The CNO challenged the Navy last year with his Frag Order 01/2019, “ A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority. This article will examine maritime transcendence efforts of both the People ’ s Republic of China ( PRC ) and the U.S. in late years, including shipbuilding. It will besides examine ideas on how to pay for future U. S. Navy shipbuilding .
- China’s Navy…..Seeking Maritime Superiority: The PRC is modernizing virtually every element of its military. It has plans to field a world-class military by 2035 and a dominant military by mid-century. One of the focus areas of this effort is the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the PLAN. Consistent with its near-term goal of regional hegemony, the PRC is building Navy, Coast Guard, Maritime Militia, and merchant fleets faster than any other nation. Its Navy now directly commands their Coast Guard, adding hundreds of armed ships to its fleet. Even its Maritime Militia is under the command and control of the PLAN and is lightly armed and trained to conduct disruptive operations against rival nations.[i]
The PRC’s fleet of warships now outnumbers U.S. warships in the Indo-Pacific by a significant margin, perhaps as much as 10 to 1, not even including its Coast Guard and Maritime Militia vessels. With this new capacity and capability, The PRC constantly intimidates its neighbors through its increasingly aggressive maritime behavior. The PRC has even contested the U.S. on many occasions as noted in the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, updated December 20, 2019, which documents numerous serious incidents between the Chinese and U.S. going back to 2001. The PRC is becoming more aggressive with the U.S. with some PLAN Admirals openly advocating sinking U.S. Navy ships. The PRC intends to control the international waters off its shores and strategic choke points. They have illegally militarized portions of the South China Sea (SCS) in international waters, constructing islands from various shoals, atolls, and other features. These islands currently total more than 3200 acres of manufactured land in the SCS and have been thoroughly militarized with port facilities, runways, hangars and aircraft, sophisticated radars and missile facilities. Their militarization represents a significant risk for future conflict between the U.S. and our allies and the PRC.
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The PRC has concocted an imaginary “nine-dash line” comprising most of the SCS, which they now claim as their own territorial waters despite the U.N. in 2016 rejecting their unfounded claims. By making this claim and by their behavior of harassing and blocking other nations in the region, they intend to take ownership of most of the vast resources within the SCS. Examples abound of their aggressive actions with other nations in the region with particularly egregious examples being the recent sinking of a Vietnamese vessel
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and interference with a Malaysia oil exploration rig in its own waters.
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After a four year delay, the U.S. has now officially rejected the PRC’s claims related to the SCS and was quickly joined by Australia in doing the same.
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The PRC has invested heavily in long-range anti-access area denial (A2/AD) missiles. These missiles represent a serious threat to our warships since considerable uncertainty exists about the effectiveness of our defenses against them.
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The express purpose of their arsenal of A2/AD missiles is to increase the stand-off distance from China that our warships must maintain to avoid attack. By pushing our Navy away from its shores, it hopes to turn the SCS into Chinese territorial waters and force the U.S. Navy outside the first island chain. In addition, the PRC has sown huge areas of the SCS with underwater sensors, creating the “Great Wall of Sensors” and dual-use cables that simultaneously carry communications traffic and include sensors. The PRC has a mature mine laying capability with one report indicating that they had more than 500 ships and aircraft capable of sowing mines. These new factors will make U.S. nautical operations in those areas even more difficult, if not dangerous. During 2005-2019, the CRS documents that the PLAN increased in size by 119 combatants.[vii] That same report documents that the U. S. Navy increased by only eight ships over the same time period. In recent times, worry has intensified across the region that the PRC imminently plans to illegally declare most of the South China Sea its own Air Defense Identification Zone.
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- U.S. Navy…..Trying to maintain Maritime Superiority: In his Frag Order 01/2019, the CNO details at some length the measures the Navy will take to maintain its supremacy. However, not mentioned are specifics on which ships or how many are necessary to what most experts now think is the main threat, The PRC. A new Force Structure has been under development for some time now and is currently hung up due to OSD and Congressional “oversight.” The CNO FRAGO highlights Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), and Littoral Operations in Contested Environment (LOCE) as being key to the Navy’s ability to counter our potential adversaries. In this section, challenges facing the Navy in terms of numbers of ships and types of platforms will be examined.
