As China expands its strive into the indian Ocean and wraps up construction in Southeast Asia, the same classify of assets that built-up the seven Spratly features that China occupies into artificial islands may decamp for ports in the indian Ocean, potentially strengthening China ’ mho logistics chain for its naval activities in what its strategists term the Far Seas .
Dredging up ‘Pearls’
China ’ south controversial island-building in the South China Sea — particularly in the Spratlys — has been the subject of extraneous speculation a well as international litigation since it began on an industrial scale more than 18 months ago .
While some foreign sources prematurely asserted that China was already establishing a “ chain of Pearls ” composed of ball military “ bases ” across the indian Ocean, China ’ mho extant reclamation efforts have alternatively constituted a step toward establishing militarily-relevant facilities in the South China Sea. China ’ randomness structure work on the reef in the Spratlys is by no means newly, though ; in 1988 the PLA had already started stationing troops in huts on bamboo poles in the island chain.
rather than freshness, the main reasons that China ’ second construction has alone recently made headlines is because of both the absolute scale and speed at which it was executed and the implications it has for neighboring countries. China is besides the first state in the area to turn amply submerged reefs into full-fledged man-made “ islands, ” and is the entirely one to build at least one high-capacity 3,000 meter airstrip with a taxiway on a have it controls. Such a track has already been completed at Fiery Cross Reef, with another well afoot on Subi Reef and yet another possibly emerging at Mischief Reef. The last is suggested by grading and tamping by bulldozers in two strips visible in satellite imagination of Mischief ’ s northwest share .
The amphetamine at which China was able to create these islands owes itself wholly to China ’ randomness dredger development over the past decade, and the movements of respective of China ’ south largest dredgers have been tracked in the area. China ’ s big self-propelled cutter-suction dredger ( CSD ) Tianjing was spotted at the Union Banks and Tizard Banks in 2013 and early 2014, then at Hughes Reef between 20 March and 3 April 2014 conducting nation reclamation. The trailing suction hopper dredger ( TSHD ) Tiankai was besides seen operating at Mischief Reef between 14 January and 16 February of this year, while the CSD Xinhaitun was identified in the same location from 24-28 February. According to a Sina.com report, China ’ mho dredgers were able to expand two different islands in the Spratlys to the degree that they could support normal construction in the couple of only three months, a concrete expression of China ’ s large and rapid construction capacity. Both Tianjing and Tiankai are operated by China Communications Construction Company ( CCCC ) Tianjin, though their web site makes no mention of any active projects in the South China Sea region. Pictures in an article on the New York Times website besides show dozens of chinese dredgers working simultaneously at Mischief Reef, demonstrating the diaphanous numbers China has deployed for have augmentation .
The Pentagon has stated that although these backbone castles are of limit military utility program due to their smallness and vulnerability, they could be used to provide logistics support to maritime patrols or an air defense designation zone ( ADIZ ) in the long term. The theme of using these islands as a way to extend patrol fits China ’ second larger “ maritime rights ” enforcement strategy in the South China Sea, whereby it prevents early countries from pursuing fish, energy exploration, construction, or early activities in the area, regardless of whether early countries accept China ’ second claims or not, thereby asserting effective control. This scheme already seems to be paying dividends for China. As Ding Zhile, Chairman of the Qionghai Tanmen Fisheries Association in Hainan province, relates, when fishermen previously went to the disputed Huangyan Island ( Scarborough Shoal ), they would always see fishermen from the Philippines, whereas now all they see are chinese government vessels. chinese fishermen nowadays feel much safer fish in disputed waters, Ding adds, as they know chinese patrol boats are poised to intercede should they encounter worry .
Beijing ’ s assertiveness regarding its position in the South China Sea is thus far firm, even in the face of external litigation brought against it by Manila and increasing pressure from Washington. The United States has been conducting exemption of navigation exercises in the sphere in an attack to ensure that China ’ south “ islands ” do not interfere with impeccant passage, though chinese officials have taken the status that exemption of navigation does not extend to warships and planes in territorial waters. Flights near the islands have repeatedly been subject to warnings from China ’ s navy that they are entering a military zone and should turn back, lending credibility to the possibility of China setting up an ADIZ in the area—as it did over much of the East China Sea in 2013. however, the late sweep of several chinese warships within 12 nautical miles of U.S. land in the aleutian Islands off Alaska presents a contradiction between China ’ sulfur words and its actions, and will make it harder for Beijing to object to U.S. naval ships operating close to China ’ mho “ islands ” in the Spratlys .
