Edited by : S. Sadia Kazmi
As function of its contributions to academic and policy sermon, the Strategic Vision Institute hosted an In-house round table discussion on the ‘ Nuclearization of the indian Ocean and its Implications on Strategic Stability ’. The speakers comprised of a broad range of experts from the Pakistan Navy who have held key diplomatic, military and academic positions throughout their careers. These included, Ambassador Vice Admiral ( R ) Khan Hasham Bin Saddique HI ( M ) ( President IPRI ), buttocks Admiral ( R ) Saleem Akhtar ( Former Pro-rector, Bahria University, Islamabad ) and Capt. ( R ) Syed Aqeel Akhtar Naqvi ( Senior Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, SPD ) each of whom elaborated on cardinal areas of the issue at hand. A number of noteworthy academic researchers and analysts besides took contribution in the discussion including the heads of respective think-tanks, key journalists and representatives from foreign embassies leading to a full of life and candid discussion .
In his open remarks, President/Executive Director SVI, Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema offered a abbreviated
diachronic overview of the emerging geo-political dynamics of the indian Ocean Region ( IOR ). He explained that at the show, the integral region was being contested over by about all the major powers, where China, Russia and the US are vying for direct a well as indirect influence. The regular motion towards the nuclearization of the IOR however has led to an increasingly complex set of dynamics which extending beyond the India-Pakistan competition is probably to have a major affect on the prevail capital baron competition within the region. He explained that despite the increased focus being paid to such developments in the late past, the nuclearization of the IOR was not a new phenomenon as such. The Cold War witnessed both the US and Soviet Union deploy several sea-based nuclear assets which played a outstanding function in shaping the area ’ s geo-politics. It wasn ’ metric ton possibly until Britain ’ s withdrawal from East of the Suez in the deep 1960 ’ s that the region ’ s littoral states were able to project greater charm and power across the IOR. This holds particularly truthful for the development of nuclear capabilities which India for case made considerable strides in, particularly under Rajiv Gandhi ’ randomness leadership. These capabilities ( the foundations for which were laid back then ) have come to fruition with India fielding its first nuclear ballistic missile submarines such as the INS Arihant while actively building its second nuclear powered ballistic bomber the INS Arighat. Deployed with nuclear capable ballistic and cruise missiles such as the K-15 and the Dhanush, India ’ s current actions equally well as future plans are stated to well raise tensions as a direct leave of the deployment of several ready to fire nuclear weapons across the amerind Ocean Region. Dr. Cheema stated that these developments frankincense merit good attention and that he looked fore to how the learn speakers equally well as the other distinguish participants would contribute to this burgeoning discourse .
Speaking on the ‘ Emerging Geo-politics of the indian Ocean Region ’, Ambassador Vice Admiral ( R ) Khan Hasham Bin Saddique presented a detail overview of the sculpt importance laid by both regional and extra-regional players regarding their nautical interests in the indian Ocean. He began by explaining how the geo-strategic trends impacting the IOR emanated directly from the overall geo-political landscape of the world which in itself was undergoing transformation. This, he stated, was highlighted by the rise of China, and the rise of ultra-nationalist movements such as what was being witnessed in Europe and India, bucking the previous decades ’ globalization trends. Considering how oceans served as the main center for office politics and the future of power politics was likely to be contested over in Asia, Vice Admiral Saddique identified several regional and global factors that converged together in defend of his argument. This, he stated, was besides apparent at the grand strategy floor as apparent in the US ’ s pivot to Asia strategy angstrom well as the constitution of the quadrilateral alliance between the US, India, Australia and Japan much referred to as the ‘ Quad. ’ As such, the stallion IOR based on the US ’ s emerging Indo-Pacific strategy, which was in turn aimed at containing China ’ s rising influence across the South China Sea, was resulting in the IOR come forth as the most militarized and conflict-ridden area, barren of any kind of regional cooperation or shared security mechanism. particularly considering how some of the earth ’ s most important and dense sea lines of communications traversed through this region, it was frankincense important that Sir Walter Raleigh ’ s dateless quote be taken into account in which he stated that “ Whosoever commands the sea commands barter ; whosoever commands trade commands the riches of the worldly concern ; and whosoever commands the riches of the universe commands the global itself. ”
Highlighting the importance of these precepts particularly with regard to the amerind Ocean Region, Vice Admiral Saddique besides referred to the celebrated Mahanian pronouncement which states “ Whosoever attains nautical domination in the indian Ocean would be a outstanding player on the external scene. This ocean is the cardinal to the seven seas in the twenty-first hundred and the fortune of the world will be decided in these waters ”. This was farther apparent in the key function the stallion region played in global trade. Home to a meaning proportion of the world ’ sulfur fisheries, the IOR serves as a vital theodolite decimal point for around 40 % of the world ’ sulfur offshore petroleum production, 50 % of the populace ’ s seaborne container dealings and one one-third of the universe ’ s seaborne bulk cargo. Considering how a bombastic number of develop nations were dependent on vital energy supplies passing through the indian Ocean, the region was subject to the presence of a bombastic total of regional and extra regional forces. This for example was apparent in the country of Djibouti which situated at the mouth of the Red Sea was host to the US, Chinese, japanese and french Naval bases .
