Along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Border, Stability Is Built on Flexibility

Summary

In a divided zone along their molding, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have introduced a flexible arrangement based on a rigid physical border and a fluid economic border. This flexibility, leading to the co-management and equal profit share of hydrocarbons, has largely averted conflict. It rests on constructive ambiguity and avoidance of direct confrontation. The approach has its challenges but showed its deservingness in 2009–2019 when the two resolved a major dispute over the zone .

Key Themes

• Fixed borders were foreign to the early twentieth century Arabian Peninsula. Instead, borders were porous and subject to Ottoman and British imperial politics, changing local power dynamics, and shifting tribal allegiances.
• Between 1913 and 2000, four agreements defined Kuwait’s southern boundary. A major consequence of one such agreement in 1965 was the establishment of the Divided Zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in what had been called the Neutral Zone.
• Between 2009 and 2019, a dispute between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia over the Divided Zone halted hydrocarbon production there starting in 2014, until the flexible border arrangement enabled a breakthrough.
• While the two sides resolved a disagreement over sovereignty in the Divided Zone, potential problems remain over the joint management of hydrocarbons, which will require addressing several matters.

Findings and Recommendations

• Kuwaiti-Saudi relations are strong, and the likelihood of conflict remains minimal.
• The flexibility guiding the Kuwaiti-Saudi relationship and border arrangement is innovative and has repeatedly defused disagreements. It is worth showcasing as a model for resolving disputes elsewhere.
• Introducing better-defined safeguards and timelines to resolve problems would strengthen the flexible model and accelerate conflict resolution processes.
• Both countries need to ensure that the compensation mechanism in the Memorandum of Understanding of 2019 that helped resolve their dispute over the Divided Zone is one they will respect and strengthen.
• Kuwait and Saudi Arabia should proactively address how they intend to manage their shared hydrocarbon resources in the Divided Zone after the next expiration of Saudi Chevron’s concession, whose renewal in 2009 had provoked the 2009–2019 dispute.
• The two countries should tackle other pending issues—including oil migration, environmental concerns, and offshore production—in a way that takes into account Kuwait’s and Saudi Arabia’s maritime boundaries with Iran, parts of which have yet to be defined.
• Kuwait and Saudi Arabia should establish bilateral working teams to address remaining issues and preempt misunderstandings. These would consist of an empowered younger cadre to ensure that the spirit of compromise and the flexible border approach continue in the future.

Introduction

Bader Al-Saif

Bader Mousa Al-Saif is a nonresident colleague at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where his research focuses on the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula .
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Studies of Kuwait ’ mho borders tend to focus on the Iraq-Kuwait border, given the Iraqi occupation of the country in 1990–1991.1 however, Kuwait ’ randomness concerns over sovereignty and borders are not limited to its northerly neighbor. Before Iraq ’ s institution under a british Mandate in 1921, Kuwait—then a british protectorate—had to work out arrangements on the eastern one-half of its border with what would become Saudi Arabia. It did this first with the british colonial authorities ; then with the Sultanate of Najd in central Arabia, ruled by Abdulaziz Al Saud, well known as Ibn Saud ; and then after 1932 with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia .
between 1913 and 2000, four major agreements helped to define Kuwait ’ s southerly limit. They yielded boundary variations that reflected regional boundary line and balance-of-power fluctuations. In 2000, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia besides established a maritime frame agreement, which was widely welcomed as resolving the final boundary issue between the two countries.2 however, the agreement did not settle all surround issues. alternative interpretations of the Kuwaiti-Saudi border warranted a fifth agreement in 2019—in effect an addendum to a previous agreement, coupled with a separate memo of understanding—that aimed to achieve greater clearness and bring closing to the surround interview .
conflict over the Kuwaiti-Saudi margin has been avoided due to the fact that the two sides have hanker worked out a compromising mechanism to address bound issues. This allowed for a inflexible physical edge alongside a fluid economic border relationship that has been reflected in bless agreements dividing profits from petroleum equally in a territory known, first, as the Neutral Zone, then as the Divided Zone. several elements characterize this tractability. These include constructive ambiguity on surround issues, the ability to accept fluctuate meanings of the molding, a preference for avoiding direct confrontations over border disagreements in favor of indirect message, a willingness to compromise, an awareness of geopolitical realities, and patience. Yet this set about still represents a challenge. The agreement of 2019 may have put to rest hover concerns over reign claims and border limit, but it besides left room for potential discord over the joint management of evenly shared natural resources .
In a region characterized by edge disputes, both Kuwait ’ randomness and Saudi Arabia ’ s ability to repeatedly resolve their differences has led to evolving bound arrangements in an area containing huge hydrocarbon wealth. Kuwait has balanced its hope not to alienate Saudi Arabia with preservation of its sovereignty. Both countries have besides built on their historic relationship and on Saudi Arabia ’ randomness prioritization of its energy interests in the Divided Zone, which houses 0.5 percentage of ball-shaped oil output.3 This inclination to find a middle anchor has resulted from developments throughout the twentieth century affecting the Kuwaiti-Saudi margin .

The Fluctuating Kuwait-Saudi Border

Fixed borders were foreign to the early twentieth century Arabian Peninsula.4 Porous by design, borders were subjugate to Ottoman and British imperial politics, changing baron dynamics among local anesthetic rulers, and shifting tribal allegiances. This led to an adaptable attitude toward borders, all the more so as this created utilitarian openings for territorial expansion at times. In hardheaded terms, such an expectation shaped Kuwait ’ s pragmatic overture to border relations with Saudi Arabia, particularly after the rise of Ibn Saud, who reigned starting in 1902 over the Sultanate of Najd and then from 1932 until 1953 over the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia .
The british and Ottoman empires were the two dominant allele powers in the region during the early twentieth hundred. Kuwait ’ s seventh rule, Mubarak Al Sabah, who reigned from 1896 until 1915, succeeded in playing the two empires against one another by initially maintaining agreements with both empires, which increased his ability and scope in the process. That occurred at a prison term when the House of Saud had momentarily lost its territories and members of the family, including Ibn Saud, had sought refuge in Kuwait. Known for his art and drive, Mubarak Al Sabah concluded a secret agreement in 1899 with Great Britain, making Kuwait a british protectorate. The british took over Kuwait ’ mho defenses and extraneous affairs, particularly after the agreement became known to the Ottomans. Having to balance between an Ottoman empire that had interests and a presence in the arabian Peninsula on the one hand and an ambitious local anesthetic rule seeking to enlarge his territory on the other, the british came up with a compromise.5
The Anglo-Ottoman Agreement of 1913 was the first attempt to specify Kuwait ’ south boundaries, and it did then through a two-tier placement ( see map 1 ). It attributed undisputed autonomy to Kuwait within a 40-mile ( 60-kilometer ) spoke from the center of what is today Kuwait City in all directions. It then specified an forbidden zone “ under the administrative charm of the Shaikh of Koweit ” extending to within a 140-mile ( 225-kilometer ) radius from the city center.6 The british believed that dividing Kuwait into two areas would assuage the Ottomans by not granting complete autonomy to all the lands Mubarak Al Sabah claimed, giving the two imperial powers room to maneuver over their spheres of influence .

