India’s Answer to the Belt and Road: A Road Map for South Asia

Introduction

Asia has a massive and growing motivation for infrastructure. There is enormous likely for cross-border cooperation on connectivity and infrastructure growth. The Asian Development Bank estimates that between 2016 and 2030 developing countries in the region will need to spend $ 1.7 trillion per year to build the infrastructure required to “ maintain its growth momentum, eliminate poverty, and answer to climate change. ” 1
Japan and the United States have been among the primary donors for development projects in Asia since World War II, although other countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom ( UK ) have played a greater role in late years as well.2 Japan in particular has provided significant development aid to South asian countries, including India. meanwhile, China ’ south emergence as a regional strategic and economic actor has reshaped the prospects for connectivity in Asia. Beijing has demonstrated a newfound common sense of political will to undertake regional connectivity initiatives, supported by the country ’ south excess capital, a careen that has changed the security environment in India ’ s neighborhood .

Darshana M. Baruah

Darshana M. Baruah is an associate degree mate with the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace where she leads the indian Ocean Initiative. Her primary coil inquiry focuses on nautical security system in Asia and the role of the amerind Navy in a fresh security architecture.

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Beijing ’ s growing collaboration with India ’ mho neighbors has created a sense of malaise in New Delhi. Like any rising power with ball-shaped ambitions, China is looking to expand its presence and increase its profile beyond its immediate region. naturally, as China ’ south influence in South Asia grows, India is faced with the challenge of managing its relationship with its biggest neighbor and competing to maintain its prominence in the region .
India has begun to view China ’ s commercial initiatives as a means to advance its strategic ambitions in ways that frequently are not conducive to India ’ randomness interests. Former amerind alien secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar noted in 2016 that the “ synergistic dynamic between strategic interests and connectivity initiatives – a universal proposition – is on detail display in our continent. ” 3 He went on to caution against countries using connectivity “ as an practice in hard-wiring that influences choices. ” 4 The view that connectivity offers a place of tools to influence other countries ’ foreign policy choices has become commonplace in analysis about the China-led Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ). The BRI has garnered much care, positive and negative, since its origin in 2013. It is one of the global ’ second biggest initiatives for promoting connectivity and providing funds to finance infrastructure development. In South Asia, the BRI underscores the growing Sino-Indian rival in the subcontinent and the indian Ocean area .
India has started to craft a policy answer. In its strongest stance on the BRI to date, India marked its protest by not attending the Belt and Road Forum that China hosted in May 2017. In official statements, India questioned the first step ’ south transparency and processes, and New Delhi opposed the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor ( CPEC ) due to concerns about territorial reign. As India calibrates its policy response, alternatively of perceiving the BRI as one project, it would be fresh to look at the enterprise as a apogee of respective bilateral initiatives, many of them involving projects that were actually initiated before the BRI itself was formally launched. The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar ( BCIM ) Economic Corridor, for case, was launched in the early 1990s. similarly, China ’ s twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road ( MSR ) is a combination of bilateral infrastructure projects in the indian Ocean area that China has sought to present as a multilateral inaugural .

India is not opposed to infrastructure development in the region, but it is concerned about the strategic implications of certain Chinese-led initiatives.

To best understand India ’ randomness concerns, it is helpful to examine four specific corridors that establish major components of the BRI and run through India ’ s South asian neighborhood : the CPEC, the BCIM Economic Corridor, the Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor, and the MSR ( see figure 1 ). These four corridors and the infrastructure projects associated with them have a direct carriage on India ’ s strategic interests. They run close to India ’ s continental and nautical borders and are affecting its security interests and strategic environment. China ’ s date with India ’ second immediate neighbors through these corridors threatens to alter existing power dynamics in the area. India is not opposed to infrastructure development in the region, but it is concerned about the strategic implications of certain Chinese-led initiatives. A basal refer for New Delhi is that Beijing will use its economic bearing in the region to advance its strategic interests. One luminary exemplar is the strategically located port of Hambantota, which the Sri Lankan government was forced to lease to China for ninety-nine years in 2017. The port was built using chinese loans but, due to the high interest rates, Sri Lanka was ineffective to repay and incurred a burgeoning debt burden.5

India will have to work with its partners in the region to offer alternative connectivity arrangements to its neighbors. To date, New Delhi has been behind in identifying, broach, and implementing a coherent overture to connectivity in the region. Although India has identified countries such as Japan as key partners in formulating a response, there has been little build up on a design of action. New Delhi urgently needs a integrated framework for providing an option to Chinese-led connectivity initiatives to protect its strategic goals and remain a dominant baron in South Asia and the indian Ocean region .

China’s Push for Connectivity

Beijing ’ sulfur connectivity repel predates the BRI. It began at home in the early 2000s, as China focused on developing its western regions. As China ’ s coastal regions flourished in the 1990s, the economic development gap between these areas and the inside and western parts of the country increased. infrastructure investments, primarily in transportation, were one of the driving factors of the resulting Great Western Development Strategy.6 Soon after, Beijing began to look at connectivity and infrastructure projects beyond its borders to connect China to its neighbors in Asia, through Central Asia up to Europe, over farming, and through the ocean. Railway, road, and port development have primarily been at the vanguard of Beijing ’ south connectivity drive in the region and beyond .
The BRI weaves together all these preexisting initiatives into one august design, while the conversations on the projects with participating nations remain by and large bilateral. The BRI was first base formally announced as One Belt One Road by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. Xi talked about the Silk Road Economic Belt during a travel to to Kazakhstan in September 2013. A calendar month by and by in October 2013, Xi proposed the MSR while speaking at the indonesian fantan. China ’ s marriage proposal to revive the Silk Road is an ambitious mind based on multilateral cooperation. The inaugural has two components. First, there is a continental road ( or the economic belt ) connecting China to Europe through South and Central Asia. Second, the MSR aims to create a sea corridor between China and Europe by way of the indian Ocean. Regarding the continental route, India ’ s primary concern is the CPEC and increasing malaise about chinese connectivity investments in Nepal. The MSR is a broader issue for New Delhi, as the amerind Ocean is a primary sphere of matter to for the amerind Navy and is immediately linked to the country ’ s maritime security and strategic interests .
While there has been uncertainty regarding the success of the BRI, there has been little doubt about the economic benefits of such a network for the region writ large.7 For several asian countries, China ’ mho capital has been a welcome summation for addressing the region ’ s massive infrastructure requirements. By offering projects aimed at infrastructure development, Beijing has begun to assume a leadership function. China is well placed to use its economic increase to address the regional challenges related to growth and development. With a miss of alternatives, China ’ randomness proposals seem lucrative to smaller nations in need of better infrastructure and connectivity .

China is well placed to use its economic growth to address the regional challenges related to growth and development.

For China domestically, the BRI was aimed at generating jobs and placing China at the lapp table of development donors as the United States and Japan. This besides helped Beijing award itself as a supplier of populace goods, setting itself apart as a leader. In his annual report before the National People ’ s Congress, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in 2015 underline Beijing ’ s ambitions to “ go ball-shaped ” by involving chinese firms in oversea infrastructure building projects and partnering with foreign firms.8 In 2013, China ’ s focus revolved around appeasing its neighbors and emphasizing peaceful development .
By 2015, Beijing was aggressively pursuing a newly role in the global rate. In South Asia, the increasing degree of competition between China and India has raised the stakes. Until China ’ south BRI emerged, New Delhi did not sense a terror to its bilateral relationships with its neighbors, as India ’ s relationships with early leading infrastructure funders in South Asia, such as Japan, are not characterized by such a prevailing feel of rival. China ’ s arise highlights India ’ s underlying wariness that Beijing ’ s influence in the area comes at the expense of New Delhi ’ s standing as a regional drawing card. China ’ s diplomatic outreach in South Asia seems to be a solution of its ball-shaped ambitions to be a great baron. Like the typical rising world power, China questions the existing order and aims to create a structure more friendly to its interests. Such a shift, if advantageous to China, would profoundly affect New Delhi ’ s strategic and national interests .
China finally released official documents to elaborate on its vision for the BRI, although detail plans did not quickly emerge. about two years after Xi ’ s initial announcement of the Silk Road, the chinese government in March 2015 released a Vision and Action document titled “ Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. ” 9 The document reemphasized the necessitate to build on traditional trade, infrastructure, and cultural links and the opportunities for regional cooperation. It underlined the changing geopolitical landscape and put forward China ’ sulfur principles on win-win cooperation. On connectivity and infrastructure, it put fore four priorities : transportation infrastructure, interface infrastructure, air travel infrastructure, and energy infrastructure. The document besides mentioned the need for an Information Silk Road through the construction of “ cross-border ocular cables, ” “ transcontinental submarine ocular cable projects, ” and “ spatial ( satellite ) information passageways. ” 10 Yet the document failed to address issues such as a project choice process, the nature of reference, and terms of negotiations in a structured way. It is probable that China did not have a detail plan for the BRI either during its launching in 2013 or in the stick to years.11 Beijing began to construct a road map based on the reactions from the global community .

