nautical security system : likely terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities
Introduction
Maritime security is a principal protective component of United States ‘ global war on terrorism. The Bush Administrations ‘ National Strategy for Maritime Security states that “ the infrastructure and systems that span the maritime domain … have increasingly become both targets of and likely conveyances for dangerous and illicit activities. ” 1 widely reported maritime attacks against the United States and its allies, such as the bombings of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 and the french petroleum oil tanker Limburg in 2002, have focused congressional attention on nautical threats. 2 In 2006, consider over the fail undertake by Dubai Ports World to operate marine terminals at some U.S. ports raised extra Congressional concerns about U.S. nautical security activities. 3 Questions have emerged regarding both the nation ‘s overall scheme for maritime security and its flat of commitment to specific components of that strategy .
As consider about U.S. nautical security continues, policy makers seek a better understanding of the nature and likelihood of electric potential terrorist attacks against the United States, and how federal programs prioritize their efforts to prevent such attacks. This report outlines the key dimensions of maritime terrorism and how these dimensions may characterize particular attacks in the global maritime domain. The report illustrates credible maritime assail scenarios based on actual past attacks or electric potential attacks developed for maritime security exercises or other U.S. anticipate terrorism activities. It discusses the challenge to maritime security planners of facing a about inexhaustible issue of electric potential attack scenarios and how certain union programs address this challenge. It besides reviews respective perspectives on the overall likelihood of maritime terror attacks on the United States. finally the report discusses implications for fatherland security policy. 4
Characterizing Potential Maritime Terrorist Attacks
Maritime terrorism encompasses a wide range of likely attack scenarios. While individual scenarios have distinct features, for purposes of this report they may be characterized along five common dimensions : perpetrators, objectives, locations, targets, and tactics. These dimensions are utilitarian for discussing both historical instances of maritime terrorism and likely scenarios for future nautical attacks .
Perpetrators
Identifying likely perpetrators is important in evaluating maritime attacks because perpetrator capabilities vary widely and, consequently, give birth on the types of attacks they might attempt. Disgruntled shipping workers, for example, may exploit privileged port access to circumvent security safeguards and mount an “ insider ” attack on maritime infrastructure. An Al Qaeda cell, on the early hand, may mount an entirely different type of attack on the lapp type of infrastructure, exploiting sophisticate prepare in terrorist tactics and privileged access to weapons and explosives, specially abroad. Although many terrorist groups may pose a credible menace to the United States, not all may pose a nautical threat .
Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been a primary coil focus of U.S. nautical security policy given the terror network ‘s hostility to U.S. interests and its record of past attacks. Al Qaeda or its operatives, for example, appear to have been creditworthy for both the Cole and Limburg bombings. 5 Likewise the Abu Sayyaf Group, Islamist separatists based in the Philippines and tied to Al Qaeda, appears to have been behind the bombard of the Philippine vessel Superferry 14 in 2004. 6 Groups or individuals not inevitably affiliated with Al Qaeda may besides attack the United States, however. It is noteworthy that the only nourish external terrorist campaign in U.S. waters over the last 40 years was carried out by anti-Castro Cuban groups between 1968 and 1976. 7 independent Islamist terrorist cells may besides emerge as Al Qaeda is disrupted or disaggregated by the U.S. war on terror. According to a State Department review of Al Qaeda activeness in 2005, “ what was once a relatively structure network appeared to be a more circulate worldwide movement of like-minded individuals and humble groups, sharing grievances and objectives, but not inevitably organized formally. ” 8 Given this development among terrorist groups, nautical terrorism scenarios increasingly require consideration of a broad spectrum of potential perpetrators .
Objectives
Acts of maritime terrorism may have many objectives. They may seek to cause human casualties, economic losses, environmental price, or other negative impacts, alone or in combination, of minor or major consequence. 9 If human casualties are the principal objective, passenger vessels such as cruise ships and ferries, which together account for less than 4 % of U.S. commercial vessel inventory, may be more attractive terrorist targets than cargo and other vessels. 10 consistent with this intelligent, union agencies reportedly concluded in 2004 that the Washington state ferry system had been under surveillance as a possible terrorism target. 11 A weapon of aggregate destruction ( WMD ) attack on a heavily populate U.S. port could inflict the greatest phone number of human casualties. The Defense Department ‘s Joint Task Force–Civil Support developed such a scenario in a 2005 exercise involving the smuggle and explosion of a 10-kiloton nuclear device in the port of Charleston, SC. 12
If economic loss is the primary objective, terrorists may seek to carry out unlike types of attacks, with potentially few homo casualties but significant impacts to critical infrastructure or commerce. The Limburg fail may have been an attack of this type, threatening to disrupt the ball-shaped oil barter and causing considerable alarm among oil tanker operators. 13 Although the bombard killed merely one penis of the Limburg ‘s crowd, it caused indemnity rates among yemeni shippers to rise 300 % and reduce Yemeni port shipping volumes by 50 % in the calendar month after the attack. 14 The fail besides caused significant environmental damage, spilling 90,000 barrels of oil into the Gulf of Aden. 15 other types of nautical attacks could disrupt more immediately the embark operations of samara commercial ports. For model, in a 2005 Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) exercise, terrorists hypothetically destroyed the International Bridge in Sault Ste. Marie, MI, blocking the transportation channel below with debris, by exploding a fuel tanker truck on the bridge. 16
The electric potential consequences of a panic assail are besides an crucial consideration in evaluating terrorist objectives. Terrorists groups such as Al Qaeda appear to choose the scale ( and timing ) of their attacks in holy order to maximize media coverage, and therefore, public awareness and psychological shock. As one academic study concluded ,
To make it into the news program, terrorists operating in western countries can commit some minor terror incidental with few fatalities, whereas terrorists in developing countries need to “ produce ” a lot of blood to attract the attention of western media. 17
consequently, attack scenarios must consider consequences, and how such consequences would align with the objectives of potential perpetrators. The study cited above suggests that terrorists attacking the United States may achieve their media objectives tied with relatively minor attacks .