even though Ibn Saud reclaimed central Arabia in 1902, he was not mentioned in the 1913 agreement, which was framed as an Ottoman-British understanding over Kuwait ’ sulfur boundaries. however, World War I began soon thereafter, halting the agreement ’ randomness ratification.7 Yet the british had unwittingly planted the seeds of a hybrid order on the border. The agreement ’ s division of land under Kuwaiti control condition laid the foundation for the british to limit Kuwait ’ s expansion when required. That moment arrived a few years subsequently, in 1922, when a second agreement had a drastic shock on Kuwait ’ s southern frontier .
The balance of power shifted in northern Arabia with the run of Kuwait ’ s Mubarak Al Sabah in 1915 and the uninterrupted advance of the ambitious Ibn Saud, who sought to maximize his territorial gains throughout the peninsula. The Kuwaiti frontier was one among many of his targets. not alone did Ibn Saud not recognize the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Agreement that gave Kuwait what Ibn Saud claimed were his ancestral lands, he besides imposed a trade wind blockade to compel Kuwait and its loyal tribes to succumb to his rising power.8 Both Kuwaiti traders and the british wanted to see an end to such tensions, particularly when skirmishes between the two sides briefly turned bloody and moved into Kuwaiti territory.9 That is when Kuwait and the Sultanate of Najd agreed to settle their surround differences with british aid .
At beginning, the british stuck to the terms of the 1913 agreement. They reaffirmed the agreement ’ s two-tiered breakdown of Kuwaiti control. however, they changed their stance in 1921 by saying that parts of the out zone under Kuwaiti administrative influence would be achromatic ground, with neither Kuwait nor Najd taking carry through until Britain settled the matter.10 This went against the wishes of Ibn Saud and Kuwaiti rule Ahmad al-Jaber, who came to power in 1921. It took around a year for the british to decide on the molding in the Uqair Conference .
The Anglo-Ottoman Agreement of 1913 faced several setbacks. not only was it never ratified, but one of its parties was an conglomerate that would soon disappear, and it was concluded in a period of transformative change. furthermore, it proposed an anomalous territorial musical arrangement in which an area so far unaccustomed to boundaries suddenly found itself with two, each designating zones of ill-defined authority ranging from complete sovereignty to mere administrative oversight. All these challenges were compounded by the meteoric rise of Ibn Saud and the failing of Mubarak ’ s Al Sabah ’ randomness successors .
Against this backdrop, a second undertake to define Kuwait ’ second boundaries took seat at the Uqair Conference of December 1922 ( see map 1 ). Yet Kuwait was not originally the focus of the conference, which was primarily meant to resolve a bound dispute between Iraq and the Sultanate of Najd. Due to Ibn Saud ’ mho doggedness, the negotiations went nowhere. This led british eminent commissioner in Iraq Percy Cox to pursue a different tactic, making practice of the head character he played at Uqair and his oversight over Iraq. He awarded the domain claimed by Ibn Saud in the north to Iraq, and to placate him, he “ ruthlessly deprived Kuwait of two-thirds of her territory and gave it to Najd, ” in the words of a early british official in the Gulf.11 The area taken from Kuwait corresponded to character of the bring that had been placed under Kuwait ’ s administrative influence in the 1913 agreement.12
All of this was done with no direct Kuwaiti presence at the Uqair Conference. rather, Sir John More, the british political agent in Kuwait, represented Kuwait due to the protectorate agreement of 1899 that ceded its refutation and foreign affairs to Britain. The british acknowledged that they had dealt a “ blow ” to Kuwait but went ahead with the agreement to preserve british interests elsewhere in the region.13 Al-Jaber was naturally displeased with such an consequence but was told by Cox that the new agreement safeguarded Kuwait against possible future claims by Ibn Saud. Because of Ibn Saud ’ mho originate, Kuwait was besides weaker in 1922 than it had been in 1913, which encouraged the british to alter the libra of exponent on its borders.14
Al-Jaber ultimately had to accept the 1922 agreement, seeing it as part of a longer series of frame readjustments that might shift to his advantage in the future.15 But that was not to be. The emerging nation-state system in the Middle East after World War I lent permanence to the border changes, as did the discovery of oil and the subsequent operations of external oil companies. however, this was not the end of Kuwait ’ s have with a fluctuating frontier to its south. A clause in the Uqair Convention kept the frame issue receptive even when contribution of the land under Kuwait ’ s administrative charm was transferred to Najd.16
The british had introduced a knickknack in the agreement of 1913, subdividing Kuwaiti territory into two categories of control. In 1922 they innovated again by introducing a alleged neutral zone along the eastern half of the border between Kuwait and Najd. In this zone both countries would plowshare peer rights.17 Therefore, by 1922 the land the british had once nominally viewed as being under Kuwait ’ s administrative influence in the confederacy had either been given to Najd or turned into an area of shared control, cementing the flexible boundary mind. Such an ambiguous and imaginative arrangement could have led to discord ( as it late did between 2009 and 2019 ), but the likely for conflict early on was tempered by shifting geopolitics, the good Kuwaiti-Saudi relationship, and projected economic gains in the zone that pushed both sides to make it a seat of joint opportunity .
The area of the Neutral Zone is 2,228 square miles ( 5,770 square kilometers ). not much care was initially paid to the fact that Kuwait and what would become Saudi Arabia had adequate rights in the territory.18 That merely changed upon the discovery of petroleum in southern Kuwait in 1938 and the Kuwaiti and Saudi decisiveness to award separate petroleum concessions in the Neutral Zone in the 1940s and 1950s.19 not lone was oil stage, but besides the deposits there were among the richest in the world.20 This underlined the need to clarify government of the territory, particularly when it came to anoint installations and the housing and movement of those working in the oil industry. The british had never addressed such matters, leaving it to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to do thus .
Kuwait ’ s independence in 1961 usher in a fresh chapter in the share area along the Kuwaiti-Saudi frontier. This produced a one-third agreement over the frame that continued to leave room for alternative interpretations. Unlike the 1913 and 1922 agreements, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were nowadays negotiating over their border directly. The negotiations in the 1960s went through multiple phases and produced several agreements. These ranged from determining the boundary of the Neutral Zone to dividing the zone into two equal parts.21 Of the series of agreements concluded between 1961 and 1969, the 1965 agreement on partitioning the Neutral Zone was the most consequential, with a bear on the present.22
The 1965 agreement did not challenge the consequences of the Uqair Convention ; however, it did add another layer of flexibility to the margin. It turned the vaguely structured and evenly shared Neutral Zone into what became known as the Divided Zone ( see map 2 ). Kuwait and Saudi Arabia each annexed the territories closest to their border, while maintaining the 1922 stipulation on the peer sharing of natural resources in the zone. A key planning preserved the sixty-year concession agreements with external oil companies signed by both states during the 1940s and 1950s. Both Kuwait City and Riyadh avoided an escalation by reaching a compromise that safeguarded their perceive interests .