China’s Outreach on the Belt and Road

however, as China began to discuss the project in bilateral settings, the miss of a detail plan and framework raised considerable doubt and suspicion around the global, including in India. As the project advanced, questions from early countries regarding its intent, processes, and miss of clearness began to grow louder.12 China responded to these strategic suspicions by stating that “ we must get rid of the Cold War mentality. .. . There is no shroud strategic agenda to use this first step as a mean to gain celestial sphere of influence, still less to violate early ’ mho [ sic ] sovereignty. ” 13

As China began to discuss the project in bilateral settings, the lack of a detailed plan and framework raised considerable doubt and suspicion around the world.

Despite these misgivings, China has continued to use the BRI to signal its willingness to increase its regional charm and play a larger leadership function. even as Xi unveiled the BRI, the 2013 U.S. government closure in Washington, during which then president Barack Obama canceled a tour of Asia, cast doubts on the U.S. pivot to Asia.14 Beijing used this opportunity to fill that vacuum and present itself as a new asian drawing card. It was around mid-2014 that President Xi Jinping began pushing the mantra of “ Asia for Asians. ” China began invoking a feel of regionalism and creating a space for itself to lead by presenting new solutions to regional issues. Xi Jinping in 2014 noted, “ In the final analysis, it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia. .. . As China is a strong ace of the Asia security concept, it besides works to put such a security system concept into practice. ” 15 The message was clear : asian countries should not rely on external actors for their growth and development, but take matters into their own hands and shape their own destiny .
The underlie message was clear : China is will and ready to lead the region .
Following the plunge of the BRI in 2013, China continued to discuss the Belt and Road in all its bilateral engagements, aiming to garner incontrovertible statements in support of the first step. International support was an easy way for China to lend credibility to the inaugural and chase away concerns and hesitations. however, the stronger China pushed to secure international documentation for the first step, the loud were concerns on the first step ’ south miss of foil and details.16 Although Beijing was recounting international support at every forum, it was not until 2017 that China began to sign agreements and understandings entirely on the Belt and Road ( see table 1 for a list of taiwanese agreements with a direct reference to the Belt and Road ) .

Most of China ’ sulfur infrastructure projects—the corridors and ports—began as bilateral projects much before the BRI was officially rolled out. The Belt and Road bundles together all of China ’ s ongoing projects into one package and presents it as a multilateral inaugural. It besides identified a few newfangled projects. The CPEC was the inaugural agreement exclusive to the Belt and Road Initiative. Many proposed corridor and port projects have even to be confirmed or discussed, such as the Kolkata port. Some ports, such as Gwadar, are not mapped on Beijing ’ sulfur MSR, so far Gwadar is distinctly a depart of the CPEC. This lack of consistency and finely details about the process and mechanism of the inaugural have raised a issue of questions. Growing concerns led China to host the first external forum on the BRI in 2017 .
The May 2017 Belt and Road Forum was Beijing ’ mho largest diplomatic campaign to display international back for the first step. It was well attend and garnered international attention. According to taiwanese officials, “ The Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation was reportedly attended by 1500 delegates from 130 countries including 29 Heads of states, ” 17 although, some analysis suggested these numbers were exaggerated.18 In his open lecture at the forum, President Xi Jinping noted China ’ s trade with countries along the BRI route exceeded $ 3 trillion between 2014 and 2016, that China has invested more than $ 50 billion in participating nations, and helped create more than 180,000 jobs.19
The primary factor in China ’ randomness emergence as a key musician in infrastructure development has been its capital excess. none of the existing ( United States and Japan ) or emerging ( India ) powers can challenge Beijing ’ south advantages in connectivity financing. Some estimates project that China will invest up to $ 4 trillion to realize its vision for the BRI.20 Even combined, Japan and its partners can not rival China on connectivity finance. Beyond capital, there are besides dangerous challenges in coordinating projects in third gear countries. While China has dispatch control over its recognition of projects and investments abroad, partnering countries would have to identify projects and implementation through their respective priorities and advisory mechanisms normally delaying the execution summons. China is increasing its efforts by committing promote capital through the Silk Route Fund, China Development Bank, and the Export-Import Bank, among others. 21 While China enjoys alone advantages in terms of its excess capital, its efforts may encounter challenges in terms of project execution, discrepant habit of international best practices, and high interest rates and debt burdens .
The confidence deficit and the lack of transparency in BRI is possibly why Beijing was ineffective to mobilize unify support for its first step at the forum. Despite the bearing of an impressive list of nations, including Japan, the dominant investor in infrastructure projects in Asia, China was ineffective to issue a joint dispatch signed by all nations present. rather, the dispatch was signed by thirty nations including Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka from India ’ randomness neighborhood.22 According to chinese analysis, “ It shows that Russia, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Pakistan and Indonesia are the five most cooperative countries in advancing the BRI. ” 23 Although nations such as the United States, UK, France, Germany, Australia, and Japan attended, they abstained from committing to the joint affirmation, which suggests that they, besides, have concerns about the BRI and China ’ s intentions .
Some of India ’ s neighbors were among the countries that thronged the forum. not only did China gain Nepal ’ s corroborate fair a day before the forum, but it besides signed clean agreements with six of India ’ randomness neighbors : Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, and Afghanistan. The leadership from Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal made speeches congratulating President Xi Jinping for his regional leadership and welcomed chinese investments in their respective countries .
The fact that China was able to garner such an impressive answer from India ’ randomness neighbors without New Delhi ’ sulfur engagement signifies a number of things. One, it exposes India ’ s inability to offer substantial development aid to its smaller neighbors. Two, it highlights that the smaller countries welcome the presence of another rising power and are will to accommodate the rival that follows such a change in power dynamics. Three, this development underlines India ’ s lack of strategic betrothal with its neighborhood, although Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s Neighborhood First policy is a step toward correcting this neglect .
It is deserving noting that China aggressively sought India ’ mho engagement in the Belt and Road Forum. New Delhi ’ s presence at the forum would have been significant for two reasons. First, it would show the indian government ’ s endorsement of chinese connectivity projects in the area. If India was volition to participate and seek gains from the first step, New Delhi would have little reason to be concerned when its neighbors deepened their date with China. Second, as the early asian and emerging power, India ’ s presence at the forum would lend credibility and advance President Xi Jinping ’ s mantra of “ Asia for Asians. ” however, the mood in India was beginning to shift on Chinese-led connectivity and infrastructure projects in its neighborhood. Beijing ’ randomness diplomatic reassurance was not adequate to dispel strategic suspicions in India, and New Delhi decided not to attend the forum.24

India’s Misgivings About the Belt and Road

India alone began to debate the implications of the BRI when China deepened its infrastructure engagements with India ’ s neighbors in South Asia and the indian Ocean area. As New Delhi continued to debate its political calculations on the Belt and Road, there were significant voices on both sides of the political dilemma surrounding whether India should participate in the Belt and Road and the first step ’ south May 2017 forum .
On the one handwriting, some proponents of indian engagement pointed to specific ways that India could benefit from the BRI. The most obvious model is that the BRI would provide a means to help finance the nation ’ s domestic infrastructure projects. The economic benefits India could accrue might be specially pronounced in the northeastern partially of the nation, which has traditionally been geographically distant from the rest of India and from major cross-border trade routes. To those charitable to indian engagement in the BRI, the sense that connectivity is gaining momentum throughout the Indo-Pacific far underscores that New Delhi should consider ways to enhance its own economic standing on deal and transportation issues so as to avoid being left behind .
yet despite these electric potential benefits, indian opposition to the BRI appears to have ultimately won out. India ’ second misgivings about Chinese-funded projects through the BRI ultimately come down to a few samara concerns. New Delhi is worried that Chinese-funded infrastructure projects may : 1 ) run afoul of accept external standards and norms ; 2 ) sabotage indian sovereignty claims on quarrel edge territories and other security system interests, specially counterpart China and Pakistan ; and 3 ) grant China greater geopolitical influence and undue economic and diplomatic leverage over the policymaking decisions of India ’ south neighbors in ways that disadvantage India .