Locations
Where a potential nautical attack could occur is besides essential to defining a terrorism scenario. Examples above have already illustrated that maritime attacks targeting U.S. interests may occur in U.S. ports ( of which there are over 360 ) 18 or among the ports of the state ‘s 165 nautical trade partners. 19 specific types of attacks, such as the smuggle of WMDs in ship-borne cargo containers, may involve both a foreign port of departure and a U.S. port of entrance. Maritime terror attacks may besides occur at sea in areas of concentrate transportation like the Straits of Gibraltar where, in 2002, Al-Qaeda operatives reportedly plotted to attack U.S. and British warships, and possibly commercial vessels. 20 The Straits of Malacca in southeast Asia is another placement frequently identified by security analysts as a potential locus of nautical terrorism activity. In 2001, Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists reportedly had plans to attack U.S. united states navy vessels visiting the region. 21 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD ) has identified nine like shipping bottlenecks around the world where potential terrorist activities are a concern. 22
terrorist attacks in U.S. waters may have the greatest potential to injure U.S. citizens if they occur in populated areas. They may besides have the greatest potential for economic impact in the consequence of the closure of a major U.S. port. Nonetheless, future attacks on U.S. interests in foreign ports, or on vessels at ocean in passage to the United States, may be easier for terrorists to execute than attacks in U.S. waters .
Targets
Another key view of nautical terrorism scenarios is identifying likely targets. There are numerous possibilities, specially in and around ports. As a U.S. Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) analyst testified before Congress in 2006 ,
Ports contain a number of specific facilities that could be targeted by terrorists, including military vessels and bases, cruise ships, passenger ferries, terminals, dams and locks, factories, position buildings, office plants, refineries, sports complexes, and other critical infrastructure. 23
In accession to vessels and infrastructure, terrorists may seek to attack nautical communities using ships as manner of speaking vehicles for WMDs or by exploiting chemicals or explosives in cargo ships or onshore repositing tanks in populate interface areas. The Homeland Security Council included terrorist attacks on ships carrying flammable and toxic chemical cargoes in a U.S. port among the venture scenarios it developed in 2004 as the footing for U.S. homeland security national readiness standards. 24 Because the characteristics of infrastructure targets or human targets may be unique to any particular category of target ( for example, propane tankers ) or residential district ( for example, Charleston ), understanding how aim characteristics relate to terrorist capabilities and objectives may offer valuable insights into the credibility of particular attack scenarios .
Tactics
Maritime security analysts have discussed numerous potential tactics for terrorist attacks on U.S. nautical targets. The follow passage from the National Strategy for Maritime Security summarizes many of the tactics most normally mentioned in maritime security discussions :
Terrorists can besides develop effective attack capabilities relatively cursorily using … explosives-laden suicide boats and luminosity aircraft ; merchant and cruise ships as energizing weapons to ram another vessel, warship, port facility, or offshore chopine ; commercial vessels as launching platforms for projectile attacks ; subaqueous swimmers to infiltrate ports ; and unmanned submerged explosive manner of speaking vehicles. Mines are besides an effective weapon …. Terrorists can besides take advantage of a vessel ‘s legalize cargo, such as chemicals, petroleum, or liquefied natural boast, as the explosive component of an attack. Vessels can be used to transport potent conventional explosives or WMD for explosion in a port or alongside an offshore adeptness. 25
General tactics of maritime attacks like those above have been far described in security bulletins based on specific terrorism intelligence. For model, in 2004 the Federal Bureau of Investigation warned of possible improvise marine mines in “ waterborne flotsam normally seen around waterways ” or attached to buoys. 26 More specific tactics have besides been articulated as separate of U.S. maritime security exercises discussed late in this report .
As the previous citations suggest, analysis of terrorist tactics must take into account the specifics of the attack in doubt. Some analysts believe that there is a “ abject probability ” that terrorists would try to use a boastfully ship as a weapon because of the complexity of doing indeed, but that attacks by minor boats are more likely because they “ satisfy the submerge terrorist necessity for simplicity. ” 27 similarly, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard ( USCG ) has reportedly stated that “ there is a significant threat by vessel-borne improvised explosive devices ” and that “ vulnerability to small-boat attacks stood out ” during a 2006 menace assessment. 28
Unlimited Scenarios
The dimensions of nautical terrorism defined above may be used to characterize both historical terrorist attacks and electric potential future attacks against the United States. Table 1 provides a set of exemplifying characteristics which could serve as the footing for the development of potential fire scenarios. table 1. case Maritime Attack Characteristics
| Dimensions | example Characteristics | |
| Perpetrators |
• Al Qaeda and affiliates • Islamist unaffiliated • Foreign nationalists |
• Disgruntled employees • Others |
| Objectives |
• Mass casualties • Port disturbance |
• Trade dislocation • Environmental damage |
| Locations |
• 360+ U.S. ports • 165 foreign deal partners |
• 9 cardinal ship bottlenecks |
| Targets |
• Military vessels • Cargo vessels • Fuel tankers • Ferries / cruise ships |
• Port area populations • Ship channels • Port industrial plants • Offshore platforms |
| Tactics |
• Explosives in suicide boats • Explosives in light aircraft • Ramming with vessels • Ship-launched missiles • Harbor mines |
• Underwater swimmers • Unmanned submarine bombs • Exploding fuel tankers • Explosives in cargo ships • WMDs in cargo ships |
Source: CRS .
What is apparent from Table 1 is the possibility of generating numerous alone, logically consistent, and operationally credible assail scenarios based on different combinations of perpetrators, objectives, locations, targets, and tactics. Doing so thoroughly, however, leads to far more potential attack scenarios than likely ones, and far more than could be meaningfully addressed with express counter-terrorism resources. As one security analyst has articulated the problem ,
An accurate judgment of the current nature and setting of the ball-shaped maritime terrorist terror should be driven by an appraisal of what is probable, preferably than merely possible. however, sober analysis of this issue has been clouded amid the anxiety created by the current global security climate, with much discussion turning on the impression that terrorists could potentially strike any target with virtually any means available …. 29
A key challenge, therefore, for U.S. security analysts and policy makers is prioritizing the nation ‘s nautical security activities among a virtually unlimited phone number of potential assail scenarios. How federal agencies have been addressing the “ outright scenarios ” problem is discussed in the follow section .