China ’ mho island construction in the Spratlys is not quite finished, with holocene photos of Subi Reef showing another 3,000m track under construction, China ’ randomness third on South China Sea features, along with several ships from China ’ s big dredging fleet. however, this separate of construction should wind down soon, with China shifting to fortification of islands frankincense built, and then these dredgers will leave to find exploit elsewhere. The interrogate remains of where they might go once their Spratlys construction is finished. While China ’ s own domestic market is impressive, expected to reach between 5 and 7.5 billion cubic meters by erstwhile this year, the country ’ s “ Maritime Silk Road ” program besides has a heavy stress on port construction, channel dredge, and farming reclamation. China ’ s large construction capacity and new dredger engineering will undoubtedly find itself useful along the Maritime Silk Road, expanding ports in the indian Ocean Region ( IOR ) and beyond through investment both from the chinese government and China ’ s State-owned Enterprises ( SOEs ). This construction and expansion has raised the concern of early countries active agent in the region, notably India, leading to fears of the eventual execution of some form of a “ string of Pearls ” network—however difficult and uncertain it might be for China to attempt this in rehearse .
China’s Maritime Silk Road
China ’ randomness Maritime Silk Road project, initially proposed by Xi Jinping in 2013, was initially pitched as a way to develop economic ties between ASEAN countries and China. It has expanded to besides include countries in south Asia and possibly even east Africa. This policy envisions the investment in and building of large infrastructure projects along the historic Maritime Silk Road from Fujian state, through the indian Ocean, and over to the Mediterranean, including several high-profile projects within in the IOR .
Since the proposal of this raw strategy, China has invested in the expansion and operation of respective ports throughout South and Southeast Asia. Projects extend from Pakistan to Sudan to Singapore. Several prominently feature China ’ s boastfully SOEs, including CCCC, China Merchants Holdings ( International ) ( CMHI ), and China State Construction and Engineering Company ( CSCEC ). CCCC recently integrated its three dredging subsidiaries, CCCC Tianjin, CCCC Shanghai, and CCCC Guangzhou, into one company—CCCC Dredging—which controls more than half of China ’ s 1 billion+ m3/year dredging capability. The majority of CCCC ’ south oversea business is conducted through its oversea auxiliary, China Harbor Engineering Company ( CHEC ) .
CCCC, through CHEC and other branches, has been involved in several large infrastructure projects in the IOR. In Pakistan ’ randomness Karachi, CHEC has signed a narrow for a container terminal yard and house construction at Karachi Deepwater Port, which is the fourthly continuing project undertaken by CHEC at Karachi. At the port of Qasim, besides in Karachi, CHEC carried out care and groove dredge, ampere well as dredging for a u-turn extension project from 2010-11. It is presently involved in constructing the Qasim International Container Terminal ( QICT ), which involves the dredge of the waterway to a depth of 16m and will result in an annual capacity of 1.17 million TEU. Outside of Karachi, CHEC was besides involved in the deep-water port of Gwadar, reportedly engaging in talks with Port of Singapore Authority ( PSA ) about taking over operation of the larboard in 2012 before the larboard was handed over to China Overseas Port Holdings in 2013. CHEC was involved in the original structure of the port at Gwadar .
CCCC has besides funded the $ 1.4 billion ( US ) Colombo Port City project in Sri Lanka, which involved the expansion of the port and the services of respective dredgers, including CCCC Guangzhou ’ s 10,000m3 Junhai-02 TSHD. While this project initially came under examination in 2014 for corruption, environmental issues, high interest rates and single rights over air space above the Colombo Port City land, workplace has continued, and the port is presently under a 35-year build, operate, and transfer agreement between the Sri Lanka Ports Authority ( SLPA ) and China Merchants Holdings ( International ) ( CMHI ), which owns an 85 percentage stake in the interface. On the other slope of the island, CHEC, along with chinese spouse Synohydro, besides constructed Phase I of Hambantota Port. In 2013, Sri Lanka granted CMHI and CCCC operating rights to four berths at Hambantota Port in rally for an still of loanword conditions for the port ’ second development. Loan relief was needed, with Phase I costing over $ 300 million ( US ) and Phase II, besides involving CHEC, totaling round $ 800 million. Whereas taiwanese companies have effective control of over 100 hectares of nation in Colombo, all of the bring in Hambantota will be owned by SLPA, including Phase II ’ s artificial island .