Speaking of Pakistan ’ s maritime interests in character to the IOR ’ s geo-politics, Vice Admiral Saddique stated that Pakistan ’ s sovereignty and territorial integrity were besides discipline to threats from its nautical environment which the Pakistan Navy remains creditworthy for securing. This includes ensuring the safety and security of the state ’ sulfur citizens, ports, ship, fish, trade, department of energy supplies and all assets and resources within the country ’ s nautical domain. This further involves ensuring the security of full of life Sea Lanes of Communications ( SLOCs ) during conflict ampere well as peace meter while besides maintaining the peace and security of all areas of nautical interest for the nation. He explained how with a coastline of about a 1000 Kms, an EEZ of 240,000 sq. kilometer and an carry continental ledge of 50,000 sq. kilometer, Pakistan was naturally poised to dominate all-important stretch and vital routes, while holding huge unexploited nautical electric potential .
furthermore, Pakistan holds friendly relations and settled boundaries with all its maritime neighbors except for India. As discernible in the great Sir Creek issue, the miss of a distinctly demarcated frame between the two countries over this disputed area holds implications for both Pakistan ’ s coastal boundary deoxyadenosine monophosphate well as its maritime surround. Adding to this complexity is the stopping point proximity of Karachi Port and Port Qasim which handle 45 % and 55 % of the nation ’ s maritime trade wind and cargo respectively. While there are other ports and potential harbors in development ( such as Ormara, Pasni, Jiwani, Sonmiani, Basol, Keti Bandar, Shah Bandar and Jati ) the singular localization and convergence of Pakistan ’ mho SLOCs and oil distribution systems around Karachi serves as a major potential aim, considering its close proximity to Indian air and naval installations. Considering how about 91 % of trade and 100 % of petroleum imports to Pakistan are transported via sea routes the base hit and security of the Nation ’ s SLOC ’ second remains the key national interest. There is an huge potential in further developing the country ’ sulfur maritime resources and leveraging them for economic benefit. Considering Pakistan ’ s close up proximity to the Persian Gulf, there is a huge likely in setting up shipbuilding and compensate yards in the country. similarly, the fishery diligence ’ s contribution to GDP is less than 1 % while promise geological indicators point to there being a high probability of submarine minerals and hydrocarbon resources, estimated at around 40 billion barrels of vegetable oil and 200 trillion cubic feet of gasoline .
Hence, while the threats being faced by Pakistan along its maritime sphere stove largely from piracy, trafficking/smuggling, unregulated activities and environmental disasters, the most immediate and traditional menace that arises is from India ’ s growing determine in the IOR built on its increasing naval force. At the introduce, the indian Navy enjoys numeric superiority over the Pakistan Navy by about 6:1. By 2027, it plans to battlefield a 200 embark Navy equipped with at least 3 air craft carriers, 6 nuclear submarines, 20 conventional submarines, 60 destroyers/frigates and a number of aircraft of respective types. furthermore, India ’ s open and sub-surface platforms are besides probable to be equipped with a broad range of nuclear able ballistic and cruise missiles that are to have a direct affect on the region ’ s strategic balance .
With a 7500km coastline, 1200 islands, 2 M sq. km EEZ and a continental shelf of around 1.2 M sq. kilometer, the IOR holds fantastic importance for the indian express. Its nautical infrastructure includes around 12 major and 200 not major ports with four offshore bases/posts. These have been set up largely because a large part of India ’ s energy and trade security is besides dependent on its maritime links. closely 80 % of its blunt oil is imported by sea while around 80 % of domestic natural gas production is contributed to by offshore natural gas fields. In accession, around 90 % of trade wind by volume and 70 % by prize is transported via India ’ s maritime links .