In acute contrast to the PRC, the U.S. has built far fewer ships in that same 2005-2019 time period cited above. [ nine ] President Trump campaigned on rebuilding the U.S. military, including increasing the size of the Navy to 350 combatants. In 2018 NDAA Congress passed into law the necessity for 355 combatants. As of this writing, the Navy has 301 combatants in deputation, a deficit of 54 ships. many believe the requirement is much higher immediately due to the looming threat of the PLAN. restfully, spokesmen for the Navy have admitted that with current and aforethought appropriations, the Navy will be unable to reach 355 ships. While Congress has increased the DOD budget by more than 28 % under President Trump, shipbuilding appropriations only went up slenderly in 2017 but have remained apartment for 2018-2020 and will decline by about $ 4B in 2021. Congress has thus far only appropriated approximately 75 % of what ‘s required to attain the finish, and most experts nowadays agree the number is unachievable in the stream fiscal and political environment. The accumulative consequence of the deficit gets larger each class and is now estimated to exceed $ 30B. To reach the Congressionally mandated 355 ship goal would require an increase in the Navy ‘s SCN budget from the stream level of ~ $ 20B per annum to a hold level of $ 31B for the foreseeable future until we reach the compulsory act of ships. There is no discernible swerve or shift in numbers or types of ships since the CNO FRAGO was issued being programmed in Navy budgets to reflect the modern DMO, EABO, or LOCE scheme. In fairness, in the Navy ’ randomness 2021 NDAA request, the Navy is requesting funds for a number of unmanned Surface and Undersea vehicles, and those requirements are linked DMO, etc. [ ten ] modern warships are extremely complicated and take a very long time to build. Our newest carrier, USS Gerald Ford ( CVN-78 ), took 12 years to build. It was commissioned in July 2017, but it has hush not reached initial operate capability ( IOC ) and won ’ thymine for a long time to come due to problems with the raw electronic launch system and newly designed ammunition elevators that don ’ thymine knead among other things. [ xi ] Recent estimates indicate that it will not make its first deployment until 2023. other ship classes take less time to build, but most take at least six years. Both LCS variants have been troubled since the first ship was commissioned, however these ships continue to be built even as the Navy announced plans recently to retire the first gear four ships of the class. The Zumwalt course is similarly trouble, having gone through multiple iterations for its mission, and the Navy is even trying to work out how to use this ship. Two more of this class are under structure while the Navy tries to discover its mission. The Zumwalt is nowadays assigned to the Surface Development Squadron in San Diego, a silent entrance fee that the Navy in truth does not know for surely what to do with this transport class. The Commandant has made it clear that the 38 large amphibious ship metric unit has been overtaken by events. [ twelve ] Yet as the CRS documents, the Navy shipbuilding plans show the Navy hush reflects 38 amphibs as the official requirement and existing ship types are in the grapevine to be built. [ thirteen ] It is not just the SCN costs that are consuming such a big share of the Navy ’ mho budget, but it ’ s besides the work force costs for the crew and the O & M/procurement costs for the train, hold, maintenance, weapons, and the wholly logistics train. These examples raise the question of what types of ships the Navy needs to meet the PRC threat ? Would it make sense to reassess the want for the ships that are in the pipeline ?
In wartime, ships are sunk. Because it takes therefore long to construct warships, the future war will be fought with the ships we already have. Since the spill of the Soviet Union, the U.S. shipbuilding industry has experienced a fantastic decline. today there are only seven shipyards in CONUS capable of building the Navy ’ s warships. The complex nature of Navy combatants requires us to retain a robust state-of-the-art shipbuilding diligence that is capable of building the world ‘s most advance warships. According to the CRS, the industry has unparalleled capability but specify capacity, i.e., it can entirely build a few ships at a time and would have to add considerable work force and make major implant investments before being able to build more ships types that will be most effective at facing the PRC threat. It is pressing to build more ships of the right type while we calm have time. Exacerbating the situation, Bath Iron Works is behind agenda in building Burke-class Destroyers and is having labor problems with the shipyard having recently gone on strike that adds to the trouble. [ fourteen ] According to the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip S. Davidson, “ China is now able of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios brusque of war with the United States. ” Some maintain that U.S. ships are distillery far victor to taiwanese ships. That may well be so. But, at some decimal point, measure trumps quality. And our transcendence is by no means agreed upon by everyone. Robert O. work, the immediate past Deputy SECDEF, has stated that China has attained peer or near-peer military world power status with the U.S. and exceeds the U.S. in some fields, including Space technology. [ fifteen ] And, Mr. Work is by no means the alone senior official to express this position .
