The Google Earth collection for the Maritime Boundaries in the Timor Sea can be downloaded here .
If you ’ ra concern in figuring out how all these treaties work in concert, it is credibly more useful to just go ahead and play around with it on Google Earth, but I ’ ve provided a ocular summary below using screencaps from the collection .
I. The Indonesian-Australian Seabed Boundary Agreement (1972)
In the begin, there was the col :
Australia and Indonesia entered into the 1972 seabed boundary treaty, which established a maritime limit that was significantly north of the medial line between Indonesia and Australia. The limit in front of Portuguese-controlled Timor remains nebulous .
In 1975, Portuguese exited the setting, and Indonesia promptly invaded. Indonesia and Australia judge, and fail, to enter into an agreement establishing the maritime limit between Australia and Indonesian Timor .
II. The PFSEL (1981)
In 1981, Indonesia and Australia still had not entered into any permanent treaty arrangements over their nautical boundaries, but they did succeed in reaching a memo of Understanding concerning the Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Arrangement. This MOU did not establish any agreement as to the ocean floor resources, but provided a work placement for early maritime concerns in the region by establishing the Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Line ( PFSEL ). The PFSEL was drawn roughly along the median between the coasts of Timor and Australia, and this note would late be largely replicated as the body of water column limit in the 1997 Treaty between the Australia and Indonesia, establishing an exclusive Economic Zone Boundary and Certain Seabed Boundaries
III. The Timor Gap Treaty (1989)
In 1989, Australia and Indonesia entered into the Timor Gap Treaty, which came into impression in 1991. The TGT, if taken in a generous light, could be described as a “ creative compromise. ” It was ultimately reached by simply setting aside the wonder of nautical boundaries, and rather establishing three “ zones of cooperation ” in which Australia and Indonesia could jointly produce the petroleum found in the challenge Timor Sea region. Tax revenues from Zone A were split between Australia and Indonesia 50 % /50 % ; in Zone B, Australia paid Indonesia 10 % of the tax revenues it collected ; and in Zone C, Indonesia paid Australia 10 % of the tax revenues it collected .
The coffin-shaped design of the Zone of Cooperation Whole ( “ Zone ” ) was a deliberate choice made by Indonesia and Australia, and it does not immediately reflect nautical boundaries that would be suggested by international law. basically, the parties agreed that the widest region of the Zone would be placed where the “ Timor gap ” lie, in between the open left by the 1972 seabed boundary line, and the Zone would then become narrower both to the union and south of the Timor gap .
Northern and Southern Boundaries of the Zone
The placement of the northerly and southerly boundaries of the Zone has a relatively aim basis. Indonesia and Australia agreed to draw the northern boundary of the Zone directly on top of the deepest point of the Timor Sea — the Timor Trough. The Timor Trough lies approximately 40 nautical miles south of East Timor, and it runs approximately twin to the timorese coastline. The northern limit of the Zone is significant in that it marks the boundary of the most extensive territorial claim that Australia has tried to assert in the Timor Sea .
Australia ’ s claim to sovereign rights over all of the nautical areas south of the Timor Trough are based on the “ natural extension ” rationale. The natural extension principle, which has been about wholly discarded under modern international law, provided that the boundaries of a coastal country ’ s maritime district should reflect the ‘ natural extension ’ of its land territory along the contintental shelf, based on geological features of the ocean floor. Roughly talk, it provides that a department of state ’ randomness rights to the continental ledge cover until interrupted by some geological feature. Australia has contended that the Timor Trough is the relevant “ interrupting ” geological feature in the Timor Sea, and consequently its rights extend from the australian slide trace to the deepest point of the public treasury :
In contrast to the Zone ’ s northern limit, the Zone ’ s southerly boundary is drawn along a line that is 200 nautical miles off the coast of the island of Timor. This represents what is, theoretically, the most extensive claim that Indonesia could have made over the Timor Sea, based on the 200nm exclusive economic partition ( EEZ ), as established by UNCLOS. When a state has no close maritime neighbors, its EEZ stretches out from its coastal baseline to the 200nm limit. however, when the sea between two adjacent states is less than 400nm ( as is the case in the Timor Sea ), both states are unable to have a broad 200-mile EEZ. In those cases, the EEZ is alternatively typically drawn along a median agate line between the two coasts .
evening though the 200nm limit does not technically apply to the Timor Sea, it did provide a useful limit for Indonesia and Australia to use during their negotiations over the Timor Gap Treaty. In ordering to set the northern and southerly boundaries of the Zone, the parties ’ reached an agreement that ( at least theoretically ) would reflect both Indonesia and Australia ’ s maximum possible nautical territorial claims .