The agreement of 1965 further entangled the policies of both states over their hydrocarbon reserves. While this inject complexity into their kinship, it besides guaranteed that the two countries, to avoid interrupt oil production, would not transgress each other ’ mho rights. The agreement was besides clearer than the 1913 and 1922 agreements. however, it contained enough ambiguities that in 2014–2019, it would result in the disruption of anoint production in the Divided Zone, an opportunity price estimated in the billions of dollars.23 This disturbance was ascribable to a conflict over the motion of reign in the zone. It was to be expected, possibly, as the legal advisers of both countries had expressed a contrasting understanding of the 1965 agreement soon after its signing.24
The Kuwaiti government viewed the new cable separating the two equal parts of the Divided Zone as an international bound that transferred to each submit total reign over the half accorded to it. The saudi government, in turn, saw the division as an administrative and economic one that clarified the rights of both states given the undefined references to these rights in the 1922 agreement.25 Therefore, to Riyadh, the 1965 agreement did not produce a autonomous border. It produced an administrative argumentation with no hold on the legal status of the jointly held district. In that sense, the Neutral Zone, or now the Divided Zone, had a separate identity unconnected to either Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Rather, it had the status of a condominium held jointly by both countries per Saudi Arabia ’ s view.26
The ambiguity surrounding the frame protected it from conflict, but it besides contributed to the confusion brought approximately by the different Kuwaiti and Saudi interpretations of the Divided Zone ’ south condition. The 1965 agreement refers to “ annexation ” and to each country pursuing what appear to be sovereignty-related activities—administration, defense, and legislation—in its half of the zone.27 This is what Kuwaiti officials used to advance their argument for sovereignty. Yet nowhere in the agreement does the term “ sovereignty ” appear. The 1965 agreement was the anchor agreement guiding Kuwaiti-Saudi border arrangements and the mechanism for shared natural resources in the Divided Zone. But while it may have contributed to better organizing the management of resources, it barely clarified the count of reign .
A case in point is the fourth border-related agreement signed in 2000, this time addressing the nautical border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia ( see map 2 ). It took the 1965 agreement as its launching pad, extending the peer onshore partition to the joint offshore area. The agreement did not distinctly state, however, that the two islands located off the northerly partition belonged to Kuwait. alternatively, it affirmed that the resources of those islands and the wall Divided Zone area should be “ owned in common, ” adding more uncertainty to the issue of sovereignty rights.28
consequently, the agreements of 1965 and 2000, which partitioned the joint Kuwaiti and Saudi nation and nautical areas, did not translate into a common understand over their legal condition. This disagreement helped to exacerbate the border dispute of 2009–2019, which would represent a major crisis between the two countries but besides show that they had the mechanisms to transcend it .

The 2009–2019 Border Dispute: How Conflict Was Avoided

The quarrel of 2009–2019 between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was a major test for the elastic order both countries had adopted in their border relations. The spirit of compromise that had pervaded the agreements of 1965 and 2000 proved vital when a newly frame misunderstanding arise in 2009 over the shared management of natural resources and differing interpretations of the boundary in the Divided Zone. This flexible approach reminded the two states that they had an effective and unique method for addressing their disagreements, despite its challenges. The resoluteness, agreed in 2019, represented the fifth attempt to define the borders following the former ones of 1913, 1922, 1965, and 2000 .
The reciprocal desire to compromise was a consequence of respective factors that went beyond previous Kuwaiti and Saudi tractability on their border relations. These were born of necessity and were a reflection of historically solid Kuwaiti-Saudi ties. Kuwaiti officials were mindful that their country was less mighty than their larger neighbors, as Iraq ’ mho invasion in 1990 had underlined. The saudi government in turn had finespun frame disputes to address elsewhere and, like Kuwait, sought to resolve a trouble preventing the state from in full exploiting its hydrocarbon wealth .
The quarrel in 2009 came out of the fact that the 1965 agreement and its by-product, the Divided Zone, had not taken place in a vacuum. Prior to 1965, several U.S. and japanese companies were working in what was then however the Neutral Zone. In 1948, Kuwait awarded the american english Independent Oil Company, or Aminoil, a sixty-year concession in the zone. A year later, Saudi Arabia did the lapp with the Pacific Western Oil Corporation, a auxiliary of Getty Oil ( Getty was subsequently purchased by Texaco, Inc., which then merged with Chevron Corporation ) .29 Both states jointly granted offshore exploration rights in 1957 and 1958 to the Japanese-owned arabian Oil Company, lasting until the class 2000. The concessions bore fruit. Getty discovered the large Wafra onshore oilfield with a capacitance of 300,000 barrels per day ( bpd ) in 1954, while the arabian Oil Company in 1960 discovered the Khafji offshore field—the offshore part of the Safaniya anoint field that is inside the Divided Zone—with a capacity of 220,000 bpd ( see map 3 ) .30

