China and the “Malacca Dilemma”

SOURCE: FLICKR / COREY SEEMAN Like most asian countries, China is heavily dependent on hydrocarbon imports. apart from its chief supplier and partner, Russia, other significant sellers are located in the Middle East or Africa. consequently, more than 70 % of the PRC ’ s petroleum and LNG exports is shipped through the Strait of Malacca, which makes it a crucial route from the point of view of the China ’ s energy security system policy. however, its importance is not limited to the transport of raw materials. According to calculations by the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ), about 20 % of global maritime craft and 60 % of China ’ s deal flows are moved through the Strait and the South China Sea, making it the most authoritative sea line of communication for the chinese economy .
In November 2003, President Hu Jintao described China ’ s situation as the “ Malacca Dilemma, ” referring to the miss of alternatives and vulnerability to a naval blockade. The President suggested that “ certain powers have all along encroached on and tried to control navigation through the [ Malacca ] Strait. ” It is open that the term “ certain powers ” refers to the United States and the ability of the US Navy to control the communication routes. This issue has been debated for years both in China and afield, while authorities in Beijing have long sought to diversify energy sources and increase the share of renewable energy. An extra component which worsens the situation of China is its deteriorating relationship with India deoxyadenosine monophosphate well as its ambitious naval modernization and development program. India ’ mho placement at the crossroads of the most authoritative transmit routes in the indian Ocean is a potent asset in encase of an armed conflict. The PRC ’ s dependence on maritime trade wind hinders a potential naval blockade of Taiwan. Cutting off the island from goods could be a prelude to an amphibious mathematical process or a joyride of political blackmail on the authorities in Taipei. simultaneously, however, undertaking such actions might lead to analogous ones by the US forces and their allies aimed against China .
Over the past two decades, the issue of sea lines of communication ( SLOCs ) has been gaining importance in the strategic discussion of the Middle Kingdom. China ’ randomness 2015 military strategy stated that “ the security of oversea interests concerning energy and resources, strategic SLOCs, a well as institutions, personnel and assets abroad, has become an at hand issue. ” furthermore, the document stressed that “ the traditional mentality that land outweighs ocean must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting nautical rights and interests. ” such declarations confirm that China ’ mho military and political elites realize that the maritime domain will be crucial in the avocation of chinese security and world power condition. Operations of China, deprived of control condition over SLOCs and strategic depth, when compared to the US forces, will remain sternly constrained. Overcoming the existing blockade is a sine qua not condition for China if it wants to abandon the “ partial ” world power status and become a full-fledged one .

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Beijing ’ second concerns associated with the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea stem from the fact that the US Navy ( 7th and 5th Fleets ), which operates in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East, is the only push capable of ensuring the security system of SLOCs stretching from the slide of Africa to East Asia. Since the time of Deng Xiaoping, China has been a “ stowaway, ” which benefited from America ’ s proceed commitment to ensuring complimentary navigation and security in asian waters. equally long as China focused on economic modernization and its military remained relatively weak, the function of the US Navy was seen as a constructive contribution to a positive international environment. This “ strategic window of opportunity ” allowed chinese companies to achieve a remarkable commercial success and unprecedented consolidation into the global economy .
chinese authorities are trying to mitigate the Malacca Dilemma by reducing dependence on energy imports from the Middle East. Beijing is trying to establish alternate estate links and energy cooperation with Russia, Central Asia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and ( silent hypothetically ) Iran and Turkey. cooperation with Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor ( CPEC ) was perceived as an opportunity to gain an extra access target to the indian Ocean through the construction of a new gas pipeline. however, the challenging topography of the Himalayan region and high transit costs make such investment unprofitable. additionally, it is located in an fluid region, which is vulnerable to a potential attack in the event of a conflict with India. For years, the chinese authorities have besides been exploring the possibility of using the Northern Sea Route ( NSR ) to diversify trade routes, chiefly with Europe and Russia. yet, as a leave of shipping restrictions associated with the frosting cover, it inactive plays a fringy character and can not be an alternative to the Indo-Pacific routes. The measures taken by the chinese authorities are insufficient to drastically reduce the level of addiction on transport through the Malacca Strait. A potential solution to dependence on petroleum petroleum imports from the Persian Gulf would be to develop the renewable energy and electric-powered vehicles sectors. however, this action will require at least a few decades, which means that cargo through the Malacca Strait will remain a source of concern for Beijing and an instrument of informal US blackmail for many years to come .