U.S. Maritime Security Activities
A number of coherent approaches to prioritizing nautical security activities exist given the unlimited number terrorism scenarios. One approach is to emphasize diversity, devoting available counter-terrorism resources to a broadly representative sample distribution of credible scenarios. Another overture is to focus counter-terrorism resources on lone the scenarios of greatest concern based on overall hazard, electric potential consequence, likelihood, or related metrics. U.S. maritime security agencies appear to have followed policies consistent with one or the other of these approaches in federally-supported exercise and award programs. These approaches lead to differing allocations of resources and levels of protection against specific types of attacks. How they ultimately relate to one another under a national nautical security strategy remains to be seen .
Maritime Security Exercises
The USCG, the U.S. Navy, and other union agencies conduct ongoing port security aim exercises domestically and oversea. Taken jointly, the terrorism scenarios in these exercises to date have spanned an highly broad range of objectives, locations, targets, and tactics. Specific scenario characteristics are discussed below in the context of particular nautical security exercise programs .
PortSTEP Scenarios
In collaboration with the USCG, the Transportation Security Administration ( TSA ) has developed U.S. nautical terrorism scenarios under the means ‘s Port Security Training Exercises Program ( PortSTEP ). 30 PortSTEP fulfills the annual exert requirements for Area Maritime Security Plans under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-295 ) through a combination of basic tabletop, advanced tabletop, and field exercises. The PortSTEP program began in 2005 and plans to complete exercises in 40 port areas by October 2007. According to the PortSTEP program position, the 25 exercises conducted through 2006 have involved chemical, biological, and radiological ( “ dirty bombard ” ) attacks, a well as respective kinds of explosives and improvised explosive devices. The scenarios have targeted or exploited cruise ships, container ships, a harbor truck, a barge, a rail cubic yard, port industrial facilities, bridges, and a national landmark. Because the TSA is creditworthy for the security of all major coat transportation modes, it is a specific goal of the PortSTEP program to incorporate surface department of transportation modes such as rail and hauling into its nautical security exercises. While the tilt of ports in PortSTEP includes many of the largest U.S. ports, it covers a broad cross-section in terms of size and geography, including Buffalo, NY, Chicago, IL, Corpus Christi, TX, Juneau, AK, Long Beach, CA, Pittsburgh, PA, and Tampa, FL. 31
AMSTEP Scenarios
The USCG has developed extra U.S. nautical terrorism scenarios under its Area Maritime Security Training and Exercise Program ( AMSTEP ), initiated in October 2005. Like the PortSTEP plan, AMSTEP conducts tabletop and discipline exercises to fulfill annual practice requirements for Area Maritime Security Plans under P.L. 107-295. AMSTEP differs from PortSTEP in that it emphasizes airfoil transportation modes less intentionally in its terrorism scenarios. The program plans to conduct up to 28 exercises through FY2007, specifically in ports not covered by the PortSTEP plan. The AMSTEP program office states that its exercises are designed around Area Maritime Security Committee objectives in person ports ; there are no requirements to conduct exercises under any specific scenario. 32 According to the limited public information available, the program ‘s drill scenarios in 2006 involved terrorist stowaways on an inbound hazardous cargo vessel, an explosion at a jet fuel receiving terminal, a fishy box at a port facility, surveillance of petrochemical terminals, a potential improvise explosive device ( IED ) attached to the hull of a bottom, larceny of gasoline tanker truck, and explosion aboard an vegetable oil tanker in a ship channel, among others. 33 The USCG has conducted AMSTEP exercises in port areas including Key West, FL ; Duluth, MN ; Long Island, NY ; Charleston, SC ; Corpus Christi, TX ; Houston/Galveston, TX ; and Washington, DC, among others. 34
Asymmetric Warfare Initiative
Port security exercises have besides been conducted jointly by the U.S. Navy, USCG, FBI, local jurisprudence enforcement, and other agencies under the federally sponsored Asymmetric Warfare Initiative ( AWI ). The AWI exercises, carried out annually since 2003, have reportedly included the comply terrorist attacks scenarios :
- Explosives attack on a chlorine storage tank in port
- Hostage-taking and executions aboard a vessel in port
- A marine mine attack on a Navy frigate in port
- Underwater explosive devices planted on multiple vessels in port
- A nuclear device aboard an incoming vessel in a 55-gallon drum
- Attack on a port with a biological disease agent35
- Detonation of a “dirty” bomb in a shipping container in port36
- Aircraft attack on a passenger ferry or cruise ship
- Ammonium nitrate bombs shipped by rail to a port37
- Sarin gas attack on a cruise ship in port38
The AWI has held its exercises in Port Hueneme, CA, Los Angeles, CA, San Diego, CA, and the Puget Sound, WA, and Hampton Roads, VA areas .
Other U.S. Attack Scenarios
In summation to the scenarios listed above, the USCG, the U.S. Navy, other government agencies, and security analysts have reportedly developed attack scenarios as part of other maritime security exercises or plan activities. These scenarios have included :
Read more: Maritime search and rescue – Documentary
- Various types of an explosives attack on a ship in port39
- “Dirty” bombs in cargo containers at multiple U.S. ports40
- Radioactive materials carried on a cargo ship 90 miles offshore41
- Underwater and fishing boat explosives attacks on a riverboat42
- Bombing and sinking of a liquefied propane gas (LPG) tanker in a major commercial and naval shipping channel43
- Hijacking of a river tanker for use as a “floating bomb”44
- Ramming and “dirty” bombing a ferry with a hijacked cargo ship45
- Coordinated bombing of docks and bridges, and mining of the harbor at a major commercial port46
- Attack on a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal and tanker in port47
again, although these exercises may have been conducted independently of one another, they encompass a broad range of electric potential attack scenarios .
Overseas Exercises
apart from exercises in U.S. territorial waters, the U.S. Navy, USCG, and other federal agencies participate in nautical security exercises overseas, frequently in cooperation with other countries. For model, in 2006, the U.S. Navy and USCG joined with the Thai Navy and other external participants in simulating the hijack of a vessel with military cargo in the Strait of Malacca. 48 In 2006, the U.S. Navy besides participated in a multi-national nautical exercise involving the conjectural placement of sea mines by terrorists in coastal waters of the South China Sea. 49 In 2003, the U.S., japanese, australian, and french Navies conducted an practice involving the seizure of illegal WMD-related cargo aboard a commercial vessel in the Coral Sea. 50 These are only three illustrations of what appear to be numerous maritime counter-terrorism exercises carried out by U.S. agencies around the populace over the past five years .