The litmus trial for Kuwaiti-Saudi relations in the Divided Zone came when the concessions expired. Kuwait ’ s concession did not last up until 2008, its mean end date, given Kuwait ’ mho nationalization of the concession in 1977 and the transfer of the field ’ mho management to a joint Kuwaiti-Saudi operational company.31 The Saudi government chose a different road. Their inshore concession in the Divided Zone to Saudi Arabian Chevron ( SAC ), a auxiliary of Chevron, ended in 2009.32 What happened adjacent took Kuwait City by surprise. Riyadh unilaterally renewed the concession without consulting Kuwaiti leadership, even though Articles IV and VI of the 1965 agreement stipulated joint cooperation given the countries ’ equal ownership of hydrocarbons in the Divided Zone.33 Further complicating matters, the concession was located in the Kuwaiti one-half of the zone. Saudi Arabia consequently made a decision that not only transgress Kuwait ’ mho right to shared management of the natural resource but besides infringed on Kuwaiti sovereignty according to Kuwait ’ s understand of the 1965 partition of the Neutral Zone .
An effective resolution of the challenge had to address the two issues that led to the repulsion. First, it had to determine whether the line partitioning the Divided Zone represented a sovereign border ( the Kuwaiti politics ’ mho position ) or whether it was an administrative line ( the Saudi government ’ second view ). The implications were widely unlike. The Kuwaiti government assumed arrant sovereignty for Kuwait north of the line and for Saudi Arabia south of it. The saudi-arabian government, on the other hand, reaffirmed the 1922 agreement, which had indicated a condominium over the shared nation with adequate rights for both sides. This gave the two states access to each other ’ south annexed zones—annexations that had taken place for administrative purposes .
The moment consequence was related to the management of resources. Regardless of how they characterized the legal separation agate line in the Divided Zone, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia did not renege on the principle of equally sharing the natural resources in the totality of the zone, according to the agreements brokered in 1922, 1965, and 2000. The point of competition had more to do with how to manage the resources without ignoring either country ’ s rights. management of the resources was the saudi-arabian politics ’ mho main concern, while sovereignty was the Kuwaiti ’ second .
Sovereignty hits a sensitive cord in Kuwait given its memory of the Iraqi occupation and its vulnerability as a little department of state surrounded by three larger states—Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Safeguarding Kuwait ’ s territorial integrity is a national priority. That is why then emir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah took immediate action after the Saudi cabinet unilaterally renewed the oil concession with SAC. He sent a letter to then Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud in February 2009 expressing Kuwait ’ s reservations, yet no immediate resolution was in sight.34
In idle of this, Kuwait exercised its sovereignty over the northerly parcel of the Divided Zone, whose annexation had taken station about forty-five years in the first place. This took assorted forms without directly confronting Saudi Arabia. SAC was asked to follow Kuwaiti laws and regulations. That meant that the previously tolerated terms of the 1949 concession, which saw the execution of Saudi law in Kuwait ’ randomness share of the Divided Zone, were no longer valid. SAC had to apply for a Kuwaiti let and parturiency visas to operate while besides following early Kuwaiti procedures. This made operations more unmanageable for the company.35
In answer, in October 2014 Saudi Arabia unilaterally announced the crippled of operations in the offshore Khafji field, allegedly for environmental reasons.36 Whether these were veridical or not, they represented a desirable cover to object to Kuwait ’ s treatment of SAC. Around half of the Divided Zone ’ second production came to a stop. The site merely worsened when both states decided to close the onshore operation at Wafra in May 2015 for purported alimony. This efficaciously suspended all petroleum and gas operations in the Divided Zone for the first time since the discovery of oil there.37
The element of compromise introduced by the compromising bound access shaped Kuwaiti and Saudi management of the battle flush before a resolution was found. The two states indirectly expressed their disagreement through actions within their purview—whether demanding the execution of Kuwaiti law or closing oilfields for alleged environmental and care reasons. Given the entangled border kinship, these actions had a bearing on the other state. Yet this was done without a direct collide. The same could be said of their public positions. The differences of opinion were known to both parties and to outsiders, but they were not openly aired due to the historic relationship between the two nations. Kuwait City believes that Saudi Arabia represents its “ strategic depth. ” 38 A former Kuwaiti deputy prime minister and foreign curate expressed this opinion, stating, “ Our destinies are entangled. .. The relationship is not lone crucial to the two governments but to the people as well. ” 39 That is why the lapp minister dubbed the conflict with Saudi Arabia a “ class dispute. ” 40 Kuwait had to finely balance its interests against the importance of its ties with Riyadh.41
Three factors accelerated negotiations in 2019 after an about five-year foramen in oil drill operations in the Divided Zone, allowing both countries to avoid a recourse to the International Court of Justice.42 First, there was a exchange in the Saudi leadership, when King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud came to the throne in January 2015 and late appointed his son Mohammed bin Salman as crown prince in 2017. Their bold leadership style and centralize form of administration mean that they could make promptly decisions, which is what happened when the crown prince intervened toward the end of the negotiations to close the deal.43
second gear, Kuwait well organized itself and moved away from the decentralized approach it had previously adopted in addressing the issue. rather of having discriminate negotiation teams from the Foreign Ministry and the anoint constitution, including the Oil Ministry, the Kuwaiti government consolidated efforts and dealt simultaneously with the two issues of reign and the management of resources, streamlining the negotiations and allowing for coordination across the ministries.44 The emir even asked the give voice and astute National Assembly Speaker Marzouq al-Ghanim to join these efforts. This underscore how significant Kuwait considered a settlement to the trouble to be, equally well as its eagerness to come to an sympathy with Saudi Arabia on outstanding boundary line issues.45
A one-third reason was that the global oil market was in need of far output from oil-producing states to cover for a decrease in output from Iran due to U.S. sanctions. Because the Divided Zone produced 500,000 bpd on top of its 5 billion barrels reserve capacity,46 the deficit in production affected the constancy of oil markets and the ball-shaped economy. The former U.S. president of the united states Donald Trump administration engaged with Saudi and Kuwaiti officials to resolve their differences and resume production. At the lapp time, leaving the oilfields idle for much longer would have negatively impacted a fall to normal production levels.47
The starting point of negotiations was determining the condition of the Divided Zone and its line of separation. The saudi-arabian government deemed it a contradiction for Kuwait to claim total reign over its half of the zone while Riyadh held an equal share of the natural resources there according to the 1922 and 1965 agreements. however, Kuwait used outside examples to convince Riyadh that sharing natural resources across a molding did not contradict sovereignty claims. realization of a autonomous molding penalized neither country because it would apply to both. Concessions were reciprocal cross. On this consequence, the Saudi government gave in to Kuwait ’ s sympathy of the 1965 agreement, accepting that the limit in the Divided Zone constituted an international border.48
Arriving at a common military position over reign was the entrance point into resolving the other pending issue, namely management of resources. The previous oil concessions were tolerated by both sides because they had been granted anterior to the 1965 agreement and even before Kuwaiti independence. But a new Saudi concession could not continue to operate according to Saudi law given Kuwait ’ s—and now Saudi Arabia ’ s—acceptance of the autonomous condition of the Divided Zone. Saudi Arabia was willing to renegotiate its extend and modify concession agreement with SAC to respect Kuwait ’ s sovereignty and laws, but it did so with the arithmetic mean that Kuwait would compensate the party for the losses it would incur by relocating its headquarters from what was now Kuwaiti land to Saudi land.49 Kuwait agreed to this, making a concession in its turn to arrive at a deal that would safeguard the common interests of both states and their shared natural resources. The agreement seemed to settle differences for the time being .
The two states formalized their understanding in an addendum to the 1965 agreement and an accompanying memo of reason ( MOU ) signed on December 24, 2019. The addendum clarified that the separation telephone line in the Divided Zone was an external surround, with “ complete sovereignty ” for Kuwait north of it and for Saudi Arabia south of it. The document besides specified that the joint mathematical process model for the management of natural resources would apply unless differently specified.50
The agreement showed that flexibility had prevailed once again. But was the 2019 arrangement the final one ? possibly not. It quelled doubts related to the fictional character of the separation line in the Divided Zone and settled sovereignty claims there, but lingering questions remained over the joint management of resources .