The company ’ s extensive projects besides include the $ 705 million ( US ) construction of an submerged tunnel below the Karnaphuli river and larboard expansion at Chittagong in Bangladesh, the design, construction and alimony of nominate docks and related structures at Tuas South port in Singapore, a $ 213 million contract for a crude oil terminal and impart dredge project in Myanmar, adenine well as the construction of a salt pier in Djibouti. In 2013, CHEC besides signed a cooperative agreement on the expansion of the Aden Container Terminal in Yemen before internal imbalance in the area came to a head .
CCCC is far from the only company operational in the IOR, though, as other chinese SOEs have further augmented regional investments. CMHI holds 23.5 % post in Port de Djibouti S.A., which includes two-thirds of the port ’ second Doraleh Container Terminal. construction of the Damerjog livestock port and the multipurpose Doraleh port, with both projects launching in 2013, are being funded by China Merchants Group. CSCEC won the bid for the engineering, procurement, and construction ( EPC ) project of Phase I of the Doraleh Wharf in August of 2014, which includes the construction of a 1,200m long frontage for five multi-purpose deep water berths, a 175m long service berth, and associate encouraging facilities, all in Djibouti .
On land, chinese companies besides opened a newfangled oil pipeline from the Chinese-built Kyaukpyu port in Myanmar to Kunming, Yunnan province, in early 2015. additionally, CCCC subsidiaries are involved in building educational infrastructure in Djibouti and three highways in Sri Lanka, although a proposed a railroad agate line in Myanmar between Kyaukpyu and Kunming has been cancelled.
Read more: How Maritime Law Works
Ports or Pearls?
chinese overseas investment is nothing new, and has steadily increased since China ’ second reform and opening up menstruation. From January-June 2015, the turnover from taiwanese overseas contracted projects reached $ 67.54 billion ( US ), with a total contract value of China ’ sulfur contracted projects abroad totaling $ 1.4485 trillion. While investment in the IOR is partially encouraged by Xi Jinping ’ s Maritime Silk Road Strategy and related grants and loans, chinese investment in this region besides accompanies increased taiwanese investments in other regions, including ports in Piraeus, Greece and the west seashore of Africa .
CCCC Second Harbor Consultants Co., Ltd. even signed the narrow for a feasibility study project of the port contribution of Nicaragua Canal, with a contract value of $ 4.32 million in 2013. The Economist has argued that far from pursuing geopolitical goals, China is just exploiting lower prices sparked by a downturn in trade between 2007 and 2008, and subscribing to a “ supersized imagination of the diligence in which an elect group of ports caters to a new genesis of mega-vessels, ” supporting the argument that taiwanese interests in these ports are strictly commercial. Increased trade, improved architecture, and better trade relations benefit both China and the countries receiving the investment. however, chinese larboard investments have generated rumors of taiwanese abroad naval support facilities initiation. Rumors aside, they are offering China a larger, more dependable logistics network with electric potential military applications .
such an emerging network can better support the auspices of its citizens oversea and of chinese abroad interests. Examples include PLAN anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, the evacuation of taiwanese and foreign citizens from Libya and Yemen, and the see of syrian chemical weapons for destruction. Protection of oversea chinese citizens is increasingly important for China ’ south politics, with the shell of taiwanese workers being taken hostage by rebel groups in Sudan in 2012 but one of many challenges to which Beijing must respond. These overseas actions require a logistics network that would allow for China ’ s united states navy to operate efficiently and efficaciously for extended periods of fourth dimension in international waters. recently, chinese ships have relied on commercial ports and facilities to support anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden, chiefly using the commercial port facilities in Oman ’ randomness Salalah, Yemen ’ s Aden, Djibouti, and Singapore to replenish, refuel, and overhaul. They have besides called on Pakistan ’ s Karachi, the Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh ’ second Chittagong, and Myanmar ’ s Sittwe for friendly visits or joint drills. China besides has active investing projects in all of these locations, arsenic good as several others ; these have the likely to expand the phone number of ports available to the design for resupply during anti-piracy missions and any future peacetime operations. As the crisis in Yemen shows, a diverseness of possible access points is necessary in order to ensure constant, authentic support .
