Cmdr. Robert J. Briggs and Cmdr. Richard D. Slye monitor the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning from the pilothouse of the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mustin in April. U.S. NAVY / Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Arthur RosenThe Navy League ’ second Center for Maritime Strategy set sail on a surveil ocean of supportive calls, emails, and letters. The pressing cause of our nation ’ randomness maritime baron resonates from commercial districts to the cargo terminals. With our ideal placement inside the capital beltway, we will gather a coalition of maritime-minded business leaders, think tanks, concerned citizens and congressional leadership to drive the sea changes our nautical future needs .
consequently, I spent the first week in full “ startup ” mode, launching the position off the blocks while interviewing CMS candidates, fielding phone calls and taking CMS ’ sulfur message on the road. I had the pleasure of introducing our mission and vision on two popular podcasts hosted by Francis Rose of Fedscoop and Walker Mills of Sea Control ( affiliated with the Center for International Maritime Security, or CIMSEC ). Both interviews will give you an estimate of where we want to take CMS in the months and years to come
meanwhile, over the Thanksgiving break, I had some time to reflect on the past and the future as CMS endeavors to become a firm advocate of America ’ s maritime ability. In fact, merely last month, I keynoted at Deep Blue 2021, a canadian maritime league. In preparing for my remarks, I harkened back to an assignment I undertook in the Pentagon in 1997 — a reflection indicative of the predictive errors that led how our nautical project decayed to its current state .
As a member of the staff of Dr. Paris Genalis, director of naval war in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology ( USD A & T ), I served as a government adviser for the Defense Science Board Task Force on Submarines. The DSB ’ s team of talented, bi-partisan scientists, industrialists, civilian policy makers and uniform services representatives chartered to decide the direction the nation would take in our future genesis of submarines.
The undertaking effect first needed a vision of the future resolving what capabilities our next generation submarine required. Over its foremost few months, the undertaking force embarked on a mini futures study to predict the security environment in the nautical sphere in 2020 and beyond. It ’ s worthwhile to examine some of their conclusions, assess the accuracy of their predictions and then assess how we have done as a nation in responding to future threats .
The undertaking pull began with a prediction of the type of battlefield trends the military would face in 2020 and beyond. They envisioned :
- Multiple, simultaneous and shifting geographic foci
- Greater requirements for stealth, agility and self defense
- Proliferation of technology in sensing, guidance and targeting significantly increasing weapons effectiveness for all parties
- More effective coordination of sensors and shooters over longer ranges would allow smaller forces to conduct precision strike from greater distances
- Mission diversity would increase, requiring a greater variety of warfighter skills and tradecraft
- Reduced decision cycle would decrease warning time, intensifying the need for rapid response capabilities.
Twenty three years ago, the task force ’ s future military swerve predictions were spot on. We are deterring and defending against multiple adversaries on multiple axes in building complex competitions which threaten to explode into conflicts fought over extreme draw ranges. Agile hypersonic weapons and furtive, long-range and accurate weapons in the hypersonic family of missiles slash commanders ’ available admonition clock time and necessitate the development from simple Aegis-like decision systems to artificial intelligence aid to the warfighter ’ sulfur decisiveness cycle .
The nature of the battlefield determined, the job force imagined the Navy ’ randomness role in 2020. A immediate reappraisal of the U.S. Navy ’ south latest maritime strategy newspaper, “ advantage at Sea, ” reveals the DSB ’ s judgment of the Navy ’ s mission priorities in 2020 and beyond was unusually alike. You can read them at this link to “ Advantage at Sea. ”
unfortunately, like many other future studies of the lapp era, the DSB ’ s geopolitical analysis of the “ World from DoD ’ s Perspective — in the following 10 to 20, then 50 years ” fell lethally abruptly — wrong by either miscalculation or misplaced optimism .
In 1998, the DSB predicted America would face “ no plausible strategic rival ” in 10 to 20 years, beset alternatively by an increasing number of diffuse regional threats. This was dead wrong, even though the signs were predicted. The DSB noted the nonreversible superiority of U.S. weapons systems will be reduced, that traditional alliances will become weaker and american oversea base would decrease with more restrictions or national caveats on their practice. DSB understand and reported technology diffusion would make our disincentive more challenge, particularly as regional conflicts drew focus — all devastatingly true. Despite these trends, looking to the future from the heights of american exponent, we couldn ’ deoxythymidine monophosphate gestate of a strategic adversary emerging before 2050 .
While the DBS was dead wrong in its prediction of “ no plausible strategic rival ” by 2020, the DSB was far from alone in trust on continue american global hegemony for another one-half century. Our inability as a state to predict these threats 20 years ago suppressed our ability to act. America singularly focused on its fight against violent extremism across the Middle East and Africa to the exception of all else, assuming our competitive advantage would last. As we lay entrenched, early ’ sulfur stole a march on us, filling the vacuum we left and grasping at the mantles we let droop .
so where do we go from here ? Our strategic rival out-paced our predictions by 30 years ; and 20 years of counter-insurgency stymied our recognition and chemical reaction. More than our future investments, our investing now must bias toward sea, air, space and the enable signals domains. According to the Congressional Research Service, China will increase its fleet to 425 ships by 2030, with six carriers by the mid 2030s. The U.S. Navy will globally disperse only 300-305 ships, while the People ’ second Liberation Army Navy ( PLAN ) sits en masse on the WESTPAC doorsill. even if estimations of the PLAN threat are overwrought, which they are not, a recapitalization of the evanesce and bets on commercial nautical world power hush provide guarantee economic improvement and a mobile deterrent hedge against any advancing threat against american national interests.
Efforts like the $ 25 billion Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan must be accelerated to improve the nautical industrial floor over a ten, not two. We need the capability and capacity to build, modernize and repair our ships now. Doing anything less will leave our Sailors and national security within a deadly allowance for potential kill from which there will be no second chances .
Let ’ s act nowadays and restore the capital reserve of sea power our nation needs, sooner than late !
The DSB Report summary was published on-line in 1998 by the Defense Technical Information Center ( DTIC ) .