Identifying and Averting Potential Future Tension

The breakthrough revealed the extent to which geopolitical concerns continued to influence the two state ’ randomness ties. Kuwait ’ mho interest in consolidating its sympathy of sovereignty was done with an eye toward future agreements with Iraq and Iran. Kuwait has so far to finalize maritime boundaries with both countries. Clearing a vault with Saudi Arabia over the easterly half of the common boundary line meant it could refocus its efforts on resolving sovereignty-sensitive border issues elsewhere. Furthermore, an Iran-Kuwait bound settlement could besides involve shared natural resources that will require agreement over joint operations american samoa well as a venereal disease of common reason. Having a mannequin in position with Saudi Arabia provides a useful mention for future talks .
Saudi Arabia did not accord the same precedence to sovereignty as Kuwait, given the two countries ’ differing histories and standing in the region. But the Saudi government closed the bargain in 2019 because of the economic advantages that the add production from the Divided Zone would bring. furthermore, their geopolitical stance had changed since the disagreement began in 2009. A significant rupture between most of the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Qatar beginning in June 2017 increased the importance of Kuwait ’ s mediating character in that challenge. indeed, in 2021 a reconciliation was achieved with Kuwait ’ s aid. At the same clock, Saudi officials understood that imposing their views on Kuwait when the two countries had benefited from a constructively ambiguous approach to border relations would have been counterproductive. last, because of the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and Riyadh ’ mho actions in Yemen, Saudi Arabia ’ mho image had been tarnished in the years leading up to the agreement. This pushed the kingdom to repair its damaged repute by portraying itself as a state that could responsibly resolve a bound disagreement that had implications for the external energy market.51
Kuwait ’ mho and Saudi Arabia ’ s peer partake of natural resources after the boundary line limit agreement made common sense because of how intertwine their oilfields are across the Divided Zone and their reciprocal indigence to guarantee the fields ’ development.52 however, the MOU between the two countries leaves room for electric potential discordance in the future if several issues are not addressed .
The beginning is that the parties will have to find a more effective resoluteness mechanism in the consequence of disagreements. A repeat of what happened in 2009–2019 could take years to resolve, jeopardizing the interests of both sides. Since the 2019 agreement was an addendum to the 1965 agreement, the conflict solution article in the earlier agreement guided the understanding in 2019. Yet the scheme proposed was a lax one that relied chiefly on the grace of the parties before they appealed to the International Court of Justice. While the absence of net solution mechanisms may have favored the flexibility preferred by the parties, introducing better-defined safeguards and timelines to resolve problems could have good protected Kuwaiti and Saudi stakes. While a permanent wave joint committee was established by the 1965 agreement, the dispute over the Divided Zone could not have been resolved by such a committee .
A second base issue that could complicate execution of the MOU relates to compensation.53 Both sides need to ensure that the compensation mechanism in place is one they will respect and strengthen. This mechanism follows standard procedures, with each express appointing a adviser who assesses the come to be paid. The two appoint a third adviser, and all three must come together on compensation that is binding on the parties. however, the hellion is in the details. For this process to proceed seamlessly, both sides must pledge to not interfere in it, while accepting the resultant role .
A one-third issue is that the two sides have to plan for how they intend to manage their share resources in the Divided Zone after SAC ’ mho concession expires. According to the MOU, the end date is 2046.54 Will Saudi Arabia go ahead with the joint mathematical process model or renew the concession ? If the latter takes place—and the MOU leaves open the possibility of not pursuing the joint operation model—both states will need to agree to an alternative for managing resources that does not jeopardize their interests. however, leaving this issue open in the MOU would reveal an inability to iron out differences, delaying a joint decision until 2046 .
And fourth, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia must prepare for early issues the MOU failed to resolve, particularly regarding the future management of resources.55 These include oil migration—or the inability to optimize the full electric potential of an oilfield because some of its vegetable oil escapes to early locations—as well as environmental concerns and offshore output that takes into history the tripartite nautical boundaries of Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Neither Kuwait nor Saudi Arabia has demarcated all its maritime boundaries with Iran nor are they probable to do sol anytime soon given the severance of diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran since 2016.56 however, anoint migration or environmental impacts are no less serious, as they besides could lead to disagreements .
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia should invest in their hard relationship and borrow from the unique development of their molding relations to proactively address the remaining unsolved frame issues. In that way they could avoid electric potential problems in managing their share resources. They would besides benefit from showcasing their distinctive surround arrangement as a gestural of a resilient relationship. Its elements can serve as a model for resolving disputes elsewhere—prioritizing compromise, using ambiguity and implicit message as a instrument for conflict colonization, and factoring regional developments into their actions, for model, shifts in the energy markets. These characteristics would be useful when both countries move to settle their nautical boundaries with their neighbors .
Because there remains a risk that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will enter into new disputes, they should establish working teams to address specific topics tied to their unresolved bound issues. These working teams should be set up in a way that streamlines and optimizes the activities of the two states ’ different agency. They should besides have a clear mandate, establish diaphanous rules of betrothal, and in full empower their members to talk about and decide upon the issues. They could address issues ranging from what happens after the SAC concession ends to environmental concerns and oil migration. further matters they could cover are how to coordinate their approaches toward joint offshore fields and their nautical borders with Iran .
Moving in these directions would help Kuwaiti and Saudi policymakers begin a discussion early on and prepare themselves for potentially conflictual issues. These may not be priorities nowadays, but treating them as such would help in the preemptive conceptualization of policy options if problems do get up. The flexible framework governing the bound would continue to guide the function teams, foster enhancing the relationship and lessening the impact of future disputes .
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia established a Saudi-Kuwaiti coordination council in 2018 to better harmonize their positions on general policy.57 That this took place at the height of their disagreement over the Divided Zone only underlined the realism in their kinship. however, the proposed working teams should not be limited to senior leadership. The states should empower middle management, as they need to train the adjacent generation of leaders and technocrats and inculcate in them a spirit of cooperation over border issues by delegating to a younger cell. This would add a new layer of have to reduce the possibility of discrepancy and ensure the flexible edge access endures .