Based on these requirements it frankincense follows that India ’ s emerging maritime strategy is to largely convert the indian Ocean into ‘ India ’ s Ocean. ’ As discernible in its Act East policy and the vital requirements of ensuring the base hit of its SLOCs, India ’ south ambitions are geared towards becoming a net security supplier throughout the IOR. This holds several implications keeping in mind the geo-politics of the wide area. For exemplify, the US has identified India as a key collaborator in the IOR for its Rebalancing to Asia strategy. As such the US ’ s strategic option is in line with India ’ s aspirations of achieving major power condition. It has dispelled the impressions of India ’ s more continental mentality, given impulse to Indo-US strategic relations and if materialized as envisaged, would allow the US to concentrate more on the Pacific area. consequently, India ’ s perceive character of being a final security system supplier in the IOR directly affects chinese interests in the indian Ocean. Furthermore, its aspirations of playing a greater function in the Pacific and around the Malacca Straits as function of the Quad and its strategic partnership with the US, immediately impinge upon China ’ south sensitivities. As such India ’ s Act East policy has formally signaled the submission of a fresh player that holds several implications over the constancy and security of the IOR. In perfume, it complements India ’ s hegemonic designs while pushing out Extra Regional Forces from the IOR. It disturbs the prevailing strategic balance in South Asia and opens the door for India to carry out a potential mishap under the dress of security. There is frankincense an total modicum of menace to Pakistan ’ s nautical interests leading to the possibility of opening another front. Through its hegemonic position, India may besides use different international regimes such as ‘ Container Security Initiatives ’ and ‘ Proliferation Security Initiative ’ to hinder Pakistan ’ s SLOCs. This besides poses grave economic implications considering how Pakistan ’ randomness economy relies heavily on sea deal with its maritime facilities concentrated in and around Karachi. India ’ s aspirations to control/check the IOR ’ s entrance and exit points would besides keep Pakistan ’ s SLOCs under constant threat .
Since the indian Navy ’ south strategy gyrates around ‘ force projection ’, ‘ sea control ’ and ‘ sea denial ’, the Pakistan Navy needs to bridge the break with a minimum necessity coerce developmental plan including sea-based deterrence. It should remain capable to handle the dispatch spectrum of threats while in a position to be able to exploit India ’ south vulnerabilities within the maritime domain. Its reliance on ERF should besides be as tempered since it can serve both as a terror and as a balancing impel within the IOR necessitating positive betrothal. This is all-important if Pakistan is to prevail within the emerging geo-politics of the IOR .
build up on the previously laid out regional context, Rear Admiral ( R ) Saleem Akhtar spoke on the 
‘ Nuclearization of the IOR as a consequence of India ’ s Naval Aspirations ’. He explained how in the twenty first hundred, the nautical domain has emerged as the principal stadium of contest and cooperation between states. In strategic defense documents of principal powers, the indian and Pacific Oceans now appear as a one inseparable entity. The condition “ Indo-Pacific ” or “ Indo-Asia-Pacific ” is at the heart of the discourse as stated in the official documents of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, India and others. The “ Indo-Asia Pacific ” besides figured prominently in the March 2015 US Cooperative Sea Power Strategy. It draws from President Obama ’ sulfur 2012 Asia pivot or “ rebalancing ” that calls for re-orientating 60 percentage of US naval and marine forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific by 2020. “ Re-balancing ” besides assigns India as Washington ’ s strategic partner and as a “ regional anchor and provider of security ” for the broader indian Ocean .
Over one trillion dollars ’ deserving of trade wind transits through the nautical highways of the indian Ocean each year. More than 5 trillion dollars of department of commerce travels through the Pacific per annum. asian, Pacific and Far Eastern economies are pendent on fossil resources imported through the westerly half of the indian Ocean. The importance of the sea is not only economic ; it besides acts as a medium for national defense. here principles such as ‘ Freedom of Navigation ’ and that the `Sea is the common inheritance of world ’ add distinct dimensions to the use of ocean for home defense. With advances in naval technology, the sea has become a prefer medium for projecting exponent and influencing events ashore, making it an stadium for political and military exponent plays. celebrated naval strategist, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, predicted the amerind Ocean to be the target where much of the economic and strategic “ dynamics of the twenty-first century will be played out. ” presently this area is not just viewed as a body of water system or a culture medium for transporting about 65 percentage of the earth anoint and 35 percentage of natural gas from Gulf but an sphere for contemporary geopolitics – an important region that provides the easiest and shortest access to Central Asian States and Western China, and a road via which divers consumer products are shipped from the East to markets in Europe and beyond .
These compulsions rightly make the indian Ocean the jugular vein vein of the world economy. It is imperative mood that the IOR remains a safe and secure environment for nautical activities. Non-traditional and asymmetrical challenges such as maritime terrorism, plagiarism, narcotrafficking, arms and human smuggling continue to manifest in the IOR further complicating the nautical security calculus. These compulsions a well as the ongoing war in Afghanistan and military presence in the Gulf has led to a sustained multinational naval presence in the IOR both mugwump and as region of coalitions .
Two nuclear neighbors with a apparently ceaseless competition besides sit on the shores of the western amerind Ocean. The US immediately provides India with unprecedented nuclear, defense mechanism and economic opportunities. The two are now besides partners in the region ’ s maritime security system. The US and indian navies regularly conduct large scale naval maneuvers with carriers, nuclear submarines and frontline warships from both sides participating to hone joint operational skills. Through the evocation of nuclear submarines, India has nuclearized the indian Ocean a well .