here are proposals that could ease the problem of inadequate funds to build the fleet to the Congressionally mandated flush :
1. Reassess the Strategic Triad :
- For decades U.S. defense strategic policy regarding the Soviets was the strategic triad, the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Submarine Force, the strategic bombing force, and the Ballistic Missile Force. The Soviet Union finally collapsed in 1991, so the question may well be asked, “Do we really still need a strategic triad? Many consider the U.S.’s FBM force sufficient to continue the decades old MAD (mutually assured destruction) deterrent due to their ability to remain undetected while on patrol. The Navy plans to spend upwards of $100B for the Columbia class FBM submarine. This indicates, without a doubt, that the U.S. is confident in the foolproof deterrent nature of our FBM subs. Russia maintains a very large strategic nuclear offensive force. The question is, does Russia now constitute an existential threat to the U.S.? It is not the purpose of this paper to chronicle Russia’s weaknesses but suffice it to say that Russia with a GDP of less than 20% of the U.S. can hardly be seen as the same kind of threat it was during the Cold War. If the 1991 Soviet Union realized it could not defeat the U.S., Russia of 2020 has an even better understanding of that reality. Today, Russia is primarily a threat to Europe, and in Europe, the Russian threat is primarily conventional, not nuclear, territorial or strategic. The PRC too has a strategic weapons force, but its force is tiny in comparison to the U.S.’s force. Conversely, their conventional forces, particularly its Navy, are expanding rapidly. Andrew S. Erickson of the Naval War College documents that the PRC has a warhead inventory that is a 7:1 ratio of conventional to nuclear.[xvi]
Why is this? That is because the PRC too has no intention of starting a strategic nuclear war with the U.S. that it couldn’t possibly win. So, it maintains a modest strategic nuclear deterrent posture while concentrating on massively building up its conventional forces. The low numbers of PRC nukes are consistent with its public policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. If it ever contemplated a first strike, it would be forced to build many more nukes, and it would be unable to do that in secret.
- Many military historians think strategic airpower may be overrated. Also, the line between what constitutes a bomber and what constitutes a fighter in 2020 is quite blurry due to the advent and deployment of numerous long-range air-to-ground missiles that can be fired from multiple platforms, bombers, and fighters drones, and even long range reconnaissance aircraft. The U.S. dropped billions of tons of dumb bombs on Germany and Japan in WWII and on Vietnam in that conflict. Studies after WWII, the Vietnam War, and after the campaign to eliminate ISIS all document that bombing was largely ineffective.[xvii]
Which leads to the question: Does the U.S. still need bomber fleets in 2020, not just one but 3 (B-52, B-1, and B-2), and why is the U.S. developing yet another bomber, the B-21? Many say the U.S. keeps bombers because of advocates for bombers and bureaucratic resistance to change.
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Is it time for a serious examination of the utility of long range, strategic bombers, and where the bombers stack up in terms of preferred launch platforms? Many platforms can already launch the same weapons bombers use. Most platform specific existing smart bombs and missiles could be modified for other platforms, including the Army’s long-range fires and Navy aircraft, ships and submarines.
- Our static strategic missiles are obsolete, and some say dangerous. Of the three legs of the strategic nuclear triad, the Minuteman force is the most antiquated, risky, and flawed due to being unable to be stopped once launched.[xix]
Now that both the PRC and Russia claim to have developed long range, hypervelocity, maneuverable Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, the Minutemen are potentially much more vulnerable than ever before. If the US ICBM and strategic bomber assets were eliminated or even just reduced, funding would be freed up to build more ships that the Navy needs to counter the PRC or other Defense priorities. Figures are hard to obtain due to security issues, it is estimated that $15-20B per year could be reprogrammed to other uses.
