The Marine Corps ’ new force design may allow East Coast expeditionary units to look much different than West Coast or Japan-based units, a nod to the building complex but different environments they ’ ll operate in and threats they ’ ll confront in the future .commanding officer of the Marine Corps Gen. David Berger recently released his force design 2030 design, which calls for the creation of new Marine Littoral Regiments, a well as redesigned Marine Expeditionary Units ( MEUs ) that would be optimized for the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations concept that has driven a lot of the Marines ’ planning in late months .
The overarching theme of the wedge design is to embrace what is unique about the Marine Corps and divest of capabilities that are already nonmigratory in the joint military unit, Berger told reporters this week. If the serve is to act as an expeditionary and amphibious crisis response wedge, rather than a second land army, then it needs to change how it equips and organizes itself. In the case of heavy tanks, short- and medium-range artillery, bridging companies to support nourish domain campaigns and more, Berger wrote in his report that he is confident the Army has the good capabilities and that the Marine Corps does not need to duplicate that .
however, he notes he is not confident in the MEUs and Marine Littoral Regiments, which would be the formations most responsible for carrying out EABO – a concept that was reinvigorated in 2016 and signed out in 2018, and that falls under the Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment ( LOCE ) concept, the Marine Corps offering that pairs with the Navy ’ south Distributed Maritime Operations concept.
Asked by USNI News what made him convinced in EABO but not confident in the formations that would execute it, he said he had a fair agreement of what a Japan-based MEU or MLR might look like, but that California- and North Carolina-based Marines would need to craft their own kinds of units besides to support EABO operations in the environments they ’ d most likely deploy to .
“ I in full embrace the concept of Distributed Maritime Operations the way that the former CNO laid it out and the current CNO embraces it. I think that Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment is something that we have to embrace and be prepared to operate in. Within that, Expeditionary Advance Base Ops, EABO, is a method acting, is a proficiency, and it has proven so far in the wargames to be very effective – if you can pull it off. And it ’ s not slowly to do, ” Berger told USNI News during the media round table.
“ So that concept, that method, that proficiency of EABO poses a number of challenges for an adversary : it complicates their ability to find you and to track you, complicates their ability to engage you, and it besides reassures the partners and the allies that you ’ re trying to work with, because you ’ ra very dispersed among them, you ’ re with them – not in a repulsion manner, you ’ re in a stand-in mode. ”
“ then how does that tie in to where we ’ rhenium not as confident in the construct of a MLR and what the MEU of the future ought to look like ? first base thing I would ask you to just take onboard with us is good, we are at the point where we ’ re eruditeness. We are already convinced based on wargames and modeling indeed far that we have a fairly effective estimate of what an MLR in III MEF in Japan, based out of Japan and engage in the Pacific, could look like. We have a bunch more to learn there and we may absolutely adjust the model of that in the future. What we ’ ra not as confident in is, what is II MEF in the East Coast, what is I MEF in the West Coast, what should they build ? Do they have to be mirror image ? Should they look precisely in the lapp template and the same model ? And I ’ thousand of the modality at this stagecoach in the learn, no. Our determine should be, what is the best construct that makes feel for their operational environments ? ” the commanding officer continued.
“ Same with MEUs. We have had one framework, one manufacture for a MEU : all seven of them had to be mirror visualize for the stopping point couple of decades because they were largely flowing to the Middle East to do a deputation in Central Command. Going ahead, what they were in the first place designed for, where they ’ rhenium ball-shaped, nowadays we should have the latitude for a Marine Expeditionary Unit in one place may look different than another Marine Expeditionary Unit. So when I say less confident, what I ’ meter trying to communicate is, A ), they don ’ t have to all be mirror persona, we should be able to tailor them to their operate environment, and B ), we don ’ thyroxine want to create all looking one way and then undo that two years from now when we discover that that ’ s not the best way to construct it in Camp Lejeune, it should be a little bit different. So we ’ ll use the ones in Japan as kind of the test bed, we ’ ll learn from that. The other two parts of the Fleet Marine Force will watch, will observe, and then we ’ ll name out how they ought to be constructed, and it could be the lapp or it could be different. ”
last year III MEF Marines tested out a couple pieces of EABO in survive exercises. In one, according to 31st MEU Commanding Officer Col. Robert Brodie, reconnaissance Marines conducted a high-level jump onto Ie Shima island near Okinawa, paving the manner for a raid force being flown in to seize the island. Once the island was secured, CH-53E heavy-lift helicopters flew in fuel bladders and munition to conduct a ahead arm and refueling point ( FARP ) operation with the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter jets that were experimenting with how they could contribute to island-hopping operations in the Pacific .