Conclusion

Kuwait ’ south limit of its southerly frontier has been a hundred in the make, starting with the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Agreement, passing through the 1922 Uqair Convention, and continuing to the 1965 Kuwaiti-Saudi agreement and its corollaries in 2000 and 2019. The kernel of the compromising border arrangement is that it is built on a fixed forcible frame and a fluid economic border relationship that involves co-management of natural resources and equal profit share. The arrangement is not without its challenges, but it has been able to sustain and reinvent itself whenever there were doubts about the Kuwaiti-Saudi relationship .
Throughout its universe, Kuwait has been realistic and mindful of its geopolitical vulnerabilities vis-à-vis its larger neighbors. political considerations played a major function in Kuwaiti think when it concluded the 2019 agreement. The state ’ s sensitivity on matters of reign was fair given its threatened condition since its independence and its occupation in 1990–1991. therefore, coming to a clear understand with Saudi Arabia on sovereignty in 2019 represented a win for Kuwait, while Saudi Arabia ’ south precedence was protecting its fiscal interests and resuming vegetable oil production. Each state got what it wanted .
Kuwaiti-Saudi relations are firm. The likelihood of conflict is minimal, and if disputes arise over the management of resources, the two states are more than adequate to of coming to an agreement, as they have done repeatedly. however, this does not mean that they should avoid putting in rate mechanisms that facilitate a settlement of disagreements, which would save them meter and money. The elastic margin approach has worked by giving Kuwait and Saudi Arabia a margin of maneuver in negotiating mutually satisfactory outcomes, and it will probably continue to do indeed. But to ensure this happens, both sides will need to instill in a new generation of officials the spirit of compromise that has prevailed until now.

Note on Methodology

This paper draws on a broad range of sources and methods. It engages in a critical content analysis of chief sources in Arabic and English, such as legal agreements, diplomatic correspondences, parliamentary hearings, populace statements, memoirs, and several interviews with former and current senior government officials, energy experts, and an editor-in-chief of a major media exit. It besides utilizes several junior-grade sources and deploys hold forth analysis and participant observation when comparing publicly disclosed views with ones shared in private .
This publication was produced with subscribe from the X-Border Local Research Network, a program funded by UK care from the united kingdom government. The views expressed do not inevitably reflect the united kingdom government ’ s official policies .