Although the southern and northern boundaries of the Zone were therefore, apparently, “ fair, ” in that it was defined by the overlapping areas of each department of state ’ randomness maximal possible territorial claim, the actual result is inequitable in that the Zone lies a mere 40nm south of East Timor ’ s coast, but lies approximately 90nm north of Australia ’ s coast .
The Internal Boundaries of the Zone (Zones A, B, and C)
As discussed above, the Zone is subdivided into three smaller zones, and different economic regulations apply to each of the three inner zones. The division between Zone A ( the middle zone ) and Zone B ( the southern-most zone ) is drawn along the medial between Australia and Timor. This boundary lies close to — but is not coextensive with — the PFSEL, which is the median lineage that was established in the Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Arrangement.fn1
The boundary between Zone C ( the northern-most zone ) and Zone A ( the middle zone ) lies a little ways north of the original 1972 ocean floor boundary. The fish of the Zone C-Zone A limit is dissimilar to the slant of the 1972 seabed limit, however. The Zone C-Zone A limit appears to have been demarcated on the footing of ocean floor features ; it largely coincides with a ocean floor ridge to the south of the Timor Trough, where the southern slope of the Timor Trough levels off. The result is that the northern and southern boundaries of Zone C are not completely parallel, as they are not based on the lapp ocean floor feature. The northern boundary tracks the deepest period of the Trough, while the southerly boundary tracks the canyon lip of the trough :
Western Lateral Boundaries of Zones A and B
The lateral pass boundaries of the Zone ( marking the width of the Zone as it runs east-west ) are more randomly drawn than the longitudinal boundaries. The western lateral boundary of the Zone is particularly odd, as it is in fact two different boundaries. Unlike the easterly boundaries for Zones A and B ( which are roughly identical ) the western boundaries for Zones A and B show a scar and unexplained divergence. It appears that the western boundary of Zone A ( in royal Blue ) was established by a line drawn from the mouth of the Kamanasa River through the decimal point of A17, which then terminates where it meets the median boundary between Australia and Indonesia ( in white ), to intersect at the point marked by decimal point B ( e ). The western boundary of Zone B ( in bluish green ), although roughly similar, runs at a different angle from Zone A ’ second boundary. zone B ’ s boundary appears to have been established by drawing a cable from the sass of the Tafara River through point B ( einsteinium ), which then terminates where it meets the 200 nautical sea mile line of Timor ’ south EEZ ( the southern edge of Zone A ), to intersect at the detail marked by B ( five hundred ) :
The logic behind the placement of the Zone ’ s western boundary is not immediately apparent. It is often said that the western boundary is a “ simplified ” equidistant cable that divides the territorial seas between portuguese Timor and Indonesia, but there is reason to question this assumption. First, the western lines merely don ’ deoxythymidine monophosphate appear to be an equidistant limit, as it is claimed ; it may possibly be a “ simplified ” line of equidistance, but if so, it ’ s an unintuitive approximation of that. Second, the boundaries of the Zones are unerringly straight ; they draw direct line into the coasts, and not angled in a manner that would suggest they are following an organic boundary division. And, third, based on the historic context, it makes little sense for the lateral boundaries of the Zone to have been drawn along a line of equidistance. In 1989, there was only a single autonomous on the island of Timor, and that was Indonesia. The aim of the Timor Gap Treaty was to resolve the division of an undelimited nautical limit between a autonomous that held the entirety of the union and a autonomous that held the entirety of the south ; there was absolutely no need to calculate the boundary of two adjacent sovereigns on the northern side, or to have the class of the Zone reflect that. The Zone was plainly a compromise, as shown by its Trough-marked northerly frame and 200nm southerly molding, and there is no reason to assume that the western and eastern edge were not besides based on pragmatic considerations — as opposed to reflecting the sovereign district of the submit of Timor-Leste, which no longer existed .
