the Packers and Stockyards Act. See 285 U.S. 22 fn2/5| > bill 5, above .
[ Footnote 2/9 ]
In People ex rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 219 N.Y. 84, 88, 90, 113 N.E. 795, it was held that the telescope of the review on certiorari of an order of the Public Service Commission was the lapp as that of the federal motor hotel on beak in fairness of the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission as declared in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central R. Co., 215 U. S. 452, 215 U. S. 470. Compare Vanfleet, “ Collateral Attack on Judicial Proceedings, ” §§ 2, 3 .
[ Footnote 2/10 ]
Certiorari is the historic writ for determining whether the action of an deficient court has been taken within its jurisdiction, and it has sometimes been held that the writ lies only to determine this question. Compare Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. 111. But, although there is considerable divergence is the practice of the assorted states as to the oscilloscope of the recapitulation, the proceed, aside from extraordinary statutory provisions, is universally upon the criminal record and the evidence before the subscript court, and not a trial de novo.. Fore v. Fore, 44 Ala. 478, 484 ; City of Los Angeles v. Young, 118 Cal. 295, 298, 50 P. 534 ; Great Western Power Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 180, 185, 186, 149 P. 35 ; Uphoff v. Industrial Board, 271 Ill. 312, 111 N.E. 128 ; Tiedt v. Carstensen, 61 Iowa, 334, 336, 16 N.W. 214 ; Lord v. County Commissioners, 105 Me. 556, 561, 75 A. 126 ; Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. 111, 119, 120 ; Wait v. Krewson, 59 N.J.Law, 71, 75, 35 A. 742 ; Milwaukee Western Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 159 Wis. 635, 641, 642, 150 N.W. 998. It was so at common law. See Freund, “ administrative Powers Over Persons and Property, ” pp. 267-269 .
[ Footnote 2/11 ]
See the statutes and cases cited in 285 U.S. 22 fn2/5| > note 5, above. similar decisions have been repeatedly made, under the Fourteenth Amendment, in cases coming from the state courts. This court has recently decided that a state Workmen ‘s Compensation Act may validly provide for judicial review upon matters of law only. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 U.S. 594. See besides New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 243 U. S. 207, 243 U. S. 208. In Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S. 40, 271 U. S. 42, , it was held that a state board of health might be empowered, upon reasonable notice, specification of charges, and opportunity to be heard, to revoke a doctor ‘s license, subject lone to review in the courts upon certiorari. In Washington x rel. Oregon Railroad & Navigation Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510, 224 U. S. 527, a legislative act was uphold which confined the court upon review of a public serve commission ‘s order to the evidence introduced before the commission. See besides Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 235 U. S. 661 ; New York antique rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345, 245 U. S. 348, 245 U. S. 349 ; Napa Valley Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 366, 251 U. S. 370 ; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Department of Public Works, 268 U. S. 39, 268 U. S. 42. In Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685, 166 U. S. 695, it was held that the findings of fact by commissioners in assessing damages in disapprobation proceedings might be made final, leaving open to the motor hotel alone the doubt whether there was any error in the basis of appraisal, or otherwise. See besides Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 258 U. S. 147 ; Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151. Compare Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U. S. 440, 241 U. S. 451, 241 U. S. 452 .
[ Footnote 2/12 ]
See Griswold and Mitchell, “ The Narrative Record in Federal Equity Appeals, ” 42 Harv.L.Rev. 483, 488, 491 ; Lane, “ One year Under the New Federal Equity Rules, ” 27 Harv.L.Rev. 629, 639. Compare 2 Daniell, “ Chancery Practice ” ( 2d Ed. ) 1045, 1046, 1053, 1054, 1069 et seq .