The strategic libra of might in South Asia is eroding quickly. It is naïve at best, if not unwise, to believe that the amerind naval build up is China specific as sealed quarters in global defensive structure circles would think. For Pakistan, the answer to the increasing deterrence gap rests in a submerged platform at sea punctually armed with ballistic or cruise projectile that could reach India ’ s key industrial centers or be able to strike in the foe ’ south South .
anxious as they are at China anchoring in the indian Ocean at Gwadar, both the US and India are rushing to expand their strategic nautical security alliance. During his visit to India, the US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter signed what has come to be known as LEMOA, “ Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement ”, one of the three foundation garment agreements which the US has proposed to conclude with India. The early two are the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement ( CISMO ) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement ( BECA ) for geo-spatial intelligence. The United States has been pressing India to sign LEMOA for a decade. Under LEMOA, the two sides can access supplies, excess parts and services from each other ’ sulfur farming facilities, air bases, and ports .
Speaking of CPEC which promises great hope for Pakistan and China ; it is linked to connectivity with regions via nautical highways of the indian Ocean. CPEC will besides stimulate a greater and robust presence of the PLA Navy in the region. consequently, the PLA Navy will likely become a “ two ocean ” Navy, something that is nowadays the principal anxiety in New Delhi and Washington. Under CPEC, the security of Gwadar interface is already with the Pakistan Navy. The PN and PLA Navy could forge strategic collaboration in R & D, bilateral exercises, production of warships and submarines, coastal defense ampere good as seabed exploration in the EEZ .
In the current scenario, four nuclear states are having strategic interests in the region and the water body of Indo-Pacific-Asia has become the field of triangle regional pursuit for influence between US-China, India-China and India-Pakistan. The bilateral rivalries in this triangle framework is pushing the existing environment in the region towards instability. The India-US nuclear deal and growing strategic partnership is largely viewed as an alliance to counter China and Pakistan. conversely, India is disbelieving about the chinese claim that its ‘ string of drop ’ aims to provide alternative sea trade routes and suspects it as being an feat to militarize or probably nuclearize the region .
In examining the status of the Pakistan dark blue by 2020, it is significant to note that the Navy will be left with entirely 4-5 frigates. These platforms are deemed grossly insufficient given that Pakistan and China ’ s sea trade wind volume is projected to rise phenomenally and that the PN will be required to ensure its bearing far and across-the-board for the protective covering of trade wind while besides enforcing disincentive. Though a narrow of chinese submarines and warships was recently signed, two critical issues must be kept in position. first, the shock that CPEC and a amply running Gwadar port may have on future operational needs of PN. And second, the indian Navy ’ s phenomenal expansion and collaboration with the US Navy. The indian Navy is working towards fielding a 200-ship navy with three carrier job forces built around nuclear submarines and guided projectile destroyers/frigates within the adjacent decade or so. Over 130 major warships have been commissioned by the indian Navy while two nuclear submarines have already been operationally integrated. The conventional asymmetry between both states has led Pakistan to shift its doctrine towards full-spectrum disincentive .
In the event of a nuclear war, the submarine is traditionally considered the ‘ safest ’ stake, as it can survive a first fall upon by the enemy and retaliate efficaciously. The argue why nations place a significant part of their nuclear arsenals onboard nuclear-propelled ballistic projectile submarines ( SSBNs ) is because of their invulnerability, in comparison to static tune push bases, projectile sites or even fluid launchers. once at its patrol post a few hundred meters submerged, the SSBN is considered dependable from prying sensors including satellites. An SSBN, being a vessel of huge strategic respect, has to be deployed with manage and secrecy in outside parts of the ocean where they can loiter for months at a time, without fear of detection or interference. The obvious corollary is that their missile range must be adequate to reach adversary targets from safe waters. In this context, it becomes obvious that the 750kms range of the K-15 is grossly insufficient to zero in on targets in mainland China from India ’ s base waters and that India has embarked on a Pak centric nuclear weapons course of study at sea. The Sagarika/K-15 missile is the SLBM version of the land-based Shaurya projectile which has been integrated with the Arihant class submarine of the indian Navy. This medium range ballistic missile is besides assisted by the indian Regional Navigation Satellite System ( IRNSS ) to ensure guarantee home access to preciseness seafaring. This allows for the high accuracy required for a preciseness strike. The final developmental screen of the projectile was conducted from an submerged establish platform off the seashore of Visakhapatnam. The fire of this missile however could not be undertaken from the Arihant due to non-availability of submarine as it was involved in an accident earlier this year. It is worth noting here that India holds an abysmal record regarding accidents particularly with submarines .