belated last year, a alike operation was conducted to establish a FARP for the KC-130J cargo and oil tanker plane – which is much larger than the F-35 and needs a more lay down track, whereas the F-35B variant has short parody and erect land capability. Though setting up a FARP for the larger fixed-wing plane is more complex than for the F-35, in this practice the KC-130Js were used as function of a casualty emptying drill that smaller planes couldn ’ t have conducted .
concisely after the FARP set-up and CASEVAC exercise, the Marines tested another scenario, taking a beach from an amphibious transport and pushing the HIMARS rocket system ashore by LCU surface connectors. They simulated firing the HIMARS using data from an F-35B flying overhead, “ demonstrating the capability for long-range preciseness fire patronize during expeditionary operations, ” USNI News reported at the time. “ This was the foremost time that a HIMARS slip in by LCU has ever been completed in the Indo-Pacific region after a imitate amphibious raid, rehearsing naval expeditionary combined-arms maneuver from amphibious ship. ”
Berger said these exercises showed the artillery fly-in capability and the FARP capability, but that EABO could besides call for small teams to move in and out of a piece of land to conduct news collection, logistics, command and manipulate, or other missions .
“ We have to experiment with all of that to find out what the best way to build those forces are, and what kinds of equipment they need, all in the mentality of, they have to be able but they besides have to be able to displace, to be able to move, and we can ’ t make them so bad and heavy that they can ’ t get out of their own way, ” he told USNI News during the round table .
He said more model and simulation, wargaming and live exercises would be needed to continue to refine these ideas and to understand what the MEUs and MLRs would look like if applied to the Northern European field, for exemplar, or the Mediterranean, or any early area these forces may be asked to deploy to and operate in.
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“ In redesigning the Marine Corps, we ’ rhenium more at the beginning than we are at the end. But the first step was a big mistreat, and it began long earlier survive summer, but the heavy character of the lift was from last summer until now. And what we ’ ve learned is decidedly some things we have to change in the Marine Corps to have the right Marine Corps 10 years from now. And some other things look like we might need to change them, but we don ’ t have enough information however, we haven ’ thymine wargamed enough, we haven ’ triiodothyronine modeled enough to be sure of that. thus some things we ’ ra surely of and we ’ ra going to start down that path, and early areas are going to take a fortune more experiment and more eruditeness along the means. This international relations and security network ’ t the concluding report, the end submit, ” he said at the begin of the media call .
Berger ’ s report expresses assurance in the areas he wants to begin divesting of, which the service can begin doing justly away – and Berger noted during the call that Marines in these communities will not be handed a tap mooring, but would have the chance to change specialties and continue to serve as the corporation begins its decade-long transition period .
He is less confident in the investments the servicing will make and calls for more eruditeness .
In calling for a redesigned and smaller infantry battalion, Berger writes, “ I am not convinced that we have adequately assessed all of the implications of the future operating environment on the proposed structure of our future infantry battalion. While I fully support redesign of the infantry battalion in principle, I remain unconvinced that the specific proposed new reconstruct makes the coerce more capable of Distributed Operations. We must conduct more live-force experiment to ensure our proposed design results in a truly DO-capable power. ”
While he ’ sulfur certain he wants to get rid of clayey ground vehicles, he admits he ’ south still struggling with the function of light armored vehicles angstrom well, writing that, “ while I have repeatedly stated that all-domain reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance will be a critical element of any future contingency, I remain unconvinced that extra wheeled, manned armored grate reconnaissance units are the best and only answer – specially in the Indo-Pacific region. We need to see more evidence during Phase III ( of the Force Design 2030 campaign ) to support this ending before engaging in an expansion of our existing capacity, or committing billions of dollars in procurement funds towards the learning of an Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle ( ARV ). ”
And while Berger made a boastfully splash right after taking over as commanding officer survive summer by saying he wanted to get away from the long-standing prerequisite for 38 traditional amphibious ships and alternatively pursue alternate amphibious and logistics ships to better accompaniment EABO, he wrote in the force design that, “ I am not convinced that we have identified the extra structure required to provide the tactical maneuver and logistic sustenance needed to execute DMO, LOCE and EABO in contest littoral environments against our pace terror. While not an reconsideration by any means, I do not believe our Phase I and II efforts gave logistics sufficient attention. Resolving these two areas must be a priority for Phase III. ”
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