Emphasizing Scenario Diversity
Based on the scenario summaries above, it appears that the USCG, the U.S. Navy, and other agencies have structured their nautical terrorism exercises in a manner that addresses diverse terrorism scenarios across many ports. Given that the PortSTEP, AMSTEP, and AWI programs, in finical, are geared toward educate and evaluation, there are logical reasons they would employ such diverse scenarios. The PortSTEP program, for example, states that its exercises “ are scaled and tailored to each specific interface ‘s needs ” based on the recommendations of individual Area Maritime Security Committees. 51 Since many aspects of terrorism prevention and reaction ( for example, communications ) are common to a crop of fire scenarios in a given port area, the choice of one scenario or another may reveal similar things about security plan performance. Scenario diversity besides maximizes the operational and geographic experience among aged U.S. agency planners in an environment of capital uncertainty about future maritime terror attacks. Emergency responders may therefore be more likely to have at least some level of readiness for any kind of nautical attack, anywhere .
terrorism scenario diversity is besides relatively simple, with a limited indigence for building complex and time consuming risk assessments to establish scenario priorities. The only key necessity common to all of the aforesaid scenarios appears to be credibility, or, as stated in USCG port security guidelines, that they be “ within the kingdom of possibility and, at a minimum, address known capabilities and intents as evidenced by past events and available intelligence. ” 52 It may be sufficient, therefore, that scenarios are credible and meet the particular needs of local anesthetic port security officials, not that they are demonstrably more or less critical than one another. 53 The principal disadvantage of a diverse scenarios approach is that it may devote besides many security resources to relatively improbable scenarios and not adequate to more likely ones. An alternative border on, for exemplar, might be to conduct repeat exercises involving only a few high-consequence scenarios ( for example, container WMDs ) and entirely in the largest or most populous U.S. ports .
DHS Port Security Grants
The Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) initiated its Port Security Grant Program ( PSGP ) in 2002 to provide competitive security enhancement grants to U.S. ports. The PSGP awarded approximately $ 870 million in larboard security grants by the end of 2006. 54
The first gear four rounds of PSGP grants appear to have been awarded in a manner consistent with the “ wide scenarios ” approach described above. For example, the DHS awarded orotund two grants to over 125 U.S. port areas ranging from major ports such as Baltimore, MD, Houston, TX, and Long Beach, CA, to relatively minor ones, such as Christiansted, VI, Fernandina Beach, FL, and Homer, AK. These awards besides appear to have been granted for protection of a wide range of electric potential terrorist targets, including container terminals, fulminate yards, sightseeing vessels, ferries, chemical plants, energy facilities, and port operations. 55 coherent with this ending, a 2005 review of the PSGP by the DHS Inspector General determined, among other findings, that “ the evaluation and choice march focused on awarding funds to as many applicants as possible. ” 56 According to the report, this focus was influenced by tension between the “ clean and equitable ” award criteria mandated under the MTSA and the competitive criteria mandated under TSA appropriations. The report besides noted, that PSGP awards were not based on a national risk assessment because a mechanism to perform such an appraisal did not even exist within TSA. 57
In 2005, the DHS began to award PSGP grants on a more selective basis as determined by the agency ‘s modern home appraisal and rate of port risk. For its one-fifth round in 2005, the DHS evaluated the 129 largest U.S. ports using a risk-based formula to identify 66 ports eligible to apply for the grants. DHS capable topic experts further reviewed and prioritized allow applications within this pool of eligible ports based on specific risk scenario, among other factors. note that the PSGP orotund five concede application materials express that the platform
places a strong emphasis on prevention and detection relative to improvised explosive devices ( IEDs ), a well as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear devices …. Of great business to port security are IEDs deliver via small craft, subaqueous and in vehicles on ferries. Areas of focus for grantees should include security of facilities such as public cruise lines, ferry terminals, and vessels from tampering and attack. 58
PSGP round five awards were granted to 36 ports, predominantly the largest U.S. ports in terms of cargo tonnage or passenger traffic. According to the DHS, this approach was intended to allocate grant resources according to the overall risk among eligible ports and to fund projects with the greatest potential to reduce the risk of “ high-priority ” threats. 59
The PSGP ‘s orotund six allow eligibility was expanded to what the DHS has determined are the nation ‘s 100 “ most critical ” ports 60 This was an apparent reversal of the program ‘s strategic transformation in orotund five which focused on larger ports. On the early hand, the PSGP beat six grant application materials besides appeared to focus on a smaller rate of specific assail scenarios, placing a “ strong emphasis ” only on improvise explosive devices ( IED ) placed subaqueous, in vehicles on ferries, or in minor craft and not on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear devices, as stated in round five. 61 According to press reports, the Coast Guard ‘s Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model ( MSRAM ), which was used by the DHS to help evaluate its 2006 award plan applications, dealt merely with “ plausible ” scenarios, such as small boat attacks on petroleum terminals, and did not attempt to evaluate the consequences of attacks using weapons of mass end. 62 Projects which demonstrated enhanced “ Maritime Domain Awareness ” such as access controls and standardize credentialing, command and control, communications, and intelligence sharing and analysis were added as an extra criterion for reviewing concession applications in beat six. PSGP beat six awards were granted to 50 ports of the 100 eligible to apply .
For the seventh orotund of grants, to satisfy the requirements in the SAFE Port Act ( P.L. 109-347 ), DHS expanded the list of eligible ports to all those required to have an Area Maritime Security Plan, but the majority of the funds are even reserved for the highest hazard ports. 63 Selection criteria for grantees continues to emphasize IEDs, MDA, and standardized credentialing but adds hand brake drills and exercises and regional port collaboration as priorities .
Emphasizing High Priority Scenarios
The PSGP ‘s current focus on specific types of weapons and targets and on the nation ‘s largest ports demonstrates an approach to the “ unlimited scenarios ” problem which emphasizes key scenarios. While not excluding other scenarios, the PSGP beat six and seven application materials appear to narrow down priority scenarios in terms of locations ( major ports ), targets ( ferries and cruise ships ), and tactics ( IED ‘s ). Port Security officials have besides focused on priority scenarios, although not necessarily the same stated by the PSGP .