Another projectile from K serial, the K-4 is besides undergo testing. This is an intermediaterange submarine-launched ballistic missile, capable of carrying a 1 metric ton cargo up to a range of 3,500 kilometer. The INS Arihant, which is the first of the Arihant Class Submarines will be able to carry four K-4 missiles. The K-4 missile was successfully tested on 24 March 2014 from an subaqueous pontoon submerged 30 meter bass. once armed, the fleet of indian nuclear submarines will soon be able to cover the entire Pakistani territory with their ballistic missiles fired from either the Eastern or western quadrant of the indian Ocean. These ‘ K ’ missiles are intrinsically important for India ’ s nuclear disincentive arsenal because they provide India with a much needed ideal and invulnerable second-strike capability stated in India ’ s Nuclear Doctrine and thus shift the balance of power in India ’ s favor in the South asian region .
Speaking on the ‘ Implications of amerind Second-Strike Capability on IOR Security ’, Capt ( R ) Syed Aqeel Akhtar Naqvi expanded on the fine points of the shock these developments have had on the region ’ s strategic deterrence framework. He explained how the 
security landscape of the region was characterized chiefly by deeprooted hostilities and misgiving between India and Pakistan spanning about seven decades. Despite continue threats from India, Pakistan made sincere efforts to keep this region release from nuclear weapons. In 1974 Pakistan sponsored a resoluteness at the UNGA to declare South Asia as a nuclear weapons free zone and continued to push for its casing for decades more to come. Pakistan besides offered several bilateral proposals to India to prevent the nuclearization of the area such as jointly renouncing the product and manufacture of nuclear weapons in 1978, coincident accession to the NPT and coincident credence of IAEA full-scope safeguards in 1979 and a bilateral nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1987. ironically all these proposals were rejected by India. In 1998, Pakistan reluctantly responded to indian nuclear explosions, but did not relent in its efforts to maintain stability in the region. Pakistan proposed a strategic restraint government, anti-ballistic projectile treaty in South Asia and most recently in 2016 offered India to consider a bilateral agreement for a moratorium on nuclear test, only to receive an unfavorable response from India.
Capt. Naqvi stated that the above diachronic context has a direct hold on some of the most recent developments being witnessed regarding nuclearization of the indian Ocean Region and the subsequent de-stabilization of the region. The transfer of nuclear disincentive from land to sea not lone hinders the merely and equitable access to the amerind Ocean but besides stokes a dangerous nuclear arms subspecies in the region. Hence, while relations between India and Pakistan, the two nuclear-weapons states in South Asia, have hanker been characterized by a lack of trust and adequate communication, the introduction of nuclear weapons at ocean by India has the likely to upset the delicate symmetry of indian Ocean security. specially considering the close up proximity within which such weapons are probable to be deployed on some of the most advanced surface and sub-surface platforms by both countries, the likelihood of a conflict escalating to the nuclear kingdom becomes perilously likely .
Ballistic missile submarines known as SSBNs allow for an assured second-strike capability in the consequence of a nuclear attack. They for example formed a key contribution of the strategic determent framework between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War. Sea based nuclear weapons represent about 70 % of the US ’ s deployed nuclear warheads. While SSBNs are used around the worldly concern as an authoritative means of disincentive, this can alone work if it forms share of a clear nuclear doctrine. Perceiving that India has gone beyond its ambition to create a minimum credible deterrent, Pakistan will be compelled to reassess its own nuclear capabilities .
India began working on its nuclear submarine program sometime in the 1970s. By leasing vessels from Russia, the indian Navy was able to gain authoritative operational experience. between 1988 to 1991 it took on a Charlie-class nuclear-powered attack submarine ( SSN ) ; and in 2012 India again inducted an Akula-II class SSN on a ten-year lease. India ’ s foremost autochthonal SSBN, the INS Arihant, was commissioned in 2016. The second base, INS Arighat was launched in November 2017, with four such alike platforms besides likely to be inducted in the future. This submarine class is configured to carry 24 K-15 Sagarika missiles, each with a range of 750km, or eight K-4 missiles. These are presently in development, but are expected to have a range of 3,500km. The K-5 which has a aim range of 5000kms is placid presumably at the design stage. With India ’ second plans for its nuclear trio constitute of about 400 nuclear warheads, it is expected that about 100 of these warheads would be deployed on its planned fleet of SSBNs. Pakistan has responded to these developments by testing the Babur III submarine-launched cruise projectile from a active chopine, capable of carrying diverse types of payloads up to 450km. The exploitation of this restrained and modest second-strike capability is in line with Pakistan ’ s declared policy of maintaining a strategic libra, alternatively of maintaining parity with India. In effect, maintaining constancy with the minimum floor of credible disincentive .