[ Footnote 2/13 ]
Admiralty Rule 46, 254 U.S. 698. subsequent to 1842, when the procedure in admiralty became discipline to rules promulgated by this Court, and anterior to 1921, no govern specifically required that evidence be taken orally in exposed court, and the practice in some districts appears to have been to take proof by a mission. Compare Admiralty Rules 44, 46, 210 U.S. 558 ; The Guy C. Goss, 53 F. 826, 827 ; The Wavelet, 25 F. 733, 734. See besides The Sun, 271 F. 953, 954. Under the present rules, the District Court may hush, upon proper circumstances, refer causes in admiralty to a commissioner, without the accept of the parties, to hear the testimony and report conclusions on issues of fact and police. The P. R.R. No. 35, 48 F.2d 122 ; Sorenson & Co. v. Liverpool, Brazil & River Plate Steam Nav. Co., 47 F.2d 332. Compare The City of Washington, 92 U. S. 31, 92 U. S. 39 ; Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U. S. 701. The commissioner ‘s findings of fact are not disturb unless intelligibly erroneous. The La Bourgogne, 144 F. 781, 783, affirmed, 210 U. S. 210 U.S. 95 ; Anderson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 22 F.2d 532, 535 .
[ Footnote 2/14 ]
See Admiralty Rule 45, 254 U.S. 698 ; Supreme Court Rule 15, 275 U.S. 607 .
[ Footnote 2/15 ]
The decision of the District Court, acquiesced in by the Circuit Court of Appeals and this Court, that the remedy under § 21 ( boron ) of the Longshoreman ‘s Act is in admiralty, seems to me baseless. The provision in that section for suspending or setting aside a compensation arrange by injunction intelligibly implies a proceed upon poster in equity. Congress may authorize actions for maritime torts to be brought on the police side of the federal District Courts, Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 264 U. S. 385 ; or in the state courts, Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 271 U. S. 37. See besides Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 247 U. S. 384. No constitutional protest can exist, therefore, to giving effect to the rectify in fairness provided in this Act .
[ Footnote 2/16 ]
The opinion of the Court suggests that, upon alike argue, the emergence whether the injury occurred on navigable waters must alike be open to mugwump redetermination, upon the facts adenine well as the police, in the District Court. The doubt whether any particular significance attaches to such a controversy, entitling it to be doubly tried, is not before us. It has never been decided that the power of Congress to provide recompense for injuries to workmen received in the course of maritime employment depends upon the injury having occurred upon navigable waters. See Benedict, “ The American Admiralty ” ( 5th Ed. ) § 25. Compare Soper v. Hammond Lumber Co. 4 F.2d 872 ; State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263. The Longshoremen ‘s Act undertakes to cover only the field of admiralty legal power within which the decisions of this Court have held uniformity to be required. See Stanley Morrison, “ Workmen ‘s compensation and the Maritime Law, ” 38 Yale L.J. 472, 500 .
[ Footnote 2/17 ]
That Legislatures may abolish defenses recognized at common jurisprudence and create fresh causes of action not therefore recognized is beyond doubt. So besides is the power, under proper circumstances, to provide for indebtedness without demerit. Compare St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1 ; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Zernecke, 183 U. S. 582 ; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281 ; New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188. Congress may provide that a mailman shall be liable for loss or wrong to goods occurring beyond its own lines. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 219 U. S. 203. See besides Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Glenn, 239 U. S. 388, 239 U. S. 393. “ The rule, ” said the Court, “ is adapted to secure the rights of the shipper by securing one of department of transportation with one of responsibility. ” That Congress might not similarly batten integrity of responsibility for injuries to all persons working upon the lapp enterprise, regardless of the finical relation existing of narrow or use, is not to be assumed without argument and in the absence of circumstances presenting the question. The logic upon which workmen ‘s compensation acts have been sustained does not require imperativeness upon a technical master and servant relative. Compare Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U. S. 503. See besides Jeremiah Smith, “ Sequel to Workmen ‘s Compensation Acts, ” 27 Harv.L.Rev. 235, 344 .
The coarse police, of course, holds many examples of indebtedness to third persons for injury sustained at the hands of an independent contractile organ or his handmaid. E.g., Ellis v. Sheffield Co., 2 E. & B. 767 ; Pickard v. Smith, 10 C.B. ( N. S. ) 470 ; Doll v. Ribetti, 203 F. 593 .
[ Footnote 2/18 ]
See the psychoanalysis and criticism in William O. Douglas, “ vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, ” 38 Yale L.J. 584, 594-604. Compare O. W. Holmes, “ agency, ” 5 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 14-16 .