Notes

1 See, for case, Gwenn Okruhlik and Patrick J. Conge, “ The Politics of Border Disputes : On the arabian Peninsula, ” International Journal 54, no. 2 ( spring 1999 ) : 230–248 ; Frauke Heard-Bey, “ Conflict Resolution and Regional Cooperation : The Role of the Gulf Cooperation Council 1970–2002, ” Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 2 ( March 2006 ) : 199–222 ; and Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, “ Domestic Politics and Territorial Disputes in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, ” Survival 35, no. 4 ( Winter 1993 ) : 3–27. Yoel Guzansky, on the other hand, discusses Saudi Arabia ’ s margin disputes with Qatar and the UAE but does not refer to the Kuwait-Saudi one. See Yoel Guzansky, “ Lines Drawn in the sandpaper : territorial Disputes and GCC Unity, ” The Middle East Journal 70, no. 4 ( Autumn 2016 ) : 543–559. In her list of pending border disputes, Krista Wiegand does not mention Kuwait-Saudi Arabia. See Krista Wiegand, Enduring Territorial Disputes : Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement ( Athens, Georgia : University of Georgia Press, 2011 ), 87–88 .
2 Kuwait News Agency, “ Saudi-Kuwaiti Maritime Agreement Historical, Civilizational—MPs, ” Kuwait News Agency, July 6, 2000, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx ? language=en & id=1095399 .
3 “ Saudi Arabia and Kuwait Agree to Resume Neutral Zone Oil Production, ” Pipeline, December 29, 2019, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.pipelineoilandgasnews.com/regionalinternational-news/regional-news/2019/december/saudi-arabia-and-kuwait-agree-to-resume-neutral-zone-oil-production .
4 J. E. Peterson, “ Sovereignty and Boundaries in the Gulf States, ” in International Politics in the Persian Gulf, edited by Mehran Kamrava ( Syracuse, NY : Syracuse University Press, 2011 ), 21 .
5 Richard Schofield, “ Britain and Kuwait ’ sulfur Borders, 1902–1923, ” in Kuwait : The Growth of a Historic Identity, edited by B.J. Slot ( Riyadh : arabian Publishing House, 2003 ), 58–68 ; Richard Schofield, “ Kuwait-Saudi Arabia, ” in Border and Territorial Disputes, third gear edition, edited by John B. Allcock, Guy Arnold, Alan J. Day, D. S. Lewis, Lorimer Poultney, Roland Rance, and D. J. Sagar ( Michigan : Gale, 1992 ), 395–396 .
6 As stated by Percy Cox, political resident in Bushehr at the time, to British Foreign Office on July 6, 1912. See arabian Boundary Disputes, Vol. 10, edited by Richard Schofield ( Cambridge, UK : archive Editions, 1992 ), 184 .
7 Schofield, “ Kuwait-Saudi Arabia, ” 395 ; Ethan Tyler, “ A british Lake : Kuwait and the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention ” ( unpublished undergraduate dissertation, April 26, 2017 ), 45 .
8 Anthony Toth, “ Tribes and Tribulations : Bedouin Losses in the Saudi and Iraqi Struggles over Kuwait ’ mho Frontier, 1921–1943, ” british Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 2 ( November 2005 ), 145–150 ; Joseph Kostiner, “ Saudi Arabia ’ s territorial expansion : The Case of Kuwayt, 1916–1921, ” Die Welt des Islams 33, no. 2 ( Nov 1993 ), 225 .
9 Kostiner, “ Saudi Arabia ’ s territorial expansion : The Case of Kuwayt, 1916–1921, ” 228–30 ; Schofield, “ Kuwait-Saudi Arabia, ” 396 ; Schofield, “ Britain and Kuwait ’ mho borders, ” 92–93 .
10 Farah al-Nakib, “ The Lost ‘ Two-Thirds ’ : Kuwait ’ s Territorial Decline between 1913 and 1922, ” Journal of Arabian Studies 2, no. 1 ( 2012 ), 32–33 .
11 H. R. P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbors ( London : George Allen & Unwin, 1956 ), 274. Dickson was a british political agent appointed to Kuwait, but at the clock of the league he was posted to Bahrain. According to Theyab al-Hamed of Kuwait University, the british decision to give away much of the aim land under its authority was made earlier in 1920–1921 based on the shifting balance wheel of baron, so the 1922 Uqair Conference merely formalized this intention. See “ Mu ‘ tamar al-Uqair washington tahdid al-hudud fi shibh al-jazira al-Arabiyya : wijhat nadhar britaniyya ” [ A british View of the Uqair Conference and Border Demarcation in the arabian Peninsula ], YouTube video recording, 19:58, posted by “ History Club of Kuwait University, ” November 15, 2015, accessed November 23, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.youtube.com/watch ? v=zQzZYR-mU7o & ab_channel=HistoryClubofKuwaituniversity .
12 Schofield, “ Britain and Kuwait ’ mho Borders, ” 93 ; al-Nakib, “ The Lost ‘ Two-Thirds ’ : Kuwait ’ s Territorial Decline between 1913 and 1922, ” 34–36 .
13 Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbors, 275 .
14 Al-Nakib, “ The Lost ‘ Two-Thirds ’ : Kuwait ’ s Territorial Decline between 1913 and 1922, ” 36 ; Toth, “ Tribes and Tribulations : Bedouin Losses in the Saudi and Iraqi Struggles over Kuwait ’ mho Frontier, 1921–1943, ” 148–150 ; and Kostiner, 231–234 .
15 For an commute between the british high commissioner, Percy Cox, and the Kuwaiti ruler on this write out, see Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbors, 279, and al-Nakib, “ The Lost ‘ Two-Thirds ’ : Kuwait ’ s Territorial Decline between 1913 and 1922, ” 36 .
16 The article reads, “ The fortune of district. .. shall be considered to be shared [ author ’ mho italics ] between the Governments of Nejd and Kuwait ; in that territory they shall have equal rights until such time as a far agreement regarding it is concluded between Nejd and Kuwait through the dependable offices of the british Government. ” See United Nations Treaty Series, “ Agreement Concerning the Boundary Between Nejd and Kuwait. Signed at Bandar al-Uqair on 2 December 1922, ” United Nations Treaty Series, 1993, 533, hypertext transfer protocol : //treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume % 201750/II-183.pdf .
17 See Ibid., 533, for the “ shared ” and “ adequate rights ” references ; and Peterson, “ Sovereignty and Boundaries in the Gulf States, ” 44 .
18 The term Neutral Zone is misleading because it is not neutral. legal experts prefer calling it a condominium given the interests of more than one party in the state. See Husain al-Baharna, “ A Note on the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone Agreement of July 7, 1965, Relating to the Partition of the Zone, ” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 17, no. 3 ( 1968 ), 732. Al-Baharna cites Edward Hoagland Brown, who says, “ The Neutral Zone is not neutral in the actual common sense. .. . It is one of the most curious and complex legal entities. ” Another Neutral Zone came into universe between Iraq and the then Sultanate of Najd as well. The british used the neutral zone instrument as a compromise to quell Ibn Saud ’ s expansionary ardor, thereby depriving Kuwait and Iraq from complete reign and bring in Ibn Saud as an equal co-owner. besides, see M. T. el-Ghoneimi, “ The Legal Status of the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone, ” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 15, no. 3 ( July 1966 ), 695.
19 Both states granted sixty-year concessions in the neutral zone know that the returns would be evenly shared. Kuwait contracted american Oil Company ( Aminoil ) in 1948 and Saudi Arabia followed suit in 1949 with the Pacific Western Oil Company ( Getty Oil ). Both offered the japanese Oil Company offshore concessions in 1957–1958. See Schofield, “ Kuwait-Saudi Arabia, ” 396–397 ; and Muthafar Haider al-Najar, “ The Geography of Oil in the Persian Gulf, ” ( Ph.D. dissertation, October 1971 ), 27–28 .
20 El-Ghoneimi, “ The Legal Status of the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone, ” 697 .
21 Krista E. Wiegand, “ Resolution of Border Disputes in the Arabian Gulf, ” The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies 1, no. 1 ( January 2014 ), 36 ; Schofield, “ Kuwait-Saudi Arabia, ” 396–97 ; and Al-Najar, “ The Geography of Oil in the Persian Gulf, ” 28–30. Both states contracted japanese Pacific Aero Survey to determine the specific coordinates and produce the technical report .
22 United Nations Treaty Series, “ Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait on the division of the Neutral Zone, ” United Nations Treaty Series, 1993, 48–52, hypertext transfer protocol : //treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume % 201750/v1750.pdf .