Five years after conducting a series of underground nuclear tests in 1998, India had announced its ambition to establish a minimum credible deterrent, via a nuclear common chord spanning the land, air and sea domains. however, in Islamabad ’ sulfur position, New Delhi ’ s growth of a nuclear submarine force that could finally be adequate to of carrying over 100 ready-to-fire nuclear warheads in the indian Ocean goes beyond the bounds of a minimum credible hindrance. India ’ s apparent contradiction between its declarative placement and actual development of newfangled technologies and weapon systems creates ambiguity and instability in its relationship with Pakistan. The credibility and security system of a disincentive system of which SSBNs are an important component, hinges on the provision of a clear doctrine, effective command and master systems, and operational readiness. India ’ randomness plans for fielding such a big number of nuclear submarine impel constitute of SSBNs, SSNs and double adequate to weapon systems is damaging to strategic stability in South Asia. This argument can be substantiated by a number of factors effecting deterrence, crisis and arms race stability in the region .
For example, as is discernible in the doctrinal elements of India ‘ mho declared policy, shortly after its nuclear tests in 1998, India had declared that its doctrine of minimum credible disincentive would be based around a common chord of nuclear weapons pitch systems launched from land based, air and naval platforms. Both the draft nuclear doctrine released in 1999 and the official doctrine released later in 2003 express India ’ s commitment to such a minimalist nuclear pose. Such a minimalist carriage however would entail that deterrence can be projected through a smaller count of nuclear weapons that are not necessarily deployed at continuous alert. A commitment to a low number of nuclear weapons would farther prevent erect proliferation that would in turn strengthen nuclear constancy .
The development of the indian nuclear submarine force consist of SLBMs and SLCMs capable of carrying more than a hundred fix to fire nuclear warheads in the indian Ocean is not in line with India ’ s doctrinal claims of minimal credible deterrence, frankincense posing a unplayful threat to strategic constancy in the region. furthermore, the quantity of these warheads is besides probably to increase if indian policy makers decide to deploy Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle Systems ( MIRVs ) in their ocean based nuclear delivery systems. Nuclear armed states maintain a high numeral of nuclear weapons to minimize the chances of losing them in a first gear strike .
Whereas, the increase survivability of nuclear weapons on control panel SSBNS would logically alleviate the requirements of maintaining estate and air-based systems, maintenance of air and land-based systems in addition to such a large number of sea-based systems is more indicative of foremost use tendencies. Based on these dynamics, it is important to consider that constancy is premised on the very fact that it reduces incentives for preemption. Considering how an invulnerable second-strike capability greatly reduces the incentives for preemption, Pakistan ’ s exploitation of its own second-strike capability forms an substantive component of maintaining the delicate strategic balance in South Asia .
As stated in India ’ mho declared doctrine, its domain and air based nuclear arsenals are maintained in a deep-set state of disincentive where the warheads are normally de-mated from their pitch systems. This does not necessarily hold true for its nuclear weapons deployed at sea where nuclear able SLBMs and SLCMs deployed on its SSBNs on determent patrols are likely to be deployed as quick to fire. Thus, significantly heightening current alertness levels and compelling Pakistan to besides reassess the readiness of its own deterrence systems. In order for India to maintain an assure second-strike capability, it has to have at least one SSBN on disincentive patrol at all times. In holy order to pursue a bastion scheme India would besides need to gain sea operate, specially in the western channel. This may heighten the risks of its conventional forces interacting with early anti-submarine war platforms while defending its SSBNs. As such any movements of SSBNs in or out of key areas or the load or unloading of weapons would besides be perceived as escalatory. similarly, with the deployment of dual-use weapons in the amerind Ocean Region, it will become increasingly unmanageable to ascertain intentions and capabilities in an already complex ocean environment. specially where indian and Pakistani naval platforms are even more probably to interact and operate in close proximity to one early, any indian platform carrying such dual function missiles would have to be considered as a nuclear threat, even if it is carrying merely a conventional warhead. Hence, any confrontation even at the ceremonious level holds the dangerous leaning of cursorily escalating towards the nuclear kingdom, even in the shell of any accidental accident and/or trip
It is besides worth noting that while early navies have transitioned gradually from operating diesel-electric locomotive to nuclear submarines, making meaning strides in their technical experience along the direction, the indian Navy still has considerable shortcomings in terms of its functional cognition and safety record. Its flit suffers lingering serviceability issues and has endured a number of accidents such as the sink of the INS Sindhurakshak in 2013 during armament manage, the flood of INS Arihant in 2017 due to human error, and the blowing off of a brood during a hydro-pressure screen on INS Arighat in 2014. furthermore, the blueprint and efficacy of indian nuclear submarines along with their reactors is already questionable at best leaving them as well noisy and highly susceptible to detection. This puts escalatory press on the commanders of these submarines further pushing them closer towards ‘ use it or lose it ’ scenarios, further straining strategic stability .