[ Footnote 2/19 ]
See Baty, “ vicarious liability, ” passim ; Francis Bowes Sayre, “ criminal province for Acts of Another, ” 43 Harv.L.Rev. 689, 691-694 ; O. W. Holmes, “ agency, ” 4 Harv.L.Rev. 345, 5 Id. 1. The foremost textbook on Agency did not appear until 1812. Paley, “ The Law of Principal and Agent. ”
[ Footnote 2/20 ]
See the digests of the statutes in L. V. Hill and Ralph H. Wilkin, “ Workmen ‘s Compensation Statute Law ” ; and F. Robertson Jones, “ Digest of Workmen ‘s Compensation Laws ” ( 10th Ed. ). The provision in the New York Workmen ‘s Compensation Act ( Consol. Laws, c. 67 ), § 56, is exemplifying :
“ A contractile organ, the subject of whose contract is, involves or includes a hazardous employment, who subcontracts all or any function of such sign shall be liable for and shall pay recompense to any employee injured. .. . ”
In 1927, in recommending the extension of this provision to include owners or lessees vitamin a well as general contractors, the State Industrial Commissioner said :
“ From the point of opinion of making indisputable of compensation to hurt workers, all the reasons for the existing obligations put upon a general contractor for a piece of build work who sublets separate of the work, are equally cogent for doing the same in subject of an owner or leaseholder of premises who lets share of building make in precisely the like way. The practical necessitate for doing it has been shown by experience to be across-the-board owing to the large sum of build study now being done under the method acting above noted and which this amendment is designed to cover. ”
“ The existing provision has proven very beneficial in the case of contractors, and it will be evenly useful in the case of the type of owner-contractor, so to speak who must now be dealt with for solution of the like problem. ”
annual Report of the Industrial Commissioner ( 1927 ) pp. 4, 5 .
[ Footnote 2/21 ]
See, e.g., Industrial Commission v. Continental Investment Co., 78 Colo. 399, 401, 402, 242 P. 49 ; Palumbo v. George A. Fuller Co., 99 Conn. 355, 358, 122 A. 63 ; Fisk v. Bonner Tie Co., 40 Idaho, 304, 308, 232 P. 569 ; Parker-Washington Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 498, 504, 113 N.E. 976 ; american Steel Foundries v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 99, 103, 119 N.E. 902 ; McDowell v. Duer, 78 Ind.App. 440, 444, 445, 133 N.E. 839 ; Burt v. Clay, 207 Ky. 278, 281, 269 S.W. 322 ; Seabury v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 171 La. 199, 204, 205, 130 So. 1 ; White v. George B. H. Macomber Co., 244 Mass. 195, 198, 138 N.E. 239 ; Burt v. Munising Woodenware Co., 222 Mich. 699, 702, 703, 193 N.W. 895 ; De Lonjay v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 35 S.W..2d 911, 912 ; Sherlock v. Sherlock, 112 Neb. 797, 799, 201 N.W. 645 ; O’Banner v. Pendlebury, 107 N.J.Law, 245, 247, 153 A. 494 ; Clark v. Monarch Engineering Co., 248 N.Y. 107, 110, 161 N.E. 436 ; De Witt v. State, 108 Ohio St. 513, 522-525, 141 N.E. 551 ; Green v. State Industrial Commission, 121 Okl. 211, 212, 249 P. 933 ; Qualp v. James Stewart Co., 266 Pa. 502, 109 A. 780 ; Murray v. Wasatch Grading Co., 73 Utah, 430, 436, 439, 274 P. 940 ; Threshermen ‘s Nat. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 201 Wis. 303, 306, 230 N.W. 67 ; Wisinger v. White Oil Corp., 24 F.2d 101, 102. But compare Flickenger v. Industrial Accident Commission, 181 Cal. 425, 432, 433, 184 P. 851. liability to pay compensation obtains in England under circumstances in which no relation of employment exists. See Mulrooney v. Todd ( 1909 ), 1 K.B. 165 ; Marks v. Carne ( 1909 ), 2 K.B. 516 .