Indian opposition to the BRI appears to have ultimately won out.

India ’ s position on the BRI was demonstrated by its absence at the Belt and Road Forum. Responding to media queries on whether India was invited to attend the forum, the Ministry of External Affairs ( MEA ) raised a number of concerns regarding the project. The statement noted that
we are of firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognized external norms, well government, rule of law, receptiveness, transparency and equality. Connectivity initiatives must follow principles of fiscal duty to avoid projects that would create unsustainable debt burden for communities ; balanced ecological and environmental protection and conservation standards ; crystalline appraisal of project costs ; and skill and engineering transfer to help retentive term running and alimony of the assets created by local communities. Connectivity projects must be pursued in a manner that respects reign and territorial integrity.25

Transparency concerns

The indian politics ’ sulfur May 2017 affirmation conveys the indian view that the BRI is not based on principles such as good administration, rule of law, and transparency. It besides suggests the first step creates unsustainable debt burdens in some recipient role countries. For model, Colombo ’ s increasing chinese debt is a cause for concern on unsustainable debt burden.26 Furthermore, news reports and studies have shown that China ’ s approach to BRI carries some risk of unsustainable loan practices that could leave some nations saddled with senior high school levels of debt. Hambantota is a glaring exercise of such unsustainable loans, which ultimately are allowing China to gain significant economic and strategic advantages in the amerind Ocean region.27
In a good continuation of its reply to the forum, India again highlighted its concerns in a June 2017 bilateral meet with the United States. The India-U.S. joint statement noted that both sides “ support bolstering regional economic connectivity through the transparent development of infrastructure and the use of responsible debt finance practices, while ensuring respect for reign and territorial integrity, the rule of law, and the environment ; and call on other nations in the region to adhere to these principles. ” 28

Territorial integrity and other security concerns

India is increasingly concerned about China using regional connectivity projects to alter the narratives surrounding disputed territories in its favor. The amerind politics ’ s May 2017 statement claims that China has exhibited a neglect for territorial integrity, peculiarly with obedience to the CPEC, which runs through the disputed territory of Kashmir. According to India, this is a irreverence of its sovereignty, and participating in the BRI would undermine New Delhi ’ s position on the dispute, as Beijing supports Islamabad ’ south opinion of the dispute .
The CPEC and certain other aspects of the BRI more broadly tend to disregard India ’ randomness concerns about sovereignty and territorial integrity. On India ’ s eastern molding, China claims Arunachal Pradesh in its entirety and Ladakh in the north, states under amerind legal power. The 1962 Sino-Indian War was fought over Arunachal and Ladakh, a fact that makes many Indians more leery of Beijing ’ s motives for build infrastructure projects in border regions and in quarrel areas. furthermore, India is very leery of China ’ second efforts to build projects in countries neighboring India ( such as Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan ), projects that might afford Beijing an total strategic advantage in its competition with India. Given the bound tensions between India and China, Beijing must demonstrate esteem for territorial integrity for India to view the BRI in a positivist light .

Diplomatic leverage over India’s neighbors

strategically, Beijing ’ s growing expansion in New Delhi ’ s region, both in the nautical and continental domain, strengthened India ’ s resistance toward the Belt and Road project.29 In particular, India is concerned about China ’ s deepening bilateral relationships with Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal on the continental road and with the Maldives and Sri Lanka along the nautical route. however, given that the indian Ocean is a primary area of sake for the indian Navy, the MSR, in and of itself, is a major concern for India. New Delhi was not merely beginning to voice its concerns about Beijing ’ randomness expansion in India ’ s vicinity, both in the maritime and continental domains, but besides clarified its stance on the BRI.30

The Four Corridors

India ’ s much reactionary access to Beijing ’ s connectivity projects in the region has lacked coherence at times. India much has found itself caught up in responding to the latest developments, while China is moving firm toward establishing itself as a key actor in South Asia and the indian Ocean region. An examination of the following four corridors helps illuminate what activities China is engaged in, what opportunities and concerns these activities present for India, and how India might respond .

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

The CPEC begins at Kashgar in China ’ second Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and ends at the port of Gwadar in Pakistan ’ s Balochistan Province. The enterprise ’ sulfur architects envision building a network of highways, roads, railways, pipelines, ports, and data engineering parks along the route. Two focal points of the corridor are the development of Gwadar to enable the bowel movement of chinese goods from China ’ sulfur western provinces to the Arabian Sea by way of the amerind Ocean, and the modernization of the Karakoram Highway between Pakistan ’ s Punjab Province and Gilgit-Baltistan. The corridor aims to connect Gilgit in northern Pakistan to Gwadar in the south.31 chinese entities have invested approximately $ 62 billion in the CPEC.32 China ’ second grand ambitions for infrastructure investment in Pakistan are unmatched by any of Islamabad ’ s early strategic partners .
New Delhi ’ s primary resistance to the BRI has focused on the economic corridor linking China and Pakistan. India has three independent concerns—territorial sovereignty, security, and the deepening China-Pakistan strategic partnership. These issues come together quite starkly in Jammu and Kashmir, where the borders of China, India, and Pakistan meet. New Delhi ’ randomness concerns have made it unmanageable to imagine that it would link its own regional infrastructure initiatives with the CPEC. India opposes the CPEC due to concerns about sovereignty, and unless India and Pakistan come to an understand on the exit, there is little hope for cocksure movement on this presence or for constructive dialogue about connectivity collaboration with Beijing .
China ’ south apparent ignore for territorial sovereignty in India ’ s region will be the run challenge to further Sino-Indian cooperation on connectivity and infrastructure development. This long-standing concern goes back to the 1970s, when India objected to the construction of the Karakoram Highway through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. China ’ s holocene initiatives, including the CPEC, have led New Delhi to restate those concerns. There is a widespread misperception that the territorial challenge involving Jammu and Kashmir features only two parties ( India and Pakistan ) .
In fact, China has been an crucial third party to the dispute. As then Indian defense minister A. K. Antony noted in 2012, “ Indian territory under occupation by China in Jammu & Kashmir since 1962 is approximately 38,000 [ square kilometers ]. In addition to this, under the alleged China-Pakistan ‘ Boundary Agreement ’ of 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 [ squarely kilometers ] of indian territory in [ Pakistan-occupied Kashmir ] to China. ” 33 Speaking at the seventieth session of the UN General Assembly in 2015, the indian representative noted, “ India ’ sulfur reservations about the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor stalk from the fact that it passes through indian territory illegally occupied by Pakistan for many years. ” 34 India is watching developments involving the CPEC identical closely and has conveyed its concerns to China, asking Beijing to stop all activities in the area.35 Allowing the CPEC to continue would undermine India ’ s sovereignty and bolster Pakistan ’ s claim to the disputed district .