Adding to this complexity and bad environment is a meaning lack of a reciprocal understand regarding such issues. During the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union had come to an agreement delineating incidents at sea to help mitigate the risks of any accidental mishaps or miscommunication of intentions. While Pakistan and India have signed an agreement informing each other ahead of their naval exercises, this needs to be built on to ensure that there is a clear understand between the two nuclear powers regarding any adverse incidents at sea to help retain some semblance of stability .
Question & Answer Session
After thanking the speakers for their insightful presentations, Dr. Cheema opened the floor to the hearing for the questions and answers seance. The first base question to the panel was posed by Mr. Khalid Rahim in which he asked why no efforts were being made to develop closer ties with Oman and Yemen based on the current scenario taking place in the area, such as what India had been pursuing. He opined that it was very crucial that Pakistan leverage the evolving situation to help establish a maritime beachhead towards its West based on its historic ties with Gulf states. A exchangeable motion was asked by Senior PTV Correspondent Mr. Raza 
Khan in which he asked the panel why the Pakistan Navy was not considering the island of Socotra for exemplify as a potentially friendly port the way lesser military powers such as the UAE were purportedly pursuing. Amb. Vice Admiral ( R ) Hasham Bin Saddique in answering the motion stated that each country projects exponent with respect to its strength. Pakistan has historically adopted a more or less continental mentality and that great sight is needed for a more expansionist approach. This would besides require an huge come of resources to be directed towards such a goal if it is to be pursued with seriousness. Adding to this, veridical Admiral ( R ) Saleem Akhtar stated that a major argue why India has been successful in developing hard links with the Gulf region states is precisely because it is being facilitated by the United States as part of its overall scheme for the area. This forms the basis and overarching context within which India ’ s recently signed agreements with the UAE and Oman should be viewed. Speaking on the extent of Pakistan ’ s ties with these states, Capt. ( R ) Aqeel Naqvi added that the Pakistan Navy ’ s influence in the Gulf can be far gleaned from the fact that about all these Gulf countries ’ naval chiefs have been trained at the Pakistan Naval Academy. This aspect is often underrepresented despite clearly showing the deep-rooted links the Pakistan Navy shares with its Gulf partners .
Lt. Gen ( R ) Syed Mohammad Owais ( Former Secretary, Ministry of Defence Production ) while referring 
to Vice Admiral Hasham Saddique ’ s presentation asked whether there was any potential in the recently publicized oil exploration ventures that were carried out earlier this year off the coastal waters of Pakistan. He besides asked whether there was any truth to the rumors that such ventures were being discouraged by certain vest interests such as possibly the country ’ s Gulf partners. Vice Admiral Saddique replied that detail hydrographic data was first required to base any real estimate for the prospects of such natural resources. recently the country had engaged a canadian adviser to gather the necessitate seismic data for the continental shelf. adenine far as offshore oil exploration is concerned, this was the seventh well that was attempted whereas normally 60-70 such attempts are required. On whether there were any vested interests in the Gulf aimed at discouraging oil exploration in Pakistan, the Vice Admiral intelligibly stated that there wasn ’ triiodothyronine any accuracy to such rumors. This he said was apparent for example in Saudi Arabia ’ s holocene decision to build an oil refinery in Gwadar, which while holding huge likely was inactive an highly bad prospect at this current stage of growth. This should be viewed as a huge party favor to Pakistan. Adding to discussion, Rear Admiral Saleem Akhtar stated that better engineering has recently increased the chances of discovery and that more data needs to be gathered and shared with the relevant departments
Referring to the Vice Admiral Hasham Bin Saddique ’ second presentation in which he mentioned the significantly lower number of ships being operated by the PNSC in relation to the 1960 ’ s, Dr. Pervez Butt ( Former Chairman PAEC ) asked why Pakistan was not building ships the way it used to back then. To this Rear Admiral Saleem Akhtar added that while there was initially a slump in the rate of shipbuilding in Karachi, the united states navy has still made great use of the naval shipyard with a bang-up concentrate on strengthening the nation ’ s autochthonal capabilities. While there are limitations at the Karachi shipyard the new shipyard at Gwadar is likely to fill that gap and poses a valuable opportunity to further expand the nation ’ s shipbuilding industry .
Referring to Capt Aqeel Naqvi ’ s point on the built-in invention flaws and subsequent 
vulnerability of indian SSBNs, Dr. Syed Javaid Khurshid ( Senior Research Fellow, CISS ) pointed out that while these issues were being faced due to the Russian made reactors being used on these subs at the salute, these would likely soon be overcome following the development of SMRs ( Small Modular Reactors ) which India had been pursuing indigenously. These would likely greatly offset the current issues of noise adenine well as fueling and alimony issues which these reactors were undergoing due to the stage technological constraints of the indian dark blue .