2. Aircraft Carriers: Congress mandates the Navy to have 11 aircraft carriers and 9 air travel wings. As note earlier, the Navy presently has one aircraft carrier of the new FORD class in deputation. There are three more of this class carriers under construction or planned, and billions have already been spent on these ships. Recommend those ships be finished and commissioned vitamin a soon as potential to allow the retirement of the adjacent three oldest Nimitz course carriers. After this 4-ship class is complete, the U.S. should halt construction of any more big-deck CVN ‘s. The Navy should shift to constructing smaller, harder to detect, and even unmanned platforms to adjust to future war scenarios, which will probable be more high-tech with more sophisticate missile engineering. The necessity for 11 aircraft carriers needs to be re-evaluated in light of the F-35B, which allows placing our latest and most progress aircraft on many more ships. With the advent of the F-35B, the U.S. can begin to classify early ships such as the LHA and San Antonio course, Whidbey Island-class and Harper ‘s Ferry class amphibs as “ lightning ” carriers ascribable to carrying the F-35B. bill : The F-35B is besides referred to as the Lightning. This augment of the carrier fleet will provide for much more disperse naval strike capability from a a lot larger number of platforms. Distributing our air travel assets over more platforms could negate the indigence for more FORD class carriers. In addition, the Navy should rebalance its F35 ’ mho forces by buying fewer F-35C ’ mho and more F-35B ’ s so that the F-35 fleets can be much more widely dispersed and thus safe. The LHA class transition to becoming aircraft carriers has already begun with the USS America ’ s deployment to Japan with F-35B ’ south embarked. [ twenty ]
Read more: Australia Maritime Strategy
3. Large Amphib’s. Since the Commandant of the USMC has pointedly stepped away from the 38 Amphibious ship requirement [ xxi ], the Navy should reassess the nature and manipulation of these ships. In keeping with the CNO FRAGO that stresses DMO, EABO, and LOCE, the Navy should redesign its Amphibs to optimize their support for the F-35B. Despite the Commandant ’ south position on large amphibs, the Navy ’ s programming documents and the Congress still reflect 38 as the amphibious ship prerequisite and programming for two LPD-17 class ships remain in the five-year shipbuilding plan ( FY2021-2025 ). The Navy should modify all future amphibious ships to ensure that they can operate the Lightning efficiently from each type. It has even been proposed to operate F-35B ’ second from Expeditionary Sea Base Ships or Expeditionary Fast Transport Ships. It is heartening to note that the Navy and USMC are proceeding with plans for a transformative little amphib, the LAW ( Light Amphibious Warship ), with early support for studies sought a early on as next fiscal class. [ twenty-two ]
4. Littoral Combat Ship. The LCS has been a trouble chopine from the beginning. The Navy now has 19 in commission, although ten are non-deployable ( 4 are test ships, and 6 are reserved for training ). The Navy has recently announced plans to retire the first four ships next class. The three deputation packages have been a long clock time in achieving IOC, and although all three mission areas are now listed as having reached IOC, the Congress has expressed some doubt as to whether or not that is dependable. The Navy has spent billions on this transport class and has very small to show for it. The three mission packages associated with the LCS are Surface war, Mine war and Anti-submarine war, but alone the airfoil box has actually deployed. recent advances in unman engineering point to the likelihood of the quick development of unman technology for the Navy ‘s mine countermeasures deputation, which potentially could negate the LCS mine package in its entirety. serious questions have been raised about the LCS ‘s survivability, and satisfactory answers to that question have not been provided. [ xxiii ] A good look needs to be taken at the LCS and how well it fits the COCOM ‘s needs. Of the three now deployed, one is entirely used for counter-drug operations in Southern Command, and two are deployed to the Western Pacific. One has recently returned to the U.S. from a WESTPAC deployment, so a dear review of its utility on that deployment can be made in real time. A good lawsuit can probably be made to retire this embark course in its entirety and devote the funds to the FFG ( X ) now in growth. I suggest the Navy poll the COCOM ’ s regarding the transport types that meet the threats in their area of responsibility. If COMOM ’ s prefer other ship types, go to bed all the LCS ’ s early and use those resources to buy and man better ships such as the Burke-class DDG or the modern FFG ( X ) .