One of India’s main concerns about the CPEC is a sustained Chinese military presence in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

One of India ’ s main concerns about the CPEC is a sustain taiwanese military presence in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which would have serious security implications for India. Beijing and New Delhi went to war in 1962 over a boundary line quarrel along the Himalayas in northern and eastern India. If China were to have a more permanent wave military presence by way of Pakistan on India ’ s northwestern edge, that would affect New Delhi ’ randomness defense and security system priorities. India already has regular margin skirmishes with chinese troops along its easterly frame in Arunachal Pradesh. furthermore, the 2017 repulsion between indian and taiwanese troops on the Doklam tableland along the Himalayan margin sternly strained Sino-Indian relations.36 There are already reports of a chinese military presence on the Pakistan movement of the Line of Control ( LoC ) in Kashmir. China will reportedly place 30,000 army personnel to protect its economic interests in absorb Kashmir.37 Any far increase in chinese troops along India ’ sulfur borders would be a dangerous and immediate threat to India ’ s security .
India sees the careen in Beijing ’ s Kashmir positions as emblematic of the deepening strategic partnership between China and Pakistan. From India ’ s position, the CPEC has marked the emergence of China as Pakistan ’ sulfur principal external spouse, one that replaces the United States. This comes at a fourth dimension of relative U.S. decline, deteriorating Sino-U.S. relations, improving India-U.S. ties, and new tensions between India and China.38
While Kashmir ’ s emergence as a land bridge between China and Pakistan sharpens the traditional geopolitical divide between New Delhi and Beijing, Gwadar helps lend the BRI a maritime dimension. India views the Pakistani larboard as part of China ’ s unfolding nautical office projection into the indian Ocean. Although Gwadar is presently a civilian facility, many in New Delhi expect that it will emerge as an important naval base for China. If this turns out to be the case, chinese entree to Gwadar ’ south port would allow the chinese navy to sustain a presence in the indian Ocean, altering the area ’ randomness might dynamics. Without ports and access to military facilities, China would have unplayful challenges in this body of water where the indian dark blue has historically enjoyed a prevailing role. In the end, given New Delhi ’ randomness concerns about territorial sovereignty in Kashmir and growing distrust between India and China, there is small hope for Sino-Indian cooperation along this corridor .

The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor

The BCIM Economic Corridor is a chinese marriage proposal that predates Xi ’ s BRI. It seeks to build on the historic links between the eastern indian subcontinent and southwestern China through Bangladesh and Myanmar along what was known as the Southern Silk Road.39 The corridor aims to connect the taiwanese city of Kunming with the indian city of Kolkata through Dhaka in Bangladesh and Mandalay in Myanmar, seeking to boost trade, build infrastructure, and foster connectivity among these nations. originally called the Kunming Initiative, it has been under discussion since the 1990s and seeks to expand tourism, fare, and trade routes between the countries involved. China sent a significant delegating to a related league in 1999, injecting a newfangled common sense of enthusiasm into multilateral cooperation in South Asia, a region where chinese influence historically has been weak compared to India ’ second. The inaugural gained greater government traction when it was rechristened the BCIM Economic Corridor, besides in 1999. The corridor has evolved over time from a public discussion to a track II inaugural, and today it functions as a track 1.5 engagement .
Unlike the CPEC, the BCIM Corridor has encouraged date between New Delhi and Beijing, emerging as a column of concrete cooperation in an differently rocky Sino-Indian relationship. At the end of a 2013 visit to India by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, the articulation instruction noted the advancement made in “ promoting cooperation under the BCIM. .. regional Forum ” and that “ the two sides agreed to consult the early parties with a opinion to establishing a Joint Study Group on strengthening connectivity in the BCIM region. ” 40 In 2015, Modi and Xi similarly “ welcomed the build up made in promoting cooperation under the model of the BCIM. .. and [ they ] agreed to continue their respective efforts to implement understandings. ” 41 India and China have systematically expressed diplomatic support for the BCIM Corridor, keeping in heed the motivation for dialogue in the Sino-Indian relationship. however, despite this incontrovertible palaver, much of this enthusiasm is largely symbolic ; effective cooperation through the BCIM Corridor has been seriously limited .

While New Delhi sees the sense of promoting regional connectivity, it has serious strategic concerns about working with China on its eastern border.

There is a far-flung smell that India is playing for time as it debates the costs and benefits of working with China in the easterly subcontinent. While New Delhi sees the sense of promoting regional connectivity, it has serious strategic concerns about working with China on its easterly frame. Although India—being a establish member—continues its discussions on the BCIM Corridor, New Delhi is unlikely to take an active agent approach to this corridor due to its diverse security system concerns. even though India sees little profit to and little room for collaborating with China in this corridor presently, New Delhi is unlikely to pull out of this grouping all in all. could be perceived as hostile and would far deepen the strategic misgiving between the two countries .
In the interim, India harbors several security concerns. The 2017 Doklam draw intensified Sino-Indian border misgiving and highlighted New Delhi ’ s suspicions about the underlying strategic purpose of Beijing ’ s connectivity and infrastructure projects. The deadlock on the tableland sparked contention over chinese workers ’ unilateral attempt to build a road in challenge territory ( between China and Bhutan ). meanwhile, on its easterly front, India is concerned about China ’ s growing function in a region plagued by insurgencies, narcotics traffic, and other security challenges. China has a record of lending support to indian insurgencies in northeastern India. Beijing reportedly supported Naga rebels after the 1962 war on the Tibetan border.42 India ’ s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval warned in 2011 of chinese “ meddling ” in India ’ s northeastern, writing about the revival of chinese patronize to insurgents there after a “ lull since the mid-1980s. ” 43
In short circuit, India views China as a rival and expects that the BCIM Corridor, given the current geopolitical environment, risks advancing taiwanese expansion in the subcontinent. New Delhi considers this area to be in its traditional sphere of influence. Long-accumulated distrust of China has prevented India from exploring the possibilities for overland economic cooperation with China. Greater transparency by Beijing might allow New Delhi to lessen its distrust and begin cooperation on small trans-border projects .
India, for its part, must consider prospects for collaboration on specific pockets of the corridor, such as projects in Myanmar and Bangladesh to promote regional connectivity and boost infrastructure development. aside from the corridor itself, India is besides keen to rejuvenate and collaborate to enhance regional linkages under the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation ( BIMSTEC ) ; in addition to India, this framework includes neighbor countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand but does not include China. Connectivity cooperation can become one of the core pillars of cooperation among the BIMSTEC members .

The Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor

The Himalayan Economic Corridor was initially a bilateral marriage proposal between Nepal and China. It now marks the latest addition to the BRI. While Nepal formally joined the Belt and Road in May 2017, the state has held multiple bilateral discussions with China on creating a corridor across the Himalayan Mountains. All bilateral projects along the Himalayas today form a part of the Himalayan Economic Corridor and by extension the BRI. China is aware of the geographic and political challenges to creating a corridor connecting Kathmandu and Beijing. The Himalayas are a natural geographic barrier, and New Delhi is improbable to take Sino-Nepalese collaboration along its northern borders lightly .
In 2014, Beijing doubled toss off on this think by proposing a broader Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor, a triangle project involving Nepal and India. This marriage proposal was based on an idea floated by former Nepalese prime minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal in 2010 to foster “ trilateral strategic relations ” between the three countries across the Himalayas.44 Beijing possibly assumed that it would be easier to engage New Delhi on the matter if China were to include India in initial discussions.45 As it stands, this trilateral arrangement remains at the proposal stage, as the indian government has issued no conventional response .
While New Delhi offered no incontrovertible response to Beijing ’ sulfur overtures, Kathmandu was enthusiastic about greater taiwanese investments. Nepal is reliant on India for the drift of its goods and is acute to present itself as a transit hub for cross-Himalayan trade. In 2016, Dahal encouraged such collaboration, noting that the “ Himalayas can no more be considered as barriers and obstacles. alternatively, they can serve as authoritative bridges that connect the two emerging regions of [ the ] Asian continent. Most importantly, connectivity lies at the heart of trans-Himalayan cooperation. ” 46 The lapp class, Kathmandu and Beijing began discussing an extension of the chinese rail link to Lhasa in Tibet and on to Kathmandu in Nepal. To far extend its already ample connectivity ambitions, China began proposing a rail connect to Nepal that would cut through the Himalayas. By seeking to establish the Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor with Nepal analogue to the in-progress CPEC with Pakistan, Beijing is aiming to create an alternate to Kathmandu ’ s traditional reliance on indian ports for trade and the motion of goods .
Beijing cursorily began to emerge as an alternate to landlocked Nepal. While China initially was sensitive to indian concerns about strategic connectivity with Nepal, the 2015 India-Nepal blockade strengthened the wills of both Kathmandu and Beijing to foster direct links between the two nations. In 2015, the Madhesis—Indian-originating inhabitants of Nepal—blocked the Indo-Nepalese margin, demanding greater theatrical performance by way of the Nepalese constitution.47 The blockade created a fuel crisis that highlighted Kathmandu ’ s reliance on India to facilitate barter and ship. Amid the resulting tensions between the Himalayan neighbors, China announced the begin of a “ newfangled rail-cum-road trading route, with an international freight caravan loaded with 86 cargo containers carrying goods from China ’ second westerly Gansu province bound for Kathmandu. ” 48 Currently nine trade posts have been identified in the Trans-Himalayan Corridor between Nepal and Tibet on a path that goes ahead to the stay of China. however, due to the region ’ s cragged terrain, not all corridors are completely feasible.49
India watched these rapid developments in its neighborhood close. Since independence, India had chosen to keep its Himalayan borders inaccessible and ill connected. While China aggressively sought to connect its borders, India neglected its own, creating massive disconnects between its borders and hinterlands, particularly on its Himalayan front. By helping create multiple access points via roads and ports, China is able to present an alternate to South asian nations and cultivating the means to challenge India ’ randomness role as a South asian power .
In region in reply to China ’ second increased presence along its borders, India began to formulate its own plans for regional connectivity in the Himalayas in 2013. The United Progressive Alliance government ( 2004–2014 ) proposed several “ strategic rail projects, ” including fourteen railroad track lines connecting its borders to foster growth in outlying regions.50 But the lack of a strategic vision on India ’ s part led to slow execution and delays. The current government announced its purpose in 2017 to fast-track railroad track projects on its Himalayan frontiers. The Himalayan rail-express aims to connect India ’ s northern territory of Leh in Jammu and Kashmir to the easterly district of Hawai in Arunachal Pradesh. ( China claims Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir and about all of Arunachal Pradesh. )
Seeking to cut across some of the world ’ s most unmanageable terrain and enhance connectivity with Bhutan and Nepal, this India-led rail link is vitamin a much strategic as commercial. Building up its frame regions as opposed to keeping them disconnected will help India facilitate the motion of goods and troops from other parts of the country to this region. These initiatives constitute India ’ s answer to past disregard of its boundary line regions and China ’ second increasing commercial and military presence in contest areas.51 Yet execution challenges remain chiefly due to the sturdy Himalayan terrain on the indian side compared to better conditions on the Tibetan Plateau .

Sino-Indian competition in the Himalayas is likely to intensify, deepening the security dilemma between the two countries.

New Delhi will have to continue to act and think quickly when it comes to presenting alternatives to its landlocked neighbors, specially as China continues to knock on their doors with significant commercial benefits in hand. Sino-Indian contest in the Himalayas is probably to intensify, deepening the security dilemma between the two countries. Although India would benefit from tapping into chinese investments to advance India ’ s own connectivity projects, the decreasing strategic hope between the two neighbors will very probable prevent any fat collaboration .

The Maritime Silk Road

The MSR is the huge sea-based part of the larger BRI. It began in 2013 with a focus on strengthening China ’ s nautical ties with its neighbors in the Association of Southeast asian Nations ( ASEAN ). Beijing by and by gradually expanded the inaugural to include other coastal countries with the draw a bead on of connecting China to likely economic partners in Europe, Africa, and the indian Ocean. In addition to boosting regional connectivity, the inaugural traces the diachronic and cultural linkages between China and other countries along the region ’ south ancient Silk Road–affiliated sea routes. The MSR encompasses a diverseness of infrastructure projects, including ports, highways, airports, roads, and bridges .

New Delhi is concerned that China will establish a foothold in the Indian Ocean region and challenge India’s advantageous maritime position there.