[ Footnote 2/22 ]
Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 8, 4 U. S. 10 ; United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 crunch, 32, 11 U. S. 33 ; Shelden v. Sill, 8 How. 441, 49 U. S. 449 ; Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274, 76 U. S. 280 ; Home Life Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214, 86 U. S. 226 ; Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U. S. 165, 195 U. S. 167 ; Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 260 U. S. 234. It was not until the Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 470, that Congress extended the jurisdiction of the tour courts to “ cases arising under the laws of the United States, ” thus permitting to be exercised “ the huge range of exponent which had dwell dormant in the Constitution since 1789. ” See Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, “ The Business of the Supreme Court, ” pp. 65-68 ; Charles Warren, “ Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, ” 38 Harv.L.Rev. 545. large areas of the potential jurisdiction of the lower federal courts are now occupied by early tribunals. As to legislative courts, see Wilber Griffith Katz, “ Federal Legislative Courts, ” 43 Harv.L.Rev. 894. Congress has repeatedly exercised power to exclude from the union courts cases not involving the necessity jurisdictional amount. Cases arising under the Federal Employers ‘ Liability Act are triable in either the state courts or the federal District Courts. See second base Employers ‘ Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 223 U. S. 56, 223 U. S. 57 -59 ; Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 279 U. S. 377. so, besides, cases under § 20 of the Seamen ‘s Act, as amended by the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, § 33. Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 271 U. S. 37 ; Panama R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U. S. 557, 271 U. S. 562 .
[ Footnote 2/23 ]
See decisions and statutes collected in 285 U.S. 22 fn2/5| > note 5, above. sol far as concerns the question here presented, it is immaterial whether the controversy is wholly between secret parties or is between the government and a citizen. The fact that litigation under the Longshoremen ‘s Act is, in message, between individual parties ( even though under § 21 ( barn ) the deputy commissioner is the lone necessity party answering ) does not warrant the inference that the administrative features of the Act present a question not so far decided. The tribunals in 285 U.S. 22 fn2/5| > note 5, above, listed deal with matters outside the setting of the doctrine recently examined in Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U. S. 438. While the opinion in that case referred to “ assorted matters, arising between the politics and others, ” as appropriate for the awareness of legislative courts, the reference book was restricted to matters “ which from their nature do not require judicial decision and so far are susceptible of it, ” the mode of determining which “ is wholly within congressional see. ” Id. at 279 U. S. 451. The suggestion that ascribable procedure does not require judicial work in any controversy to which the government is a party would involve a revision of historic conceptions of the nature of the union judicial system. That all questions arising in the presidency of the Interstate Commerce Act, for example, or between a taxpayer and the government under the tax laws, could be committed by Congress entirely to administrator officers, in esteem to issues of law american samoa well as of fact, has never been supposed. thus, there is no reading in the opinion in Ex parte Bakelite Corporation that the Commerce Court was a legislative woo, although instances of the creation of such courts were considered in detail. See Wilber Griffith Katz, “ Federal Legislative Courts, ” 43 Harv.L.Rev. 894, 914, 915 .
[ Footnote 2/24 ]
Compare Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100, and Pearson v. Zehr, 138 Ill. 48, 29 N.E. 854, cited by the Court. These cases involved summary administrative action, and the complaining individuals had been given no opportunity to be heard on the question whether their property was in fact subject to the end ordered. The academic degree of finality appropriate in administrative legal action must always depend upon the character of the administrative hearing provided. Compare Dickinson, “ administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law, ” pp. 260-261 ; E. F. Albertsworth, “ Judicial Review of Administrative action by the Federal Supreme Court, ” 35 Harv.L.Rev. 127, 152, 153. In most states, the inclination appears to be to deny the good, in a tort action against an administrative officer, to question the universe of the fact justifying his act, if a listening was provided or if a suit for injunction could have been brought. See Freund, “ administrative Powers Over Persons and Property, ” pp. 248-252 ; Kirk v. Board of Health, 83 S.C. 372, 383, 65 S.E. 387. Compare north american Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, 211 U. S. 316, 211 U. S. 317. In cases arising under the Workmen ‘s Compensation Laws, where formal learn is available, the Massachusetts and Illinois courts, in park with many others, have held the administrative rule of the fact of employment conclusive. Churchill ‘s Case, 265 Mass. 117, 164 N.E. 68 ; Hill ‘s Case, 268 Mass. 491, 167 N.E. 914 ; Cinofsky v. Industrial Commission, 290 Ill. 521, 125 N.E. 286 ; Franklin Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 Ill. 329, 129 N.E. 811 .