There are … a number of threat concerns that are believed to be more probable and consequently are the ones that most nautical security programs today are built around. These include the use of ports or vessels as a means to smuggle weapons of mass destruction or terrorist operatives into the United States, the use of ships as a weapon to attack critical infrastructure, the scurry of ships in major ship channels and terrorist attacks on ships such as ferries or oil tankers. 64
As indicated by DHS, the priority scenarios access has the advantage of applying the nation ‘s limited maritime security resources against terrorism attack scenarios of greatest relative concern based on intelligence and hazard appraisal. The approach may besides create potentially beneficial contest among grant applicants seeking funds for similar security activities in different ports. It reflects the DHS ‘s move towards risk-based distribution of all homeland security grants, nautical and non-maritime, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission. 65
One meaning disadvantage of emphasizing priority scenarios is dependence upon intelligence and gamble assessment in an environment where neither may be robust. As the President ‘s National Strategy for Homeland Security stated in 2002, “ the equivocal nature of most news on terrorist threats means that … decisions must much be made in conditions of big uncertainty. ” 66 To the extent that precedence attack scenarios identified by DHS or port security officials are not the correct ones, good threats to U.S. nautical security may remain. possibly predictably, there appears to be disagreement among security analysts about the credibility and likelihood of particular attack scenarios frequently cited in nautical security policy discussions. specific examples are discussed in the trace section .
Likelihood of U.S. Maritime Terrorist Attacks
clear perspectives on the likelihood of specific types of maritime terrorist attacks are essential for prioritizing the state ‘s nautical anti-terrorism activities. particularly when security policies seek to concentrate resources against a relatively express number of terrorism scenarios, as appears to be the case for DHS port security grants, the responsible agencies must be confident that these scenarios are credible and do, indeed, pose the greatest terror to the United States. In practice, however, there has been considerable public debate about the likelihood of scenarios frequently identified as having high priority by federal policy makers. As a 2006 RAND study of nautical security concluded “ many perceptions of nautical terrorism risks do not align with the reality of threats and vulnerabilities. ” 67 The adopt section discusses perceptions and uncertainties pertaining to three outstanding nautical assail scenarios, including nuclear or “ dirty ” bombs smuggled in shipping containers, liquefied natural boast ( LNG ) oil tanker attacks, and attacks on passenger ferries .
The “Bomb in a Box” Scenario
Type of Bomb
The Bush Administration ‘s National Strategy for Maritime Security states that “ WMD issues are of the greatest concern since the maritime sphere is the likely venue by which WMD will be brought into the United States. ” 68 One arms master expert believes that, under stream nautical security practices, the likelihood of such an attack within the ten “ is more likely than not. ” 69 According to a imperativeness report, the operations and emergency management film director for the Port of Los Angeles has stated that the probability of a nuclear attack at his interface is “ not humble, ” and that measures to prevent such an attack are the port ‘s top priority. 70
Although much care is paid to the threat of nuclear terrorism, there are divergent opinions about the likelihood of a terrorist group such as alabama Qaeda construct or differently obtaining a feasible nuclear weapon. 71 Expert estimates of the probability of terrorists obtaining a nuclear device have ranged from 50 % to less than 1 %. 72 Among other challenges to obtaining such a device, experts believe it improbable that countries with nuclear weapons or materials would knowingly supply them to a terrorist group. 73 It besides may be technically unmanageable to successfully detonate such a nuclear device. North Korea experienced technical failures in conducting its 2006 nuclear weapons test, and this quiz took place under highly controlled conditions. 74 Attempting to detonate a nuclear device in a nautical terror attack could pose even greater operational challenges. consistent with these perspectives, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff has stated, “ I do n’t think that in the dear term there ‘s a significant likelihood of a traditional nuclear device being detonated ” in the United States. 75
early experts concede that evaluating the likelihood of nuclear terrorism is inherently uncertain, but that such electric potential attacks warrant attention even if they are unlikely .
The probability of a terrorist fire with an actual nuclear weapon can not be faithfully estimated, and it is surely lower than the probability of about any other type of terrorist approach. But the ravaging from such an attack would be therefore overwhelm that, based on expected damages—the probability multiplied by the consequences—this terror must be considered one of the greatest dangers America faces …. 76
terrorist attacks on U.S. ports with radiological distribution devices ( “ dirty ” bomb calorimeter ) is besides considered among the gravest nautical terrorism scenarios. 77 A 2003 simulation of a series of such attacks concluded that they “ could cripple global craft and have a annihilating impact on the nation ‘s economy. ” 78 many terrorism analysts view such a cheating bomb calorimeter attack as relatively probable. In a 2005 survey, for model, nuclear nonproliferation experts expressed their beliefs ( on average ) that there was a 25 % prospect of a dirty fail attack in the United States by 2010 and a 40 % opportunity of such an attack by 2015. 79 Studies suggest that the materials required to make a dirty bomb may be widely available and ill controlled internationally. 80 According to some imperativeness reports, U.S. and british news agencies have reportedly concluded that Al Qaeda has succeeded in making such a turkey. 81 interface operators have testified before Congress that they believe “ it is fair a question of time ” before terrorists with dirty bombs successfully attack a U.S. port. 82
Although many experts consider attacks with dirty bombs among the most likely nautical terrorism scenarios, other experts dispute this conclusion. Scientists have retentive questioned whether terrorists could actually build a cheating bombard with catastrophic potential since handling the necessary radioactive materials could cause dangerous burns and would probably expose the builders to lethal doses of radiotherapy. 83 build up and transport such a fail safely and to avoid signal detection would likely require sol much shielding that it would be “ about impossible ” to move. 84 Weaker dirty bombs made from less radioactive ( and more common ) materials would be easier to build and deploy, but would have a much smaller physical shock and would likely cause few human casualties. Consequently, some analysts argue that terrorists will forego dirty bombs, restricting themselves to the use of more conventional explosives. 85 In back of this controversy, analysts point to the fact that there have been no U.S. dirty bomb attacks, notwithstanding the presuppose rest of perpetrating such attacks. 86 They besides note that the 2005 U.S. indictment of alleged “ dirty bomber ” Jose Padilla, in fact, contained no evidence of, or references to, a cheating bomb diagram. 87