Unlike the contest along the Himalayas, interactions at sea between India and China have been limited, although India still harbors reservations. New Delhi is concerned that China will establish a bridgehead in the indian Ocean area and challenge India ’ s advantageous maritime side there. Concerns about chinese attempts to strategically encircle India gained grip at the turn of the millennium. Although many observers dismissed the notion that China is seeking military bases in the indian Ocean as fanciful, India has seen its worst fears of chinese power projection become reality in the last decade. As China internally debates the need for foreign military bases, New Delhi has had to come to terms with the saturation and frequency of chinese naval forays into the indian Ocean. chinese submarines have even docked in Sri Lankan and Pakistani ports. China ’ s military delicacy in the area is increasingly geared toward establishing particular political relationships and arrangements with island states that could result in friendly naval entree. When Beijing formally established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in the summer of 2017, New Delhi ’ sulfur concerns grew considerably.52
As with its dealings with neighbors on India ’ s northerly borders, China is aggressively pursuing India ’ s nautical neighbors and offering matchless commercial investments. The port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka is the newest business. The strategic localization of the port and Sri Lanka ’ sulfur geography in relation back to key ocean lines of communication strengthens India ’ s perception that Beijing is building infrastructure for its own strategic interests in the amerind Ocean region. China ’ s control of Hambantota and access to Gwadar, its other investments in the Maldives and Mauritius, and its base in Djibouti are merely the begin of Beijing ’ s apparent efforts to secure a nautical military edge.53 One March 2018 study showed that the BRI has heightened debt risks among at least some borrow countries due to poor lend practices, a stopping point that gives greater credenza to India ’ s see that China is using unsustainable debt burdens for its own strategic gains.54
India ’ s official position on the BRI is that there is not enough available information about the inaugural to make an inform decision, but in practice India already has taken several steps by itself and in concert with other partners to bolster its own regional influence apart from the BRI. China ’ s intensify presence in the indian Ocean ( as evidenced by increased submarine forays and other signs ) is a world, and New Delhi is last beginning to respond to the changing security environment. In impression, India is leery that the MSR could threaten its function as a outstanding office in the amerind Ocean .
Where possible, the indian and taiwanese governments increasingly recognize that they must find a room to limit the potential for conflict in the maritime domain. One method acting for doing so is the India-China maritime security negotiation, which is aimed at establishing a even channel for communicating about challenges and concerns. India and China are engaging with each other multilaterally besides, through platforms such as the BRICS ( a group of countries consisting of Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa ) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. While these and early efforts to mitigate the security dilemma between Beijing and New Delhi are under means, tensions remain .
At the lapp fourth dimension, to protect its own interests, India already has begun taking some steps largely on its own. For exemplar, India is modernizing and expanding its own maritime infrastructure and creating institutional capabilities to undertake infrastructure projects in the indian Ocean and countries that border it. notably, the Modi government has intensified efforts to develop the port of Chabahar in Iran, widely seen as an try to counter China ’ s presence in Gwadar and along the MSR more broadly. India has besides launched Project Mausam, a cultural enterprise to develop a narrative about India ’ s historical links with the indian Ocean littoral. many observers see this as an undertake to offset China ’ s Silk Road claims .
This active is identical apparent in New Delhi ’ s relationships with small island states in the region. India has long been an authoritative security provider and strategic partner to island nations like the Maldives, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Sri Lanka. Although these islands are small, they lie in all-important sea lines of communication that offer a meaning basis for projecting world power and fasten and protecting key trade routes. These islands could afford any nation with influence over them the opportunity to monitor waterways and project power during times of peace and the ability to indict adversaries during conflicts. India has long engaged in initiating capacity-building programs for island states to secure their maritime surroundings. Most of these island nations lack the capacity to protect and monitor the waters in their large single economic zones ( EEZs ), an sphere extending up to 200 nautical miles from a state ’ s sea baseline. Upon request, India deploys its naval assets to help monitor the EEZs of countries like Mauritius and the Seychelles. In addition, India is helping island states monitor and address nontraditional security threats, such as drug traffic, by building a radar network with a range that extends from Sri Lanka to Mauritius .
The steps that India is taking have a address bear on Beijing ’ randomness suspected maritime ambitions in the region. Given that the bulge of ball-shaped trade is seaborne, the ability to protect energy supply lines is extremely crucial for a rising power like China. For Beijing to become a ball-shaped power, it will have to establish itself as a samara musician in the indian Ocean region in terms of protecting its supply lines and securing international waters. Yet it will be unmanageable for China to maintain the naval presence required to achieve these objectives without access to ports and bases for its military assets in the indian Ocean. India ’ randomness head concern about the MSR is that Beijing is building these ports for dual military and commercial purposes. If that is the case, when needed, these commercial ports could serve as military facilities for the chinese united states navy to help mitigate Beijing ’ s geographic disadvantages in the region .
China ’ s strategic interests in the indian Ocean relate closely to the alleged Malacca Dilemma. China fears that, in the consequence of a conflict with India or the United States, its foes would attempt to block China ’ sulfur trade routes through the Malacca Strait, a key constriction through which a high share of China ’ s energy imports from the Middle East passing. To secure its department of energy supply lines, Beijing would have to either find an understudy road for its energy shipments or strengthen its navy ’ mho capacity to protect and keep outdoors existing shipping lanes. The MSR attempts to do both .
To further address the Malacca Dilemma, China has revived the idea of constructing the Kra Canal, a proposed watercourse that would cut across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand, bypassing the Malacca Strait. While this idea has been around since the nineteenth century, it has not even been realized due to respective political and strategic concerns. If completed, the duct would shorten the travel outdistance between the Pacific and indian Oceans.55 It would besides bypass the Malacca Strait and open up into the Andaman Sea, where India has its naval base in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, presumably bringing chinese maritime traffic close to India. The construction of the canal requires meaning capital and engineering, which the MSR could furnish. The MSR gives China an opportunity to address the Malacca Dilemma and strengthen its presence in the amerind Ocean region. Because of this and other projects, the MSR could pose a serious challenge to India ’ s traditional laterality of the indian Ocean region .
In addition to any unilateral steps it is taking, New Delhi is working more close with other countries. India is strengthening its security ties with indian Ocean neighbors—such as the Maldives, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Sri Lanka—even as it revitalizes a common sense of indian Ocean regionalism and steps up naval engagement with the littoral states of the Bay of Bengal. At the lapp clock time, New Delhi is expanding naval battle and early forms of collaboration with Australia, France, Japan, and the United States to maintain the current security environment and protect its strategic and security interests .
India understands the economic and technical limitations that constrain its ability to present a vision for regional connectivity. One key will be taking a collaborative border on with regional partners. New Delhi has already begun to collaborate with Japan on an option to China ’ s infrastructure-funding model. There is overlap between Japan ’ s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure and India ’ s Act East policy .
While New Delhi and Tokyo have clearly indicated that they possess the political will and intent to work on strategic economic projects, the question has now become a topic of implementation. Through their respective Indo-Pacific policies, India and Japan have underscored the motivation to work closely on connectivity and nautical issues in South Asia and the indian Ocean region. As a resultant role, the two countries announced the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, a joint project on the irani port of Chabahar, and possible collaboration in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, the two countries are immediately exploring possible forms of collaboration with Myanmar, other Southeast Asian states, and other countries in the amerind Ocean region. however, there have been massive delays on identify and implement projects. Since the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor was announced in 2016 and a imagination text file was released in 2017, India and Japan have even to identify and undertake concrete affiliated projects.56
realistically, New Delhi will besides have to look beyond Japan and reengage with its smaller nautical neighbors in the indian Ocean. India must be able to identify exploitation projects with the ASEAN nations and the other littoral countries of the Bay of Bengal and the indian Ocean. India must explore opportunities for trilateral betrothal that would allow it to contribution its resources while advancing a coarse vision on regional connectivity. Farther afield, New Delhi and Tokyo besides have launched the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor to tap into the potential to link the two continents by way of the indian Ocean .
Japan and India have emerged as natural partners in the region for a count of reasons. Like New Delhi, Tokyo has grave misgivings about China ’ s growing presence in its region. Beijing ’ south assertive behavior in the South China Sea ( a cardinal trade route between Japan and the indian Ocean ) is a good issue for Japan. Beijing and Tokyo besides have a territorial dispute in the East China Sea over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. China has besides prompted contest in South Asia, where Japan has been a overriding donor of exploitation projects. Tokyo shares New Delhi ’ sulfur concerns regarding China ’ south connectivity projects, namely unsustainable debt practices, a disregard for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a lack of foil. Japan worries that an influential China will spread its approach to doing business and alter the current security architecture and environment in ways that Japan considers hostile to its strategic interests. New Delhi and Tokyo are besides uneasy about China ’ s disregard for established rules and norms on dispute resoluteness, as seen in Beijing ’ s decision to ignore an external court ’ sulfur July 2016 predominate on China ’ s territorial claims in the South China Sea. India and Japan ’ s converging strategic interests give both countries incentives to offer alternatives to Chinese-led connectivity projects .

The maritime domain offers some promising opportunities, and India has increased its partnerships and collaboration in the Indian Ocean.

The nautical domain offers some promise opportunities, and India has increased its partnerships and collaboration in the indian Ocean. To cite a few examples, India is partnering with Japan to create smart-islands and maritime corridors, even as New Delhi intensifies collaboration with the United States on antisubmarine war. At the same time, India is cooperating more actively with France across the indian Ocean on initiatives ranging from complex military exercises to data sharing aimed at enhancing maritime sphere awareness.57 New Delhi will have to continue working close with partners such as the United States, France, Japan, and Australia to expand its maritime footprint. simultaneously, India must explore possible ways to collaborate with early countries like Indonesia, Singapore, and the UK. As it contemplates these steps, India will have to debate and consider new concepts and ideas, such as joint facilities and burden communion, in answer to its changing regional security environment.

The Way Forward

connectivity is increasingly seen as a joyride for exerting extraneous policy influence. This scene is reflected at the highest levels of statesmanship by countries like India, Japan, and the United States that have issued strong remarks about connectivity and infrastructure.58 Clearly, politics and connectivity are entwined in building complex ways .

Connectivity is increasingly seen as a tool for exerting foreign policy influence.

Given the geopolitical stakes and India ’ south reservations about how China ’ s BRI connectivity projects are presently being pursued and the strategic advantages they may confer, there is likely fiddling setting for the two countries to collaborate on the BRI. India perceives efforts to enhance interconnection as a new field for geopolitical competition with China in South Asia and the indian Ocean. At the same time, connectivity besides presents India with an opportunity to reestablish its regional primacy .
On initiatives like the BCIM Economic Corridor that include both China and India, New Delhi credibly will continue to drag its feet and slow down discussions. There may be limited opportunities for collaboration through institutions that count both India and China as members, but the increasing distrust in the relationship will hamper any positive momentum. When it comes to great invitations to participate in other Chinese-led initiatives like the MSR, New Delhi will remain hesitant, knowing that joining such projects is not in its strategic interests. will probably maintain bilateral collaboration with countries like Japan while besides remaining engaged with entities like BIMSTEC and the Bay of Bengal community, of which China is not a separate. Most of all, India must stop underestimating chinese goals and ambitions in the region .
ultimately, India must be more proactive. While China is successfully implementing exploitation projects hundreds of miles from its borders, India is even struggling to craft domestic development plans for its own surround regions. New Delhi intends to prioritize growth in its international date, but India will have to weave together its ad-hoc initiatives into one coherent road map to regional connectivity and infrastructure construction. evening as India must address infrastructure and development needs at home, it besides needs to provide an alternative to China ’ randomness overtures to the region. To this end, India must not alone respond to the changes Chinese engagement is prompting in its region but besides collaborate with partners to further its vision of regional connectivity, while accounting for its own capacitance and resource limitations .
Until the advent of the BRI, New Delhi did not feel its bilateral relationships with its neighbors were threatened as there was no such competition between India and leading donors in South Asia, like Japan. China ’ s rise not only introduces a new actor in South asian dynamics but besides highlights the underlying fact that Beijing ’ s influence in the region comes at a cost to India ’ randomness character and profile as a regional leader. China ’ south engagements in South Asia are a leave of its global ambitions to be a great ability. Like every rising power in history, China questions the existing order and aims to create a structure favorable to its interests. India presently lacks the resources to compete with China in terms of ball-shaped office ambitions, and this transfer undoubtedly affects New Delhi ’ s strategic and national interests .
In some cases, India can take steps on its own to sharpen its response. To begin with, India will have to distinctly account for its resources and capabilities related to connectivity and infrastructure development. The current government understands the urgency of acting boldly to address the changes in its neighborhood, efforts that will require fresh think and raw approaches, such as the concept of load partake. New Delhi must invest in and develop its strategic assets—like the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, for instance—to project power across the indian Ocean .
These unilateral steps however, India ’ s ongoing response might not be adequate to provide neighbors with a feasible alternative to Beijing ’ s continental and nautical projects, in light of New Delhi ’ s significant resource limitations. Given India ’ s massive mandate to develop much-needed infrastructure domestically, the country ’ s ability to act alone in South Asia and the larger indian Ocean is far limited. New Delhi can not and need not act entirely .
fortunately, convergence between the strategic interests of India and other regional actors ( particularly Japan ) have provided both incentives and opportunities for collaboration .