5. Zumwalt Class Destroyers. primitively designed to be a major class of big destroyers with in truth revolutionist design features and weaponry, this classify would have to be rightly labeled a blue failure. The Navy will end up with only ships for a entire development and construction cost of over $ 22B. The ship is indeed furtive with the radar signal of a small fishing trade, but the Navy is distillery searching for a mission for the embark, having abandoned years ago the original nation attack deputation of the ship. so, the Zumwalt has been assigned to a development squadron in San Diego while the Navy figures out what to do with the ship and its two mates. The Navy would be better off scrapping the three ships and taking the learning and operations resources and putting those towards ships that are high measure like the Burke-class DDG. Is it time for the Navy to admit kill and scrap the Zumwalt class destroyers and use the funds to buy more Burke-class Destroyers with prove measure or FFG ( X ) ships ? The U.S. has two production lines able of turning out eminent quality on budget Burke-class ships, Bath Iron Works and Huntington Ingalls and the Navy should take maximal advantage of those “ hot ” production lines to build more ships, faster to meet the compulsory goal of 355 combatants .
Conclusion: A combination of re-examining the necessitate for and the size of the Strategic Triad and revising the Navy ’ s shipbuilding requirements to correct past mistakes, recognize the extend act of combatants that can support the F-35B, and incorporating smaller and more numerous embark types consistent with the newfangled DMO, EABO and LOCE strategies could free up billions of investment dollars to enable the build the Navy of the future we need to face the loom PRC menace .
CAPT Ramsey, U.S. Navy (Ret.) served 30 years in the Navy and 23 years in Navy Civil service. He commanded Cargo Handling Battalion TWELVE during Operation Desert Storm forward deploying Fleet Hospital FIVE to Bogen Bay, Norway as a pre-positioned asset for NATO. During his career he held a wide assortment of positions with both NAVSUP and NAVFAC/Naval Construction Force including many years as the Operations Officer, CBC Gulfport. He was Member/Secretary of the Congressman Mark Meadows Military Advisory Group during the period January 2016-March 2020 .
Notes:
[ i ] Andrew S. Erickson, April 29, 2019, Fact Sheet : China ’ mho Maritime Militia, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.andrewerickson.com/2019/04/fact-sheet-chinas-maritime-militia/
[ two ] Michael O ’ Hanlon and Gregory Poling, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, January 14, 2020, Rocks, Reefs, and Nuclear War, hypertext transfer protocol : //amti.csis.org/rocks-reefs-and-nuclear-war/
[ three ] Gabrielle Reyes, Breitbart, April 3, 2020, South China Sea : chinese Ship Sinks Vietnamese gravy boat, detains crew. hypertext transfer protocol : //www.breitbart.com/asia/2020/04/03/south-china-sea-chinese-ship-sinks-vietnamese-boat-detains-crew/
[ intravenous feeding ] Rozanna Latiff, A. Ananthalakshmi, Reuters, April 23, 2020, Malaysia Calls for Peaceful End to Months-long Standoff, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-china-southchinasea-idUSKCN2250GW /
[ v ] Australia Joins the U.S. in Rejecting China ‘s Claims in the South China Sea, South China Morning Post, July 25,2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.scmp.com/news/asia/australasia/article/3094674/australia-joins-us-rejecting-chinas-claims-south-china-sea
[ six ] Sebastien Roblin, The National Interest, April 9, 2019, A2/AD : The Phrase That Terrifies the U.S. Military ( And China and Russia Love It ), hypertext transfer protocol : //nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/a2ad-phrase-terrifies-us-military-and-china-and-russia-love-it-51597
[ seven ] Ronald O ’ Rourke, Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2020, China Naval Modernization : Implications for U.S. Naval Capabilities-Background and Issues for Congress, page 22 .