Referring to the evolving geo-political dynamics of the region, AVM ( R ) Faaiz Amir ( Vice Chancellor, Air University ) noted that while the IndoPacific field represented a web site controversy for all the major powers, there was still the conspicuous absence of Russia as the US and India worked together to contain China. He asked the panel whether there was any specific argue behind the russian absence. Dr. Cheema in replying to the AVM ’ s question stated that this was largely due to the long history of Soviet-India relations which despite the evolving dynamics inactive remained quite sound to a big extent .
Directing his question to Vice Admiral Hasham Bin Saddique, Dr. Adil Sultan ( Director CASS ) asked whether 
it was prudent for Pakistan, being a relatively smaller country, to pursue a policy of continuous At-Sea Deterrence ( CASD ) particularly considering its economic viability adenine well as its numerical inferiority ( in the long run at sea ) against India ? Elaborating further he said that the UK acquired Trident in the 80 ’ randomness for US $ 12 billion and is now paying US $ 2 billion every year to maintain that capability. While India can afford to do that, the interview is, can Pakistan afford this ? He asked what kind of position can one envision Pakistan as therefore having, a bastion strategy or a continuous at sea hindrance, what would suit Pakistan ? besides based on China ’ s increasing function in the region and this whole narrative of India being threatened by the notion of China becoming a two-ocean power, is there value in helping China legitimize its character as a two – ocean power ? Replying to the wonder, Vice Admiral Saddique stated that based on his own personal opinion there was a necessitate to move from strategic disincentive to more towards cross-domain deterrence based on the presently evolving scenario. He explained that within broad spectrum deterrence there is a impression of disincentive involving war-fighting wherein the very idea of spectrum denotes a conflict spectrum. There is a motivation to further build on this and move towards economic deterrence as part of crabbed sphere determent to be able to survive. It is besides crucial to consider how the very nature of war is likely to be in terms of its aims and objectives if there ever was a battle to erupt between India and Pakistan. One needs to be well-defined whether it be a conventional date, involve nuclear war-fighting or be of a hybrid kind. Once that is decided we need to be prepared for all scenarios, therefore the emphasis on cross sphere deterrence. Based on current trends it is probable that any such war would be unretentive, flying and highly destructive. In order to deter India conventionally, operational facility is the winder in terms of having combat ready forces be it on country, sea or air. Considering the nuclear terror emanating from India particularly with the withdrawal of its aim No First Use policy, maintaining a continuous second-strike capability at sea is of utmost importance. Considering the short flight times and close distances involved, the economic cost of maintaining a continuous sea-based hindrance should not be an exit either. Hence, such operational set in both the conventional and strategic domains will exude determent. Having fight ready integrated battle groups with the ability to threaten the enemy ’ s 7000+ km coastline is besides probable to remain cardinal considering how difficult it is to defend such a huge area. On the issue of China, sooner or late Pakistan will have to enter a impregnable collaborative arrangement with China, because CPEC remains good a road unless the compulsory maritime part ( and its base hit ) is operationalized. For that there needs to possibly be a tripartite arrangement between China and Middle Eastern and African states, to ensure such collaborative security system in the nautical stadium .
Referring to the Cold War inspired determent models being discussed within strategic and nuclear disincentive frameworks in Pakistan, Ms. Anam Khan ( Researcher, ACDA ) asked why wasn ’ t any inspiration being drawn from early deterrence models such as those being employed by the UK and France involving Nuclear trio and/or dyads ? Vice Admiral Hasham Bin Saddique stated that at the consequence Pakistan is on its own when it comes to its strategic disincentive model. The french mannequin was based largely to the relative dispute in the potency of its conventional forces to its nuclear forces which is not angstrom much the case in Pakistan .
Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal ( Professor, QAU ) asked whether India ’ s strategy towards Pakistan had just shifted away from strategic determent towards compellence, specifically based on its growing emphasis 
on surgical strikes and preferring coercive military action as is apparent post-Pulwama. To this Capt. Aqeel Naqvi stated that India ’ s modernization plans, particularly in its united states navy deoxyadenosine monophosphate well as its withdrawal of its aim NFU military capability is decidedly emboldening India to adapt such a pose over the long melt. This is clearly discernible in the statements of its aged defense mechanism officials and advisors such as in the recent statements made by its defense minister. Adding to the discussion, Vice admiral Hasham Bin Saddique besides stated that India ’ s scheme of compellence has to an extent been effective, specially at least from 2001 where Pakistan was forced to abandon its policy vis-à-vis Kashmir, this for exemplify was even apparent in the present developments in Kashmir.
Media coverage
coverage of the event was reported on national television
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