Choosing the “ wrong ” law can have good case-deciding consequences. Generally, federal maritime police applies to all maritime torts ( i.e. property damage or personal injuries ) occurring on navigable waters. many judges, however, feel more comfortable with the police of the state where they sit, and much strain to apply country law when union nautical law should rightly govern the action. Because nautical jurisprudence has been developed to facilitate nautical commerce, it much differs well from ordinary submit legal principles. As a resultant role, a party who should lose under maritime law standards can avoid indebtedness when state of matter law is applied. This is apparently what happened recently in Red Shield Insurance Co. v. Barnhill Marina and Boatyard Inc, where defendant marina escaped what credibly would have been a $ 160,000 judgment .
Plaintiff Insurer provided “ floating home ” property policy on a houseboat, which sank at its chartered position at a marina in San Francisco Bay. A big collection of silt up and mire under the houseboat had caused it to list and founder. The insurance company paid the vessel owner $ 160,000 under the policy, then brought a subrogation action against the Marina. In competing summary judgment motions before the union court, both parties argued that California ’ s Floating Home Residency Law ( “ FHRL ” ) Civil Code secant. 800 et seq governed the challenge. That legislative act requires a marina owner to “ maintain the physical improvements of the park areas in good condition ” for the benefit of all houseboat lessees. The Court acknowledged that this was a case of admiralty legal power, and that federal admiralty law would displace the California legislative act if that codified squarely contravened settled nautical law principles. Finding no federal jurisprudence on the issue, the woo held that the subsoil below the see ’ sulfur houseboat was not a part of the Marina ’ s park areas. accordingly, under California jurisprudence, although the berth was known to be subject to silting, the Marina had no obligation to dredge or otherwise maintain it.
To the extent the Court ’ sulfur impression rests on California police, its reasoning seems sound. however, the Court failed to consider the being of federal nautical casing law, which arguably contradicts and conflicts with California ’ s FHRL. Under federal maritime law, specific duties of manage are imposed upon the owners of wharf and marinas. While a marina owner does not guarantee the safety of a boat at its dock, it is “ under a duty to exercise reasonable diligence to furnish a safe mooring and to avoid wrong to the vessel. This includes the duty to ascertain the stipulate of the moor, to make it safe or warn the transport of any hide guess or lack known to the wharfinger or which, in the exercise of fair care and inspection, should be known to him and not reasonably known to the shipowner. ” Trade Banner Line Inc. v. Caribbean Steamship Co. 521 F 2d 229, 230 ( 5th Cir 1975 ). Where a wharf owner knows the draft of a vessel on its premises, and knows that tidal changes may make the moor insecure for a vessel of that draft, the pier owner must “ use fair application to determine whether the docking spaces were reasonably safe ” for the yachts which were going to use them . “J. Frank Doubleday v. Corinthian Yacht Club 1979 AMC 2578 ( D MD 1973 ). here, the Marina had dredged the berth in the by because of silt up accumulations, and was presumably aware that the houseboat could be negatively impacted by the accretion of silt and debris. It is ill-defined whether the Marina had always warned the houseboat owner of the silt up problem. Had federal law been applied to this action, the court could well have reached another conclusion .
Most current marina leases contain exculpatory clauses which may insulate a marina from liability arising from negligent position maintenance. Depending on the specific give voice of the article, and the jurisdiction involved, such clauses are much found to be valid. See, for model, Sander v. Alexander Richardson Investments 334 F3d 712 ( 8thCir 2003 ) and Markel American Ins. Co. v. Dagmar’s Marina LLC 2007 AMC 2259 ( Wash App 2007 ), which held that an “ own negligence ” exculpatory article is valid if it is “ sufficiently clean, ” versus Pelletier v. Alameda Yacht Harbor 188 Cal App 3d 1551 ( 1986 ), which found a Marina ’ s contractual excuse for its own negligence to be void as against public policy. The moral to be drawn from this case that an early and exhaustive examination of option of law issues can have a significant affect on the consequence of a case .