Faced with confounding perspectives on the likelihood of a dirty bombard attack scenario at a U.S. port, analysts and policy makers draw qualified conclusions about such an attack. If a “ weak ” dirty turkey attack is more likely than a “ strong ” one, but a fallible attack will have circumscribed effects, it is ill-defined whether such an attack would meet terrorist objectives. On the early hand, the effects on the general populace of any dirty fail attack, even a weak one, may be great enough to motivate electric potential attackers. As one analyst has stated, notwithstanding the challenges to dirty bombers, “ the chances of a dirty bombard being deployed by alabama Qaeda can not be discounted … Given the exponential psychological and economic effects of such a weapon, the benefits of deploying one may far outweigh the costs and difficulties entailed in its construction. ” 88
Method of Delivery
The potential smuggling and detonation of a nuclear or dirty bombard device in a transportation container at a U.S. port is one of the threats most specifically and frequently mentioned by legislators in the context of nautical security. 89 Shipping containers may be particularly vulnerable to terrorist infiltration compared to other types of cargo for three reasons. First, transportation containers are relatively large. They come in standard sizes from 20 to 53 feet long, although the most coarse are 40 feet or longer—about the size of a truck semi-trailer. Second, the containers on any given ship are packed at the factories or warehouses of many different companies that can be dispersed far and wide-eyed from the loading larboard, making it impossible for politics authorities to ensure that only legitimate cargo has been packed. Third, the containers are typically trucked to the port of load, during which the integrity of the shipments rests entirely on the trustworthiness or due application of the truck drivers. A nautical security technical at the Council on Foreign Relations, who is a former commanding officer of the U.S. Coast Guard, outlines a scenario that most concerns him :
Let me share with you the terrorist scenario that most keeps me awake at night …. A container of athletic foot wear for a appoint brand company is loaded at a manufacture implant in Surabaya, Indonesia. The container doors are shut and a mechanical seal is put into the doorway pad-eyes. These interior designer sneakers are destined for retail stores in malls across America. The container and navy seal numbers are recorded at the factory. A local hand truck driver, sympathetic to al Qaeda picks up the container. On the way to the port, he turns into an alley and backs up the truck at a nondescript warehouse where a small team of operatives pry easy one of the door hinges to open the container so that they can gain access to the dispatch. Some of the sneakers are removed and in their locate, the operatives load a dirty turkey wrapped in lead shielding, and they then refasten the door .
early analysts assert that, if terrorists were to attempt a nuclear or dirty bombard attack in a U.S. port, they would be improbable to do so using a transport container because it would put the device beyond a terrorist group ‘s control. These analysts question whether the container embark system offers the route or scheduling preciseness required by terrorists to position the fail in the veracious place at the correct meter. other observers assert that some types of non-containerized cargo could besides be used for smuggling a fail. 90 The coach of port security at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey states that their biggest business is roll-on/roll-off cargo ( ships that carry automobiles, trucks, and other vehicles ). 91 Non-containerized cargo is more bountiful. By tonnage, containers carry only 11 % of U.S. abroad waterborne trade 92 and container ships account for about one in every three U.S. port calls. 93 other types of cargo besides face less security system screening. 94 relatively low-value cargo might be targeted if terrorists perceive it receives less attention from U.S. Coast Guard and customs officials. For case, a federal official familiar with New York seaport, pointing to a bit metal end in Jersey City, stated the following to a reporter, “ If I wanted to bring an nuclear bomb calorimeter into the interface, I ‘d do it through that trash process. ” 95
The Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) investigated the likely for maritime terrorists to use weapons of aggregate destruction ( WMDs ) in 2005. In its report, the GAO states that
An extensive body of work on this subject by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and academic, think tank, and occupation organizations concluded that while the likelihood of such use of containers is considered low, the bowel movement of oceangoing containerized cargo is vulnerable to some form of terrorist action. such action, including attempts to smuggle either in full assemble weapons of mass destruction or their individual components, could lead to widespread death and damage. 96
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Tanker Attacks
potential terrorist attacks on LNG tankers in U.S. waters have been a key concern of policy makers in ports with LNG facilities because such attacks could cause catastrophic fires in port and nearby populate areas. The Coast Guard ‘s FY2006 budget specifically requested fund for “ extra boat crews and screening personnel at key LNG hub. ” 97 To date, no LNG tanker or land-based LNG facility in the earth has been attacked by terrorists. however, similar natural accelerator and petroleum assets have been favored terror targets internationally. The fire on the Limburg, although an oil tanker, is frequently cited as an indication of LNG tanker vulnerability. The Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) specifically included LNG tankers among a number of likely terrorist targets in a security system alarm late in 2003. 98 The DHS besides reported that “ in early 2001 there was some misgiving of possible associations between stowaways on Algerian flagged LNG tankers arriving in Boston and persons connected with the alleged ‘Millennium Plot ‘ ” to bomb targets in the United States. While these suspicions could not be proved, DHS stated that “ the risks associated with LNG shipments are real, and they can never be entirely eliminated. ” 99 A 2004 report by Sandia National Laboratories concluded that likely terrorist attacks on LNG tankers, could be considered “ credible and possible. ” 100 The Sandia report identified LNG tankers as vulnerable to ramming, pre-placed explosives, insider coup d’etat, hijacking, or external terrorist actions ( such as a Limburg-type, projectile or airplane attack ). 101 Former Bush Administration counter-terrorism adviser Richard Clarke has asserted that terrorists have both the desire and capability to attack LNG shipping with the purpose of harming the general population. 102
Although they acknowledge the security information put away by federal agencies, many experts believe that business about threats to LNG tankers is overstated. 103 In 2003, the head of one university inquiry consortium remarked, for example, “ from all the information we have … we do n’t see LNG as likely or credible terrorist targets. ” 104 Industry representatives argue that intentionally causing an LNG catastrophe to injure people might be possible in theory, but would be highly unmanageable to accomplish. Likewise, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ( FERC ) and early experts believe that LNG facilities are relatively dependable compared to other hazardous chemical infrastructures which receives less public attention. In a December 2004 report, the FERC stated that