China ’ s infrastructure investment has besides revived indian fears of blockade, specially as it pertains to the Seychelles, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In 2011, China ’ second Minister of Defense responded to a report that China was invited to establish a base in the Seychelles, stating that, “ According to escort needs and the needs of other long-range missions, China will consider seeking supply facilities at allow harbors in the Seychelles or early countries. ” In Pakistan, China ’ s Yuan-class submarine hull 335 reportedly docked in Karachi for refilling in May, and in 2014, two plan vessels, a submarine and a submarine support vessel, docked at the Chinese-run Colombo South Container Terminal alternatively of the SLPA berths mandated to host military vessels, raising anxiety in India about a greater chinese presence in the indian Ocean. While visits to foreign ports to refuel and replenish are not out of the norm, the manner in which the ships docked in Sri Lanka, India ’ south strained relationship with Pakistan and China ’ second bankruptcy to deny the possibility of a issue facility in the Seychelles have all increased refer over a renewed chinese advertise for a permanent presence in the IOR .
The Seychelles besides is not alone in offering China its first possible oversea support facility. Djibouti ’ s President Guelleh acknowledged in an interview in May that China has been engaged with Djibouti in negotiations for a naval “ root ” in the minor african nation, which already hosts American, japanese, and french forces, saying that Beijing ’ s presence would be “ welcomed. ” In February 2014, Chinese General Chang Wanquan and Djibouti ’ south Minister of Defense signed a security and defense strategic partnership agreement, under which Djibouti is offering itself as a home port for China ’ south navy, in exchange for rent and military cooperation to strengthen the Djiboutian armed forces ’ operational capacities. When asked about negotiations concerning a chinese military base in Djibouti, China ’ s Foreign Ministry responded by neither denying nor confirming reports, alternatively saying that regional stability is beneficial for all countries and China is volition to increase its contributions towards this finish .
India ’ s reverence of blockade by China is, in separate, a resultant role of the perception that China is constructing a “ string of Pearls, ” or military-relevant facilities in ports around the indian subcontinent. India ’ second fears may be misplaced, though, as the potential locations for a chinese presence all deliver strategic vulnerabilities that would make it difficult to covertly construct a base and then protect it from the aircraft and missiles of India or another major world power. rather, what appears more probably, according to an October 2014 NDU composition, is the initiation of respective “ dual-use ” facilities, or commercial facilities that would provide limited Chinese Naval deployments in the IOR with logistics support, along with a few logistics bases that would house 100-500 chinese personnel. however, both a “ string of Pearls ” model and a “ dual-use ” model ask that China maintain a hard adequate political and economic relationship with the host state to ensure taiwanese access to commercial facilities, and China ’ s extensive investments in the region have set the foundation garment for this kind of strong economic and political relationship .
Conclusion
With the large number of chinese investments and renewed focus in the indian Ocean, China ’ s navy is here to stay. Beijing ’ s push to develop a “ Far-seas ” -capable navy that can project increasing influence and reach out equally necessary to protect its citizens and economic interests oversea requires a impregnable logistics range. This probable means the adoption of a “ dual-use ” strategy whereby PLAN ships use largely commercial facilities for resupply and refilling with the master of ceremonies nation ’ south approval, necessitating impregnable political and economic relationships. Investments from the chinese government and SOEs have proven that China has laid the foundations for these relationships in several IOR countries. China ’ mho dredger flit in the South China Sea has proven China ’ s construction capacity and the travel rapidly at which it can bend shorelines to Beijing ’ mho will .
now that island structure in the Spratlys appears about complete for now, many dredgers and relate machinery recently engaged there may move to the indian Ocean, where they can accelerate ongoing port construction projects. Should China seek to establish any official logistics “ bases ” or other facilities able of providing naval support, China ’ s dredging fleet has proven in the South China Sea that it has the horsepower to construct the command infrastructure efficiently. China has the necessity tools and a firm foundation already set to build the back infrastructure for a solid logistics range in the IOR. The theme of at least one taiwanese logistics “ nucleotide ” is appearing more and more to be more a question of when and not if. Keep an eye on Djibouti .