And from the maps, it does very much appear that the western boundaries had been drawn in reference to geographic features on Timor. Both the Zone A and Zone B western boundaries line astir directly with river mouths on Timor ’ s shore :
The Zone established by the Timor Gap Treaty is therefore arbitrary, in that its boundaries were not delimited on the footing of an objective and independent body of external law, but rather were delimited on the basis of negotiation and compromise between Australia and Indonesia. They are hardheaded, preferably than legal. As a solution, the western boundary of the Zone was in no way intended to reflect the territorial waters that contemporary Timor-Leste would be entitled to, as provided by international police. Using the Tafara and Kamanasa Rivers to establish the western boundaries for the Timor Gap Treaty was an arbitrary but commodious way to establish the Zones of Cooperation, as it would allow the Zone ’ second coordinates to be determined based on an existing geological feature, rather than a random coordinate .
But these two rivers have no autonomous signficance as limit markers. Their use demonstrates that the Zone ’ sulfur boundaries are not based on Timor-Leste ’ s territorial boundaries .
The Massin River, which lies to the west of the Tafara and Kamanasa rivers, is a far more signficant citation point. The mouth of the Massin river ( called the Mota Talas ) marks the limit between the state of Inodnesia and the state of East Timor. As a solution, if the Zones of Cooperation had been drawn to delineate the territorial ocean of what was then portuguese Timor, then the western boundary of the Zone should lead directly to Mota Talas .
But it doesn ’ thyroxine. Below, Mota Talas has been marked with a black thumbtack, and the boundary pipeline from Mota Talas to point B ( einsteinium ) has been marked in black, showing what a boundary from Mota Talas would look like, compared to a boundary from either Kamanasa or Tafara :
sol why draw the western boundary from Tafara or Kamanasa rather of Mota Talas ? This distinction doesn ’ t make a enormously huge remainder in terms of total sea area ; by using the limit withdraw from Tafara ( marked in bluish green ) alternatively of the boundary draw from Mota Talas ( marked in black ), a entire of approximately 131 square nautical miles are excluded from the territory of Zone A. This means those 131 square nautical miles were within Australia ’ s sole sovereign sphere, preferably than within an area that Australia and Indonesia had joint agency over .
131 square nautical miles is a relatively bantam sphere, however, compared to the Zone ’ s full territorial area. Given this marginal remainder, then even if the western lateral boundary of the Zone should have been drawn from Mota Talas rather of Tafara, does it result in any substantial bias to Timor-Leste ?
well, yes. One reason why Australia may have chosen to draw the boundary from Tafara and Kamanasa — and not Mota Talas — becomes immediately apparent if the markers for the Laminaria-Corallina natural gas fields are displayed on the map :
By establishing Timor-Leste ’ s territorial sea based on a luff that falls wholly within Timor-Leste ’ mho land territories, rather of basing it on the detail that marks it boundary with Indonesia, Timor-Leste ’ s territorial sea excludes what was, in 1989, a very significant oil field. In the 25 years since the Timor Gap Treaty, the Laminaria-Corallina vegetable oil fields have been all but tapped dry by Australia. Billions of dollars in natural resources that would have fallen within Zone A ( and therefore shared with Indonesia ) alternatively fell wholly outside of the Zone, and were used entirely by Australia .
It could be a concurrence, that the boundaris of the Zone were established so that it merely scantily excluded the Laminaria-Corallina petroleum fields. But you can understand my agnosticism. With billions at stake, that kind of convenient boundary draw can be explained better by design than by coincidence .
In any consequence, it is acquit that the Zone does not reflect what Timor-Leste is actually entitled to, because it is not based on Timor-Leste ’ s sovereign borders. If the western lateral boundary of Timor ’ south EEZ and territorial ocean were to be re-drawn today on the basis of its actual district ( and — if I were in charge of the world — the matchless that I would I draw ), a more appropriate division might be provided by the proposed limit depicted below, in scandalmongering. This way, Timor-Leste ’ s territorial ocean actully aligns with its down boundaries ( marked in the chummy jaundiced course ) :
This boundary preserves the slant established by the Timor Gap Treaty ( and the Timor Sea Treaty ) — which is not terribly army for the liberation of rwanda off from the lean of an equidistant line dividing the territorial seas of Indonesia and Timor-Leste — but it shifts the nautical limit ’ second starting bespeak over, so that it aligns appropriately with Mota Talas .