for a new LNG concluding proposal … the perceive threat of a terrorist attack may be considered as highly probable to the local population. however, at the national level, potential terrorist targets are bountiful …. many of these pose a similar or greater guess to that of LNG. 105
The FERC besides remarked, however, that “ unlike accidental causes, historical experience provides little guidance in estimating the probability of a terrorist assail on an LNG vessel or onshore storage facility. ” 106 Former Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, has stated his belief that a terrorist attack on an LNG oil tanker in U.S. waters would be unlikely because its likely impacts would not be great adequate compared to other potential targets. 107 LNG terminal operators which have conducted proprietorship assessments of electric potential terrorist attacks against LNG tankers, have expressed like views. 108 In a September, 2006, evaluation of a proposed LNG terminal in Long Island Sound, the USCG states that “ there are presently no specific, credible threats against ” the proposed LNG facility or tankers serving the facility. 109 The evaluation besides notes, however, that the threat environment is dynamic and that some threats may be unknown. 110
Passenger Ferry Attacks
congressional policy makers frequently cite passenger ferries as a key nautical security concern. For case, in 2005, one Member of Congress stated that “ there is a serious security gap in our ferry systems and we need to ensure that passengers on our nation ‘s waterways are protected. ” 111 A RAND report in 2006 argued that attacks on passenger ferries in the United States might be highly attractive to terrorists because such attacks are easy to execute, may kill many people, would probable draw significant media attention and could demonstrate a terrorist group ‘s salience and plangency. 112 One U.S. Coast Guard risk analyst reportedly has stated that “ in terms of the probability of something happen, the likelihood of it succeeding and the consequences of it occurring, ferries come out at the very high end. ” 113 such attacks have occurred oversea. As note earlier in this composition, terrorists linked to Al Qaeda attacked and sank the Philippine vessel Superferry 14 in 2004 .
In a 2006 report, the U.S. Department of Justice ( DOJ ) identified a ferry bombing as among the most probable types of nautical terror attacks. 114 The DOJ report reached this decision based largely on the act of leery incidents reported at marine facilities in the Seattle area and at early U.S. ports. however, officials in the Seattle function of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FBI ) reportedly suggested at the time that the DOJ ‘s high ranking of the passenger ferry threat might be due to more aggressive report of fishy incidents in that area than elsewhere in the nation. 115 Seattle FBI officials besides reportedly stated that they had never been able to tie a specific leery incident to a terrorist group or terrorist design. 116 frankincense, while there appears to be a logical case why ferries may be a key type of terrorist target, questions remain about actual terrorist activities related to ferries .
Overall Likelihood of Maritime Terrorism
The prior discussion illustrates the uncertainty surrounding some of the maritime terrorism scenarios of greatest concern to U.S. nautical security officials. Questions about the likelihood of these particular, high priority scenarios beg the larger doubt of how likely is any maritime terrorism attack against the United States. Some experts suggest that some such attack, in one form or another, is about inevitable. For example, one aged U.S. military policeman has reportedly asserted that “ it ‘s just a matter of time until the terrorists try to use a … maritime attack against us. ” 117 Security analysts besides point to known terrorist plots to attack U.S. maritime targets, such as those passing the Straits of Gibraltar, as attest that global terrorist groups continue to plan nautical terrorism activities. information from captured Al Qaeda penis Abd al Rahman alabama Nashiri reportedly included plans for attacks on a wide range of western nautical targets, including military vessels, vegetable oil tankers, and cruise ships. 118
other analysts believe future nautical attacks against the United States are relatively unlikely, particularly in U.S. waters. Notwithstanding specific acts of terrorism in the past, such as the Cole fail, they note that fewer than 1 % of all ball-shaped terrorist attacks since 1997 have involved nautical targets. 119 Furthermore, external terrorists have attacked no nautical targets in U.S. district since the anti-Castro attacks in 1976 despite their show ability to do so oversea. 120 Analysts besides argue that U.S. ports and waterways are increasingly well-protected against terrorists due to the ongoing security activities of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection ( CBP ), provisions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act ( P.L. 107-295 ), protections added using DHS port security grants, and other U.S. nautical security measures. 121 Classification issues may besides influence differing perceptions of nautical terrorism hazard since piracy unrelated to terrorism is common in Southeast Asia and may be conflated with terrorism in nautical security statistics. 122
A key consideration in assessing the general likelihood of a nautical attack against the United States is the implicit in operational difficulty in mounting such attacks, specially compared to land attacks which may alternatively satisfy terrorist objectives. One U.S. naval analyst has identified a number of specific challenges for terrorists in the maritime environment :
- Maritime targets are relatively more scarce than land targets;
- Surveillance at sea offers less cover and concealment than surveillance on land;
- Tides, currents, wind, sea state, visibility, and proximity to land must all be factored into a maritime terror operation;
- Maritime terror operations may require skills that are not quickly or easily acquired such as special training in navigation, coastal piloting, and ship handling;
- Testing weapons and practicing attack techniques, hallmarks of Al Qaeda’s typically meticulous preparation, are harder and more difficult to conceal at sea than on land;
- The generally singular nature of maritime targets, the low probability of damage and casualties secondary to the intended target, and the problems associated with filming attacks at sea for terrorist publicity may also reduce the desirability of maritime targets.123
Given these challenges, it remains an open motion how probable maritime attacks against the United States may be. In terms of the scenario model in this report, although a successful attack on U.S. maritime targets would likely satisfy certain objectives of known external perpetrators such as Al Qaeda, tactical uncertainties and security deterrents may lead terrorist planners to turn their attention elsewhere. It bears repeating, however, that maritime terror attacks against the U.S. have occurred and there is attest they have been planned for the future, despite the operational challenges. The like naval analyst cited above calls for continued watchfulness :
rather than develop a false feel of security system based on the impression that implicit in difficulties will limit maritime terrorism … caution is warranted in light of alabama Qaeda ‘s adaptability, ingenuity, doggedness, and audacity. Successful development and application of maritime tactics, techniques, and procedures has already occurred within the terrorist community. 124
It appears, therefore, that while maritime terrorist attacks against the United States may be more difficult to execute and, consequently, less probably to occur than other types of attacks, they remain a significant hypothesis and guarantee cover policy care .
