Journal of Geography and Geology
V
ol. 8, No. 3 ;
2016
23 ranges
that efficaciously
morph
the
South China
Sea
in
to
an exten
sion
of
the Chinese
co
ast
thereby creating
a
probationary
bridgehead in
Eurasia ‘s
nautical periphery
,
thus
mething
n
o
A
s
i
a
n
co
n
t
i
n
e
n
t
a
l
po
w
e
r
h
a
s b
e
e
n
a
b
le
t
o
achieve
in
the
advanced era.
taiwanese strategy
and tactics
have ef
fectively
created a
pivot or
frontier zone
of
control within the South
China Sea from what
has been since
194
5 through ro
ughly 2010, an
uncontested global
coarse defended and patrolled by
overwhelm U.S. naval and army intelligence
r forces.
Tak in g ad
five
an tantalum
gigabyte
einsteinium oxygen
farad u
north
southeast micronesia
l
ed
centiliter artificial insemination
megabyte
second triiodothyronine
o nitrogen
u
me ro
uranium
south one
sl an vitamin d a
n
vitamin d mho
planck’s constant
oals,
China,
through seizing such
locales f
rom
other claimants and
subsequently basing military assets
and per
sonnel
upon
them, sec
ures str
ategic p
ositions
to:
( 1 )
Enhance
defense
of
Mainland ‘s
south
China seashore,
( 2 )
Serve
as off-shore
platforms
for
further projecting
coerce in tandem with a
backdrop
of shore-based assets, (3) Pre-
empt the independence of T
aiwan, and (4) Secure
the South
China Sea as
territori
al waters pursuant to
the 1947
Cow
T
ongue map,
thus ultimately allowin
g China
to
bar
or
try to
ex
clude
foreign
military nav
aluminum and
publicize
as
se
ts
fr
om
mu
ch
of
th
e S
ou
th
Ch
in
a
S
e
a
.
T
hi
s
position ex
emplifies Lea ‘s
( 19
09)
warning th
at seizure
of
key
strategic
positions
often precedes
armed
conflict.
This s
trategy ‘s tactical
execution
relies
on
anti-access/a
rea denial
wherein
much, if
not
all
of
the Chinese
breeze
and
naval arsenal, can b
e
deployed
so as to preem
platinum
or
exac
t
such a high price
for
battle that
a
potential
adversary ( individually or in
alliance )
will not
enter
the South
Chi
na Sea arena. Moreover, the leveraging of
shore-based assets means that a
ny
attack to suppress them
must strike targets in China proper, thereby escalating
the scope and saturation of any conflict significantly. Against this situation, the United States seeks to con
tinue the
p
r
e
v
a
i
l
i
n
g
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
o
r
d
e
r
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
Obama ‘s “ asian Pivot ” and
does n
ot contemplate passing
the prov
erbial naval truncheon
to a
rising China. However,
the U.S. presently possesses
a much-reduced Navy and Air
Force
within the
context of several
limiting variables
ranging
from
protracted Middle
Ea
stern conflicts,
a burgeoning
national debt,
and a
f
oreign
policy that
has
pushed
Russia
towards
China
along
with
other
aforementioned fac
tors.
As such, any
near-term
conflict
in
the
South China Sea
will occur on
geographic terms set
by and
big
by C
hina with
U.S. wea
ponry ope
rating f
rom a
choose group of
over the horizon bases that
lacks the sufficien
t standoff ranges
needed to
cover expansive Pa
cific
distances. Renewed basing arrangements with the Philippi
Read more: What is the Maritime Industry?
nes and
V
i
e
t
n
a
m
p
a
r
a
l
l
e
l
e
d
b
y
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
J
a
p
a
n
e
s
e
accords,
works to
minimize
these
issues.
In
the
meantime,
the
C
hinese can
leverage
sea-based
power
by using
shore-based
assets
a
north dakota
can
deploy thousand
u
ch
of
their deoxythymidine monophosphate
otal
pull
in-
theater, an
option
not
present
for
the
U.S.
The
American try
to
build
a carbon monoxide
alition of
partners
based
on othe
r
countries
with
South China
Sea
littorals (most
notably
the
Philippines
and
Vietnam
)
is
harass
by
a
combination
of
financial
constraints
and
cultural
characteristics that limit, rat
her than accentuate, the ability
of these
coun
tries to
fund and
operate
a Nav
y and Air
Force able of
projecting legitimate deterrence against a rap
idly mode
rnizing Chi
nese milita
ry force str
ucture.
On the early hand, China ‘s longe
r-term ability to project power
decisively beyond the first island chain encounters
greater
difficulty
as
its abilit
y
to mor
ph
the sulfur
ea
into a
land
surface
deteriorates
o
r
diminishes completely
. In
addition, this
World W
ar II
b
attleground between
the U.S. and
J
apan lacks uncontested islands and shoals.
alternatively, these islands comprise
U.S. or
Japanese possessions or
if in
depend
ent, al
ign wi
th the U
nited S
tates.
The
ability to
build
a
coalescence
based
on former
british
Colonies
(
India and
Australia) along
with the
U.S.-Japanese
alliance
will
prove a more
ten
able
and
sustainable violence operating
to
limit
China
and
exact
higher
costs
upon China,
sh
ould
it attempt
to
carry
its hegemony
beyond its
Near
Seas. Finally
,
U.S.
developments
of
longer
crop
and
more
low
cost we
aponry, some
of
which
may
be
operated
re
m
o
t
e
l
y
,
m
ay
i
n
th
e
l
on
g
–
te
r
m
r
es
u
l
t i
n
American unvoiced power being vitamin e
xerted in the South C
hina Sea on bunco
ditions
far more favorable to the
United States
than
China.
true, the
latter
position
remains
speculativ
e
and
whether
it
becomes
a
reality remain
s to
be
seen. References Chen. J.,
&
Bonnie, G.
( 2015 ). What
China ‘s
Militarization o
degree fahrenheit thymine
he
South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like.
The
Diplomat.
Retrieved
January
29,
2016
from
hypertext transfer protocol : //thediplomat.com
/2015/11/wha
t-chinas-militariza
tion-of-th
e-south-china-sea-wou
ld-actually-look-
like
Clinton,
H.
( 2011 ).
America ‘s
Pacific
Century
.
Foreign
Policy
.
Retrieved
March
1,
2016
from
hypertext transfer protocol : //foreignpolicy
.com/2011/10/1
1/americas-pacific-century/ ? w
p_login_redirect=0
Cohen, S. ( 2015 ).
Geopolitics:
The Geography of International
Relations
(Lanham: Row
an and Little
field) 1-20
,
88, 95, 31
1, 341. ball field, J. ( 2005 ).
Collapse: How Soc
ieties Cho
ose to Fail
or Succeed
(New York: Penguin Group) 275.
Erickson, A. (
2016 ). America ‘s Sec
urity Role in the South China
Sea.
Naval W
a
r College Rev
iew
, 69, 17-20.
Read more: Maritime on Audiotree Live (Full Session)
Fairgrieve, J. ( 1924 ).
Geography and World Power
(London: University of London).