This proposed division besides reflects the equidistant-influenced 1972 Seabed Boundary. Although the 1972 course was drawn to reflect Australia ’ s “ natural lengthiness ” claim, the ultimate boundary was a compromise between a continental shelf division ( which lies along the Timor Trough ) and an equitable division based upon the shape of the Timorese and Australian coast line. The boundary channel that runs between points A18 and A17 of the 1972 treaty partially reflect the “ straightening ” of Timor ’ s slide ( where the coast stop running southwest-northeasth and begins to run west-east ), and this straighten in the coast begins just before the margin of Indonesia and Timor-Leste. This would besides suggest that a more appropriate maritime limit between Timor-Leste and Indonesia would fall somewhere west of A17 and east of A18, rather of on A17 itself.
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The Eastern Lateral Boundaries of Zone A and Zone B
The eastern lateral pass boundaries of Zones A and B are about aligned, with angles that have only the barest academic degree of difference. The boundary has been established along a occupation that starts in the middle of the island of Leti ( at sea mile 4 of an 8-mile island ), and then moves southwest until it meets the 200nm limit south of Zone B. Its lean is slightly arbitrary, though ; rather of drawing the eastern boundary through A16, as might be expected, the line intersects the 1972 boundary between A16 and A15. In some respects, it could have been drawn to represent a “ simplified ” line of equidistance. But, once again, as with the western boundary, there is only an approximate resemblance to the hypothetical equidistant occupation, and it has a more marked convergence away from Timor than would be expected, if the boundary were based on a territorial division between Indonesia and Timor-Leste. And, besides like the western limit, there is no reason to expect that, in 1989, Indonesia and Australia would have established the eastern boundary of their zone of Cooperation therefore as to reflect the appropriate territorial division between Australia, Indonesia, and a nonexistent third state .
The easterly limit may besides have been established plainly to mirror the fish of the western boundary, and provide for a more symmetrical Zone. Whatever the reason, the eastern limit goes from Leti Island on a prevailing westerly slant to where it intersects the median line, at the luff marked by A ( molarity ) ( which is immediately point M from the Timor Sea Treaty ), before finally terminating at the 200nm cable, at the point marked by B ( boron ) .
But the slant created by starting the boundary at Leti is unequitable and arbitrary when applied to a territorial division between three sovereigns. When the eastern limit was created, that wasn ’ metric ton an issue, since all of the islands were indonesian ; Leti served as a convenient geographic basis to use as a reference point point in plugging up the Timor Gap, and the boundary did not need to take into account the competing claims of a sovereign state across the channel from Leti. A more equitable line might be something approximately along the boundary line shown below, in yellow. This boundary represents an equidistant division beginning at the median of Leti and Jaco, but which angles back towards the west to represent the effect of Indonesia ’ s heterosexual baselines. The territory covered by the Sunrise IUA has besides been shaded in, in orange, for reference point :
once again, the result of this change is belittled, but significant. Timor-Leste ’ south district would encompass an approximately 70 % of the Sunrise-Troubadour field region, as opposed to the 20 % that falls within the JPDA today .
Eastern and Western Lateral Boundaries of Zone C
The lateral boundaries for Zone C ( which converge closer towards Timor ) are about entirely arbitrary : they were established by taking the northern-most point on the australian coast that lies to the east of the Timor gap ( Melville Island ) and the northern-most distributor point that lies to the west of the gap ( Long Reef ) and then drawing a line from those geographic features through points A16 and A17, respectively. Those lines then terminate where they intersects with the Timor Trough ( northern limit of Zone C ) .