New Delhi must seek help from partners like Japan when necessary to build and upgrade its infrastructure and create an alternative to Chinese-led connectivity corridors and infrastructure projects.

New Delhi must seek avail from partners like Japan when necessary to build and upgrade its infrastructure and create an alternate to Chinese-led connectivity corridors and infrastructure projects.59 India must have a blueprint to identify specific projects, mechanisms, and goals for its connectivity initiatives. other countries like Australia, France, Germany, the UK, and the United States are keen to see India play a lead character in the area. These nations have technical expertness and are already present in the region to some degree. New Delhi must identify the advantages each of these states offer and leverage them to collaborate in areas of common interest and pursue its strategic connectivity goals. together, India and these countries can coordinate their consumption of resources to address common goals such as peace and security .
While India seems to have identified partnerships as a means to address its connectivity challenges, it must now be consider about the nature and oscilloscope of relevant projects in the region. so far, New Delhi ’ randomness reception has been reactive and inadequate. If India continues to pursue a reactive policy, it will exhaust its limited resources chasing China as Beijing strives to become a regional and ball-shaped baron. India must take store of its strategic priorities ; create a sensible, coherent policy model in reception ; and move toward a burden-sharing model with its partners to secure its strategic interests in the region .
As the BRI and other connectivity projects transcend and reimagine boundaries and connect Asia with far-flung locations around the world, policymakers have to grapple with new ideas and challenges. contest and other diplomatic interactions between China and India bilaterally, in their neighborhood, and on a global scale will shape Asia ’ s modern security architecture and determine the region ’ s economic and strategic terrain for many years to come .

About the Author

Darshana M. Baruah is associate director and senior research analyst at Carnegie India. Her primary inquiry focuses on maritime security in Asia, particularly the indian Navy and its function in a raw security computer architecture. Her influence besides examines the strategic implications of China ’ sulfur infrastructure and connectivity projects in the indian Ocean region and South Asia .
Baruah was a 2016 national parliamentary companion in Australia, where her research focused on India and Australia in the Indo-Pacific. In the australian fantan, she was associated with the position of Teresa Gambaro, the electric chair of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade. There, Baruah worked on issues such as the South China Sea, opportunities and challenges in the India-Australia maritime kinship, and India ’ randomness function in the Indo-Pacific. She was besides a travel to fellow at the australian National University, the academic partner of the parliamentary fellowship. While in Australia, she besides briefly served as a visiting fellow in the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute .

Notes

1 “ Asia Infrastructure Needs Exceed $ 1.7 Trillion Per Year, Double Previous Estimates, ” Asian Development Bank, February 28, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.adb.org/news/asia-infrastructure-needs-exceed-17-trillion-year-double-previous-estimates .
2 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ( OECD ), “ Development Aid at a Glance, ” May 22, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/Asia-Development-Aid-at-a-Glance.pdf .
3 indian Ministry of External Affairs, “ Speech by Foreign Secretary at Raisina Dialogue, ” March 2, 2016, hypertext transfer protocol : //mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm ? dtl/26433/Speech_by_Foreign_Secretary_at_Raisina_Dialogue_in_New_Delhi_March_2_2015 .
4 Ibid .
5 Kai Schultz, “ Sri Lanka, Struggling With Debt, Hands a major port to China, ” New York Times, December 12, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/asia/sri-lanka-china-port.html .
6 Xinhua News Agency, “ New Five-Year Plan Brings Hope to China ’ mho West, ” December 27, 2016, hypertext transfer protocol : //english.gov.cn/premier/news/2016/12/27/content_281475526349906.htm .
7 Christophe Jaffrelot, “ Corridor of Economic Uncertainty, ” Indian Express, June 13, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/corridor-of-economic-uncertainty-barf-obor-india-china-pakistan-military-4700921/ .
8 Li Keqiang, “ Report on the work of the Government, ” ( delivered at the Third Session of the Twelfth National People ’ south Congress ), State Council, March 5, 2015 .
9 “ Joint Communique of the Leaders Roundtable of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, ” Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 16, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1462012.shtml .
10 “ Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, ” National Development and Reform Commission, People ’ s Republic of China, wardrobe release, March 28, 2015, hypertext transfer protocol : //en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html .
11 Tom Hancock, “ China Encircles the World With One Belt, One Road Strategy, ” Financial Times, May 4, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.ft.com/content/0714074a-0334-11e7-aa5b-6bb07f5c8e12 .
12 Ankit Panda, “ remark : clock for China to Come Clean on its Goals for Belt and Road Initiative, ” South China Morning Post, May 11, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2093960/comment-time-china-come-clean-its-goals-belt-and-road .
13 “ Building the Maritime Silk Road of the twenty-first century With Open Mind and Bold Courage, ” ( Address by Mr. Li Zhaoxing, Former Foreign Minister and Chairman of China Public Diplomacy Association at the International Symposium on Maritime Silk Road of the twenty-first Century ), chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February, 12, 2015, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1237173.shtml .
14 Steve Holland and James Pomfret, “ Obama Cancels Asia Tour Over Shutdown ; Raises Questions on U.S. Pivot, ” Reuters, October 4, 2013, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fiscal-obama-cancel/obama-cancels-asia-tour-over-shutdown-raises-questions-on-u-s-pivot-idUSBRE99302J20131004 .
15 “ New Asian Security Concept For New Progress in Security Cooperation, ” ( remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia ), Shanghai Expo Center, May 21, 2014, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml .
16 Panda, “ comment : time for China to Come Clean on its Goals for Belt and Road Initiative. ”
17 “ ‘ Yidai yilu ’ guoji hezuo gaofeng luntan chengguo qingdan ” [ Report on the results of the international cooperation summit forum ], the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, May 16, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.beltandroadforum.org/n100/2017/0516/c24-422.html .
18 Shannon Tiezzi, “ Who is actually Attending China ’ second Belt and Road Forum ? ” Diplomat, May 12, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //thediplomat.com/2017/05/who-is-actually-attending-chinas-belt-and-road-forum/ .
19 “ Xi Jinping ‘ Yidai yilu ’ guoji hezuo gaofeng luntan kaimushishang de yanjiang ” [ Xi Jinping ’ s lecture at the open ceremony of the international cooperation acme forum ], Beijing, May 14, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.beltandroadforum.org/n100/2017/0514/c24-407.html .
20 “ Our Bulldozers, Our Rules, ” Economist, July 2, 2016, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.economist.com/news/china/21701505-chinas-foreign-policy-could-reshape-good-part-world-economy-our-bulldozers-our-rules ; and Jonathan E. Hillman, “ China ’ second Belt and Road Initiative : Five Years late ”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 25. 2018, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-five-years-later-0 .
21 “ ‘ Yidai yilu ’ guoji hezuo gaofeng luntan chengguo qingdan ” [ Report on the results of the external cooperation summit forum ], the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation .
22 “ Joint Communique of the Leaders Roundtable of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, ” Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs .
23 Li Jing ( editor ), “ China Issues First Big Data Report on Belt and Road Initiative, ” Belt and Road Portal, November 11, 2016, hypertext transfer protocol : //eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/qwyw/rdxw/2248.htm .
24 Shyam Saran, “ The Beijing Balancing Act, ” Hindu, August 17, 2016, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/The-Beijing-balancing-act/article14572916.ece .
25 “ Official Spokesperson ’ s Response to a question on Participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum, ” Indian Ministry of External Affairs, May 13, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm ? dtl/28463/Official+Spokespersons+response+to+a+query+on+participation+of+India+in+OBORBRI+Forum .
26 Schultz, “ Sri Lanka, Struggling With Debt, Hands a major port to China. ”
27 John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, “ Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective, ” Center for Global Development, March 04, 2018, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.cgdev.org/publication/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-a-policy-perspective ; and Maria Abi-Habib, “ How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port, ” New York Times, June 25, 2018, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html .
28 “ Joint Statement – United States and India : prosperity Through Partnership ”, Indian Ministry of External Affairs, June 27, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm ? dtl/28560/Joint+Statement++United+States+and+India+Prosperity+Through+Partnership .
29 Srikanth Kondapalli, “ Why India Is not Part of the Belt and Road Initiative Summit, ” Indian Express, May 15, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //indianexpress.com/article/opinion/why-india-is-not-part-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-summit-4656150/ .
30 Ibid .
31 Khurram Husain, “ Exclusive : CPEC Master Plan Revealed, ” Dawn, June 21, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.dawn.com/news/1333101 .
32 Sajid Hussain, “ China ’ randomness CPEC Investment in Pakistan Reaches $ 62 billion, ” Live Mint, April 12, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.livemint.com/Politics/dB5tQKISoKNrvl7EwDPFbP/Chinas-CPEC-investment-in-Pakistan-reaches-62-billion.html .
33 “ India Asks China to Cease Activities in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, ” Indian Express, September 3, 2012, hypertext transfer protocol : //archive.indianexpress.com/news/india-asks-china-to-cease-activities-in-pakistan-occupied-kashmir/997108/ .
34 “ affirmation by First Secretary, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations Exercising India ’ s Right of Reply During the General Debate of Seventieth Session of UN General Assembly, ” Indian Ministry of External Affairs, September 30, 2015, hypertext transfer protocol : //mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm ? dtl/25872/Statement_by_First_Secretary_Permanent_Mission_of_India_to_the_United_Nations_exercising_Indias_Right_of_Reply_during_the_General_Debate_of_70th_sessi .
35 ( Retired ) Ambassador M. Ganapathi, “ Contours of indian Foreign Policy, ” Indian Ministry of External Affairs, March 17, 2017 ,
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37 “ taiwanese Army Troops Spotted Along Line of Control in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, ” Economic Times, March 13, 2016, hypertext transfer protocol : //economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/chinese-army-troops-spotted-along-line-of-control-in-pakistan-occupied-kashmir/articleshow/51380320.cms .
38 Shivshankar Menon, “ As China ’ s Pakistan Ties Deepen, India Needs a Strategy to Mitigate the Fallout, ” Wire, July 11, 2016, hypertext transfer protocol : //thewire.in/50524/chinas-pakistan-ties-deepen-india-needs-strategy-mitigate-fallout/ .
39 Dean Nelson, “ China Plans to Rebuild Burma ’ south World War Two Stilwell Road, ” Telegraph, January 6, 2011, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8243834/China-plans-to-rebuild-Burmas-World-War-Two-Stilwell-Road.html .
40 “ Joint Statement on the State Visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India, ” Indian Ministry of External Affairs, May 20, 2013, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm ? dtl/21723 .
41 “ Joint Statement Between India and China During the Prime Minister ’ s Visit to China, ” Indian Prime Minister ’ s Office, May 15, 2015, hypertext transfer protocol : //pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx ? relid=121755 .
42 Dinesh Kotwal, “ The Naga Insurgency : The Past and The Future, ” Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.idsa-india.org/an-jul-700.html .
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44 Madhukar SJB Rana, “ Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor : Nepal as a Gateway, ” Observer Research Foundation, February 10, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.orfonline.org/research/trans-himalayan-economic-corridor-nepal-as-a-gateway/ # _ftn8 .
45 Darshana M. Baruah, “ Nepal Joined the Belt and Road. What Does That Mean for India ? ” Diplomat, May 15, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //thediplomat.com/2017/05/nepal-joined-the-belt-and-road-what-does-that-mean-for-india/ .
46 “ investing Required in Infrastructure, ” Himalayan Times, November 10, 2016, hypertext transfer protocol : //thehimalayantimes.com/business/investment-required-infrastructure/ .
47 Krishna Pokharel, “ The Two-Month Blockade of Nepal Explained, ” Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2015, hypertext transfer protocol : //blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2015/11/26/the-two-month-blockade-of-nepal-explained/
48 Ananth Krishnan and Nivedita Dash, “ China Opens New Trade Route to Nepal Amid India Tensions, ” India Today, May 12, 2016, hypertext transfer protocol : //indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-opens-new-trade-route-to-nepal-amid-india-tensions/1/666482.html .
49 Pradumna B. Rana and Binod Karmacharya, “ A Connectivity-Driven Development Strategy for Nepal : From a Landlocked to a Land-Linked State, ” Asian Development Bank Institute Working Paper no.498, September 2014, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156353/adbi-wp498.pdf .
50 “ Report on the list of Strategic Rail Projects, ” Indian Ministry of Defense, March 11, 2013, hypertext transfer protocol : //pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx ? relid=93370 .
51 Anurag Kotoky and N. C. Bipindra, “ After Decades of Neglect, India Builds Roads Along China Border, ” Economic Times, July 12, 2018, hypertext transfer protocol : //economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/after-decades-of-neglect-india-builds-roads-along-china-border/articleshow/58833597.cms .
52 Charlotte Gao, “ China Officially Sets Up Its First Overseas Base in Djibouti, ” Diplomat, July 12, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //thediplomat.com/2017/07/china-officially-sets-up-its-first-overseas-base-in-djibouti/ .
53 Kiran Stacey, “ China Signs 99-Year Lease on Sri Lanka ’ s Hambantota Port, ” Financial Times, December 11, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.ft.com/content/e150ef0c-de37-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c .
54 Hurley, Morris, and Portelance, “ Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective. ”
55 David Brewster, “ The Kra Canal : double Bypass, ” Lowy Institute Interpreter ( web log ), August 14, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/kra-canal-double-bypass .
56 “ Asia-Africa Growth Corridor : partnership for sustainable and Innovative Development, ” Research and Information System for Developing Countries, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, and the Institute of Developing Economies Japan External Trade Organization, May 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.africa-platform.org/sites/default/files/resources/asia_africa_growth_corridor_vision_document_may_2017.pdf

57 “ Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the amerind Ocean Region, ” Indian Ministry of External Affairs, March 10, 2018, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm ? dtl/29598/Joint+Strategic+Vision+of+IndiaFrance+Cooperation+in+the+Indian+Ocean+Region+New+Delhi+10+March+2018 .
58 “ Growth, Connectivity Key to India ’ mho Foreign Policy Thinking : S. Jaishankar, ” Economic Times, August 25, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/growth-connectivity-key-to-indias-foreign-policy-thinking-s-jaishankar/articleshow/60224892.cms .
59 Darshana M. Baruah, “ Toward Strategic Economic Cooperation Between India and Japan ” Carnegie India, December 2016, hypertext transfer protocol : //carnegieindia.org/2016/12/01/toward-strategic-economic-cooperation-between-india-and-japan-pub-66326 .