The key challenge in determining the overall likelihood of a terrorist approach on a U.S. port is reducing doubt about specific types of attacks and likely attackers. Because historic terrorist natural process is not necessarily a reliable forecaster of future action, scenarios derived from attacks like that on the U.S.S Cole may not help prepare for actual future attacks. furthermore, data about the ongoing motivations, capabilities, and plans of terrorist groups is restrict and typically not in the public knowledge domain. terrorist intelligence gathered by U.S. and alien agencies may reduce this uncertainty, but is unlikely to eliminate it. Faced with this doubt, decision makers are to some extent forced to rely upon their own best judgment to reach conclusions about the likelihood of maritime terrorist attacks .
Policy Issues for Congress
Maritime terrorist threats to the United States are varied, and so are the nation ‘s efforts to combat them. As Congress continues its supervision of ongoing U.S. maritime security activities, it may focus on issues related to the consistency of nautical terrorism scenario judgment, intelligence gain, and responding to new intelligence .
Consistency of Terrorism Scenario Assessment
Development and appraisal of maritime terrorism scenarios is a winder component of federal port security exercises, allow administration, and legislative oversight. It appears, however, that these three dimensions of the nation ‘s nautical security scheme emphasize terrorism scenarios in different ways. Port security system exercises ( conducted under a count of autonomous programs ) address the broadest range of terrorism scenarios, with no obvious focus on any especial scenario. The DHS port security grant program presently emphasizes a subset of these scenarios—IED attacks on ferries and cruise ships in major ports, for model. federal legislators appear to focus oversight on a unlike subset of scenarios, notably WMD ‘s aboard container vessels and attacks on LNG tankers. As this report card states, there is a legitimate basis underlying the scenario priorities established for exercises, grants, and supervision. however, if these activities are intended to derive from a uniform federal nautical security strategy the doubt arises to what degree these activities are complementary or inconsistent .
If port officials, concede administrators, and legislators disagree on what types of approach scenarios are of greatest priority, either because their security assessments are discrepant, or because they lack sufficient news about terrorist threats, port security resources may be deployed inefficiently. For exercise, precipitously increasing security system against specific types of maritime attacks in specific locations may have limited benefits for overall port security system if other significant vulnerabilities are not addressed as a solution. A key motion is whether policymakers are excessively focused on a minute spectrum of the threat. A former Federal Maritime Commissioner has stated that “ it [ is ] fair to say there has been fiddling to no emphasis on non-containerized cargo in the political arena, ” while in contrast, “ ‘virtually everyone ‘ in the industry thinks non-containerized cargo is in ‘many respects a more vulnerable path. ‘ ” 125 While concern, in this case, for container security system may not be misplaced, there are other forms of cargo that terrorists could exploit barely as efficaciously .
Intelligence Gathering
Because intelligence about terrorist capabilities and activities is a winder component in terrorism scenario judgment, Congress may act to ensure that the responsible U.S. intelligence agencies work to improve their intelligence assembly and reduce terrorism scenario uncertainty. As a Department of Defense official has reportedly remarked ,
We have the functional capabilities to defeat any of these threats … if we see the menace approaching … .The most important thing we can do is to dramatically improve our overseas intelligence collection, with a specific orientation toward the nautical terror. 126
Better intelligence may besides help ensure that assorted federal maritime security system activities are more close aligned. The Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) evaluated in December 2005 the port risk appraisal practices of the U.S. Coast Guard, the Office for Domestic Preparedness, and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate—all agencies within the Department of Homeland Security. The GAO report concluded :
Each part faces many challenges in making far progress … For example, obtaining better quality data from news agencies would help DHS components estimate the relative likelihood of diverse types of threats—a winder component of assessing risks. In the longer condition, build up will depend increasingly on how well risk management is coordinated across agencies, because stream approaches in many ways are neither reproducible nor comparable. 127
Responding to New Intelligence
Given the active nature of the terrorist threat, Congress may consider whether federal fund mechanisms for anti-terrorism measures are elastic enough to respond to new threat intelligence. Between the time Congress decides on the allotment of security grants among the diverse exile modes in the annual appropriations process and the time that those grants are actually awarded can be about a year. Within this fourth dimension frame, new intelligence may indicate that security resources be reallocated to respond to a unlike terror. A related supervision issue for Congress is the capability of the U.S. Coast Guard and CBP to shift staff and resources as new terror information becomes available. For case, the U.S. Coast Guard has developed Maritime Safety and Security Teams dwell of about 75 personnel that are designed to provide a rapid surge capacity at any port as the motivation arises. CBP may have more trouble in shifting resources because, in summation to engage in seaports, it operates in airports and at land border crossings and not all of its inspection equipment is well adaptable across these three environments.
Conclusion
public information suggests that the threat of maritime terrorism is meaning, and can take countless forms, but that different dimensions of the nation ‘s nautical security activities prioritize these activities in different ways. As supervision of the federal character in nautical security continues, Congress may raise questions concerning the relationship among these activities, and the implications of differing terrorism scenario priorities among them. Improved accumulate and sharing of nautical terrorism intelligence may enhance consistency across diverse U.S. maritime security activities and increase the efficient deployment of nautical security resources .
In addition to these issues, Congress may assess how the respective elements of U.S. maritime security meet together in the state ‘s overall scheme to protect the public from terrorist attacks. For model, bulge quantities of hazardous chemicals are found in marine vessels, in rail and highway tankers, and in chemical facilities on land. Terrorists may seek to exploit such chemicals in any of these sectors. Balancing the nation ‘s fatherland security resources across the nautical and non-maritime sectors is a policy challenge because particular sectors may fall under different fatherland security authorities and regulations. doubt about terrorist capabilities and activities complicates this trouble by making it difficult to compare terrorist attack scenarios across sectors. Without such a comprehensive position on terrorist threats, security system analysts may have difficulty identifying which assets to protect and how well to protect them with the limited security resources available. Reviewing how these security priorities and activities fit in concert to achieve common goals could be an supervision challenge for Congress .