[ Footnote 2/25 ]
Compare Frankfurter and Davison, “ Cases on administrative law, ” Preface, p. eight. See Albert Levitt, “ The Judicial Review of Executive Acts, ” 23 Mich.L.Rev. 588, 595 et. seq. This assurance may embrace adenine well the decision of questions of law as of fact, depending upon the judicial construction given to the authority of the court. thus, in In Re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147 ; In Re Morrissey, 137 U. S. 157 ; noble v. Union River Logging Railroad, 147 U. S. 165 ; Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U. S. 53 ; and Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, all cited in note 285 U.S. 22 fn2/26| > 26, below, the Court recognized the finality of many decisions of police by the tribunals in interview. Tribunals of this fictional character are, of course, empowered, under ordinary circumstances, to make conclusive determinations of fact. See for example, Passavant v. United States, 148 U. S. 214, 148 U. S. 219 ; Medbury v. United States, 173 U. S. 492, 173 U. S. 497, 173 U. S. 498 ; Silberschein v. United States, 266 U. S. 221, 266 U. S. 225 ; Quon Quon Roy v. Johnson, 273 U. S. 352, 273 U. S. 358 .
[ Footnote 2/26 ]
( a ) In Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, the legislative act authorized the deportation only of aliens, without provision for judicial review of the executive order. Act of February 5, 1917, c. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889. Upon application for a writ of habeas corpus, by a person arrested who claimed to be a citizen, it was held that he was entitled to a discriminative determination of that claim. No question arise as to whether Congress might validly have provided for review entirely upon the commemorate made in the executive department ; nor as to the setting of review which might have been permissible upon such record .
( barn ) In ra Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, and In ra Morrissey, 137 U. S. 157, cope with the action of military tribunals. military tribunals from a system of courts separate from the civil courts and created by virtue of an independent award of power in the Constitution. Article 1, § 8, clauses 14, 16. They have authority to determine last any encase over which they have legal power ;
“ and their proceedings. .. are not afford to review by the civil tribunals, except for the purpose of ascertaining whether the military court had jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, and whether, though having such legal power, it had exceeded its powers in the prison term pronounced. ”
Carter v. Roberts, 177 U. S. 496, 177 U. S. 498 ; Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333, 206 U. S. 347. As Congress did not provide any method acting for reappraisal by the courts of the decisiveness of military tribunals, all questions of law concerning military legal power are overt to independent decision in the civil courts ; and the cases of In rhenium Grimley and In ra Morrissey, decide nothing more. Whether Congress could make the findings of “ jurisdictional facts, ” of military tribunals conclusive upon civil courts is a question which appears never to have been raised .
( c ) In noble v. Union River Logging Co, 147 U. S. 165, 147 U. S. 174, relief was granted by beak in equity to stay illegal and unauthorized legal action of the Secretary of the Interior in respect to the public lands, there being no method of judicial review prescribed by codified. Compare St. Louis Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 104 U. S. 641 .
( five hundred ) In Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U. S. 53, 226 U. S. 58, as in Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 194 U. S. 109, 104 U. S. 110, and american School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 187 U. S. 109, bills in fairness were entertained to review acts of the Postmaster General alleged to be unauthorized, Congress not having provided any method of judicial review. In each subject the interview involved was stated to be one of police .