[ eight ] Drake Long, Radio Free Asia, analysis : Is China Preparing to Declare an Air Zone over the South China Sea ?, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.rfa.org/english/news/china/southchinasea-adiz-06022020194134.html /
[ nine ] Ronald O ’ Rourke, Congressional Research Service, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans : Background and Issues for Congress, June 3, 2020, p. 71
[ x ] Report to Congress on Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles, United States Navy Institute, July 30, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //news.usni.org/2020/07/29/report-to-congress-on-navy-large-unmanned-surface-and-undersea-vehicles /
[ xi ] Sam LaGrone, United States Naval Institute, December 10, 2019, USS Gerald R. Ford : Navy Marks Progress on Carrier as Scrutiny of Program Grows, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.andrewerickson.com/2019/04/fact-sheet-chinas-maritime-militia/
[ xii ] Megan Epstein, United States Naval Institute, July 18, 2019, New Commandant Berger Sheds 38-Amphib Requirement in Quest to Modernize USMC for High-End Fight, hypertext transfer protocol : //news.usni.org/2019/07/18/new-commandant-berger-sheds-38-amphib-requirement-in-quest-to-modernize-usmc-for-high-end-fight
[ xiii ] Ronald O ’ Rourke, Congressional Research Service, December 20, 2019, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans-Background and Issues for Congress. P. 21 .
[ xiv ] Marcus Weisgerber, Defense One, Top Navy Official “ Very Concerned ” About strike at Maine Shipyard, June 22, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.foxbusiness.com/lifestyle/production-workers-strike-against-major-navy-shipbuilder /
[ xv ] Robert O. work and Greg Grant, Center for a New American Security, Beating the Americans at Their Own Game, An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics, June 6, 2019, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.cnas.org/publications/reports/beating-the-americans-at-their-own-game
[ xvi ] Andrew S. Erickson, October 1, 2019, China ’ s massive Military ( Missile ) Parade : here ’ mho My Take, www.andrewerickson.com/2019/10/chinas-massive-70th-anniversary-military-missile-parade-heres-my-take/
[ xvii ] The Economist, September 21, 2013, Strategic Bombing 1939-1944 : A Costly, Brutal Failure by Richard Overy and Allen Lane ; Robert Farley, The Diplomat, August 11, 2016, How U.S. Aerial Bombing During the Vietnam War Backfired, hypertext transfer protocol : //thediplomat.com/2016/08/how-us-aerial-bombing-during-the-vietnam-war-backfired/
[ xviii ] Scott Beauchamp, The Atlantic, January 30, 2016, America ’ second Misplaced Faith in Bombing Campaigns, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/bombs-away/433845/
[ xix ] Geoff Wilson and Noah Williams, War is Boring, September 5, 2016, Op-Ed — It ’ s Time to Ditch the ICBM, America ’ s Thermonuclear Dinosaur, hypertext transfer protocol : //warisboring.com/op-ed-its-time-to-ditch-the-icbm-americas-thermonuclear-dinosaur/
[ xx ] Franz-Stephan Gady, The Diplomat, November 22, 2019, U.S. Navy ‘s Newest F-35B-Carrying Amphibious Assault Ship Is Heading to Japan, hypertext transfer protocol : //thediplomat.com/2019/11/us-navys-newest-f-35b-carrying-amphibious-assault-ship-is-heading-to-japan/
[ xxi ] Shawn Snow, Marine Times, July 19, 2019, Marine Commandant Drops 38 Amphibious Ships to the Fight Requirement, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2019/07/19/marine-commandant-drops-38-amphibious-ship-requirement/
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[ xxii ] Megan Eckstein, United States Naval Institute, Marines Look to Two New Classes to Define Future of Amphibious Operations, June 12, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //news.usni.org/2020/06/08/marines-look-to-two-new-ship-classes-to-define-future-of-amphibious-operations /
[ xxiii ] David Axe, The National Interest, December 23, 2019, The Littoral Combat Ship : The Worst U. S. Navy Ship Ever ? hypertext transfer protocol : //nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/littoral-combat-ship-worst-us-navy-warship-ever-107886