The westerly and eastern lateral pass boundaries of Zone C are shown below, with extensions drawn to the northernmost points of Long Reef and Melville, for reference :
Timor Gap, All Lateral Lines
ultimately, by extending the lateral boundaries of Zone B south, to where they meet the Australian coast, and north, to where they meet the coast of Timor, you can see the truly inequitable human body created by the Zones of Cooperation ( and, subsequently, by the JPDA ) :
IV. Timor Sea Treaty (2002) and the Joint Petroleum Development Area
Following Timor-Leste ’ mho independence, Timor-Leste and Australia negotiated the Timor Sea Treaty. The TST basically preserved Zone A of the TGT, shown below in royal blue, and provided for a division of manipulate and tax tax income from petroleum production in that area. Following the TST, the condition of the areas to the east and west of the JPDA that lie between the crimson and white lines remained uncertain .
V. The Sunrise IUA and CMATS (2006)
Following the boundary lines established by the TST, approximately 80 % of the resource-rich boast fields known as Greater Sunrise remained in no-man ’ mho land. Although the 20 % of Greater Sunrise that lies within the JPDA would be governed by the TST ( with revenues split 90 % /10 % in Timor-Leste ’ s favor ) the other 80 % of Greater Sunrise was unaccounted for by the TST. Under the Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea treaty, which put it into home the earlier ( but unratified ) Sunrise IUA, a Greater Sunrise area was established, shaded in orange below, which provided for Timor-Leste and Australia to split the revenues from production within the area 50 % /50 % .
VI. The Lowe Opinion
The Lowe Opinion ( 2002 ) is a paper that was prepared at the behest of an energy ship’s company that had previously been divested from any opportunity of developing the oil and accelerator fields in the Timor Sea. Following Timor-Leste ’ south independence, corporations who were not among the choose consortium that had an enshrined right in the Australian-issued leases ( i.e., everyone other than Woodside and its JV buddies ) had a fiscal stake in encouraging Timor-Leste to take a more aggressive position in negotiations with Australia regarding the boundary line of the ocean floor boundary .
The Lowe Opinion was intended to encourage Timor-Leste to do fair that, and, in order to show Timor-Leste the full extent of what was potentially on the dicker mesa, it proposed an understudy plan for establishing the maritime boundaries between Timor-Leste and Australia that was tilted in Timor-Leste ’ second privilege. It did sol primarily by drawing the southern/northern boundary along the median limit ( in white ), and then re-drawing the lateral pass boundaries in an, err, aggressively equitable manner, so that Timor-Leste had more nautical territory to the east and west of the JPDA. The proposed lines from the Opinion are shown below in neon pink :
The eastern lateral boundary shows two conjectural lines — one is a median production line drawn equidistant between Timor and Leti ’ mho coasts, while the line further east is drawn thus as to give only a overtone effect to the Leti Islands, owing to their smaller size .
The Lowe Opinion does correctly point out that points A17 and A16 from the 1972 Indonesian-Australian Seabed Boundary are arbitrary points that reflect what was commodious to the drafters of the Timor Gap Treaty, rather than reflecting what international law would provide for. Although the Opinion ’ s westerly lateral boundary is excessively generous, and good arsenic arbitrary as the JPDA ’ s current western boundary, it does represent a beneficial religion claim Timor-Leste could have asserted when going into negotiations with Australia. ( And it is surely far more fair, and far more in good religion, than Australia ’ s own starting side was. ) The easterly lateral boundaries proposed in the Lowe Opinion range from reasonably reasonable to, at the most extreme point, a fairly unreasonable dismiss of Indonesia ’ s own territorial seas. The effect the Lowe Opinion ’ s propose easterly lateral pass boundaries would have, if adopted, would be to place all, or well all, of Greater Sunrise within the EEZ of Timor-Leste .
-Susan
fn1. It is interesting to compare the limit between Zone A and Zone B with the boundary that was belated established by the 1997 water column agreement between Australia and Indonesia. The 1997 water column agreement ( which divides the Timor Sea for purposes of the water system column, but not the natural resources in the ocean floor ) established a medial line that was identical to the PFSEL for every point outside of the Timor Gap. Inside the Timor Gap, however, the 1997 water column agreement does not follow the PFSEL — rather, it follows closesly to the Zone A-Zone B boundary, except the coordinates of its points run slightly to the north of the points that establish the Zone A-Zone B boundary. )
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