[ Footnote 2/27 ]
The decision in the Ohio Valley Water Co. case has evoked extensive and change gloss. See, e.g., Curtis, “ Judicial Review of Commission Rate Regulation — The Ohio Valley Case, ” 34 Harv.L.Rev. 862 ; Albertsworth, “ Judicial Review of Administrative military action by the Federal Supreme Court, ” 35 Harv.L.Rev. 127 ; C. W. Pound, “ The Judicial Power, ” 35 Harv.L.Rev. 787 ; Brown, “ The Functions of Courts and Commissions in Public Utility Rate Regulations, ” 38 Harv.L.Rev. 141 ; Wiel, “ administrative finality, ” 38 Harv.L.Rev. 447 ; Buchanan, “ The Ohio Valley Water Co. Case and the Valuation of Railroads, ” 40 Harv.L.Rev. 1033 ; Beutel, “ evaluation as a prerequisite of Due Process of Law in Rate Cases, ” 43 Harv.L.Rev. 1249 ; Green, “ The Ohio Valley Water Case, ” 4 Ill.L.Q. 55 ; Freund, “ The Right to a Judicial Review in Rate Controversies, ” 27 W.Va.L.Q. 207 ; Hardman, “ discriminative Review as a requirement of Due Process in Rate Regulation, ” 30 Yale L.J. 681 ; Isaacs, “ Judicial Review of Administrative Findings, ” 30 Yale L.J. 781. No commentator, however, appears to have understood the decision as recognizing in any manner a right to trial de novo in court upon confiscation issues .
[ Footnote 2/28 ]
It is cause for regret that the Court, in determining this controversy, should have declared, obiter, that, in matters of state public utility regulation involving administrative action of a special character, and raising questions under a different constitutional planning, a manner of procedure is required contrary to that about universally established under state jurisprudence ( see David E. Lilienthal, “ The Federal Courts and State Regulation of Public Utilities, ” 43 Harv.L.Rev. 379, 412, 413 ), and calculated badly to embarrass the operation of the administrative method in that field .
[ Footnote 2/29 ]
But see Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 227 U. S. 92. The statement by Mr. Justice Jamar there, however, went no further than to indicate that, in some circumstances, the courts on review of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission might pass an independent opinion upon the attest adduced before the Commission. See besides Interstate Commerce Commission v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 216 U. S. 538, 216 U. S. 544 ; Manufacturers ‘ Ry. Co. v. United States, 246 U. S. 457, 246 U. S. 488 -490 .
[ Footnote 2/30 ]
See Dickinson, “ administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law, ” p. 310 .
[ Footnote 2/31 ]
Out of the 30,383 nonfatal cases disposed of during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1931, the deputy commissioners held hearings in only 729, according to information furnished by the United States Employees ‘ Compensation Commission. recompense payments were completed in 11,776 cases, or 38.8 percentage of the total. In 17,328 cases, or 57 percentage, the injured employee failed to receive compensation because no time was lost, or less than seven days, on account of the injury. The proportion of 1,279 cases, amounting to 4.2 percentage of the whole, were dismissed because they did not come within the telescope of the law. Among the 18,607 noncompensated cases, formal claims were filed by the employee in merely 1,025 instances. See besides Report of the Compensation Commission, 1930, pp. 68-70 .
[ Footnote 2/32 ]

For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1931, 101 new cases were filed in the District Courts, out of a total of 30,489 cases disposed of. Report of the United States Employee ‘s Compensation Commission, pp. 69, 71. For the three preceding years, the number of cases filed in the courts was, respectively, 61, 58, and 15. report, 1930, p. 62 ; id., 1929, p. 70 ; id., 1928, p. 34. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the case at bar declaring the mighty to a trial de novo was rendered November 17, 1930, and the first opinion of the District Court on May 27, 1929 .
[ Footnote 2/33 ]
How serious these consequences will be is a motion of meditation, but it is plain that they will be aggravated by the built-in uncertainty in the setting of the doctrine announced. The determination of what facts are “ jurisdictional ” or “ fundamental ” is calculated to provoke a multitude of disputes. That there is a deviation in kind, for example, between the defense that the hurt claimant is not an employee and that he was not acting as an employee when he was injured, or that there is a deviation between the latter defense and the defense that the disability, if any, from which he suffers resulted only in part, or not at all, from the use in which he claims to have suffered it, are propositions which employers will be unlikely to accept until they have submitted them to the decision of the courts. The effectiveness of this legislation will be lessened by this opportunity for barren controversy over adjective rights and by delay or thwart decision of substantive ones .