23The design is a matter of challenge. Two members of fantan mentioned losses of $ 10 billion, citing a State Audit Bureau report. See Muhiy Amer and Ali Senaideh, “ Al-majlis yuhil ittifaqiyyat al-maqsuma ila al-kharijiyya al-barlamaniyya ” [ Parliament Refers the Divided Zone Agreement to the Foreign Affairs Committee ], Al-Jarida, January 10, 2020, 5. Saleh al-Mulla, a former member of fantan and vegetable oil official, estimated losses at $ 20 billion in a argument with a parliamentarian. See “ Munadhara bayn Dr. Abdulkarim al-Kandari washington Saleh al-Mulla hawl ittifaqiyat al-mantaqa al-maqsuma bayn al-Kuwait wal Saudia [ Debate Between Dr. Abdulrakim al-Kandari and Saleh al-Mulla over the Divided Zone Agreement ], YouTube Video, 1:37:15, posted by “ Alziadi Blog, ” January 30, 2020, accessed February 14, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.youtube.com/watch ? v=-FiMoJqL-h0. An petroleum adept, Abdulhamid al-Awadhi, cited losses of $ 44 billion. See Abdulhamid al-Awadhi, “ 44 milyar dollar khasa ’ iridium fatrat iyqaf intaj al-maqsuma ” [ Losses of $ 44 billion During the Halt of Production in the Divided Zone ], Al-Qabas, January 28, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //alqabas.com/article/5746491-رأي-متخصص44-مليار-دولار-خسائر-فترة-إيقاف-إنتاج-المقسومة. Another oil technical, Abdulsamie Behbehani, puts Kuwait ’ mho losses at $ 50 billion loss from 2014–2019. See “ Kalimat Dr. Abdulsamie Behbehani fi al-mu ’ tamar al-sahafi bi-sha ’ newton ittifaqiyat al-mantaqa al-maqsuma bayn al-Kuwait wal Sa ‘ udia ” [ Statement of Dr. Abdulsamie Behbehani in the Press Conference on the Divided Zone Agreement between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia ], YouTube video, 39:25, posted by “ Sarmad Network, ” January 15, 2020, accessed February 14, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.youtube.com/watch ? v=PY6jyGQmeUs .
24 The legal advisers of both states exchanged opposing interpretations across jurisprudence journals precisely a year after the agreement was signed. See M. T. el-Ghoneimi, “ The Legal Status of the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone, ” 690–717 ; and S. M. Hosni, “ The partition of the Neutral Zone, ” The american Journal of International Law 60 ( 1966 ), 735–744 .
25 Hosni, “ The partition of the Neutral Zone, ” 735–744 ; el-Ghoneimi, “ The Legal Status of the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone, ” 703–704 ; al-Baharna, “ A Note on the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone Agreement of July 7, 1965, Relating to the Partition of the Zone, ” 730–732 .
26 El-Ghoneimi, “ The Legal Status of the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone, ” 703–704 and 715 ; al-Baharna, “ A Note on the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone Agreement of July 7, 1965, Relating to the Partition of the Zone, ” 730–732. El-Ghoneimi calls the Neutral Zone a “ compromise sphere ” ( 703 ) .
27 See Article III of the agreement for these hints of sovereignty. United Nations Treaty Series, “ Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait on the partition of the Neutral Zone, ” United Nations Treaty Series, 1993, 48–52, hypertext transfer protocol : //treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume % 201750/v1750.pdf .
28 United Nations Delimitation Treaties Infobase, “ Agreement Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait Concerning the Submerged Area Adjacent to the Divided Zone. Kuwait, 2 July 2000, ” United Nations Delimitation Treaties Infobase, 2002, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/SAU-KWT2000SA.PDF ; Peterson, “ Sovereignty and Boundaries in the Gulf States, ” 36–37, which refers to the debatable condition of the two islands at meter of signing in 2000 ; and Greg Shapland, “ Maritime Boundaries in the Middle East, ” Asian Affairs 51, no. 1 ( 2020 ) : 146–168 .
29 Sneha Abraham, “ Understanding the Divided Zone Dispute, ” Middle East Economic Digest, August 16, 2015, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.meed.com/understanding-the-divided-zone-dispute. Texaco purchased Getty in 1984 and with it Getty ’ sulfur concession in the divided zone. Chevron entered the picture when it merged with Texaco in 2001 and purchased the concession .
30 Mohammed Abdulnasser, “ Madha tantalum ‘ arif ‘ an al-mantaqa al-maqsuma bayn al-Kuwait wal Sa ‘ udia ? ” [ What Do You Know About the Divided Zone Between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia ? ], Al-Qabas, December 24, 2019, hypertext transfer protocol : //alqabas.com/article/5737249-ماذا-تعرف-عن-المنطقة-المقسومة-بين-الكويت-والسعودية ; RT, “ Al-Kuwait tatadaras ma ‘ al-Sa ‘ udia hall al-khilafat bi-sha ’ normality haqlay naft al-Khafji wal Wafra ” [ Kuwait Examines with Saudi Arabia a Resolution to the Disagreements Over Khafji and Wafra oilfields ], RT, December 16, 2018, hypertext transfer protocol : //arabic.rt.com/business/989174-الكويت-تتدارس-مع-السعودية-حل-الخلافات-بشأن-حقلي-نفط-الخفجي-والوفرة/ ; and “ Qissat khilaf mu ‘ local area network : Azmat al-mantaqa al-muhayda bayn al-Kuwait wal Sa ‘ udia ” [ The Story of An open conflict : The Neutral Zone Crisis between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia ], Sasapost, November 21, 2019, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.sasapost.com/saudi-kuwaiti-neutral-zone .
31 Aminoil tried to overturn the nationalization decision, but did not succeed. Kuwait, however, had to compensate Aminoil. For the rule, determine : The Government of the State of Kuwait v The american Independent Oil Company ( Kuwait v Aminoil ) ( 1982 ), hypertext transfer protocol : //www.biicl.org/files/3938_1982_kuwait_v_aminoil.pdf .
32 Saudi Arabia, ” Chevron Worldwide, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.chevron.com/worldwide/saudi-arabia ; and Chris Baltimore, “ Chevron Extends Agreement With Saudi Arabia, ” Reuters, September 11, 2008, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.reuters.com/article/us-chevron-saudi/chevron-extends-agreement-with-saudi-arabia-idUSN1039993520080911 .
33 United Nations Treaty Series, “ Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait on the partition of the Neutral Zone, ” United Nations Treaty Series, 1993, 48–52, hypertext transfer protocol : //treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume % 201750/v1750.pdf .
34 National Kuwait Forum, “ Al-Sa ‘ udia tusa ‘ aid dhid al-Kuwait ” [ Saudi Arabia Escalates Against Kuwait ], National Kuwait Forum, July 15, 2008, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.nationalkuwait.com/forum/index.php ? threads/32920. The Saudi decision was announced in July 2008 but ratified in February 2009. parliamentary proceedings narrate the origins of the narrative as reported by Fahad al-Turki and Muhy Amir, “ Al-maqsuma tantalum ‘ abur bil-mudawalatain ” [ The Divided ( Zone police ) Passes Both Votes ], Al-Jarida, January 23, 2020, 1, 6–9 ; Hamad Al-Khalaf and Fahad Al-Shammari, “ Jalsat tabdid al-hawajis ” [ Parliament Session Ends Concerns ( over the Divided Zone agreement ) ], Al-Qabas, January 23, 2020, 8–9. The letter and its contents were not made public at the meter and were only mentioned after the rift was all over .
35 Rania el-Gammal and Reem Shamseddine, “ Saudi Arabia, Kuwait Shared Zone Tensions Underlie Oilfield Closure, ” Reuters, October 21, 2014, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.reuters.com/article/saudi-kuwait-oil-disputes-idUSL6N0SF0BM20141021 ; and author interview with then petroleum minister Dr. Khaled al-Fadhel, Kuwait, December 1, 2020. Dr. Al-Fadhel gave an overview of Kuwait ’ s laws and regulations to be followed by all companies operating in Kuwait. He was the oil minister at the prison term of the meeting but is no longer in politics after the curse in of a newfangled government on December 14, 2020 .
36 Abdelghani Henni, “ Saudi Arabia, Kuwait Mull Resuming production From Neutral Zone Fields, ” Hart Energy, March 13, 2017, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.hartenergy.com/exclusives/saudi-arabia-kuwait-mull-resuming-production-neutral-zone-fields-29721 .
37 Hafsa Jouda, “ Qissat al-sira ‘ al-nifti al-khafi bayn al-Saudia washington al-Kuwait bi-al-mantaqa al-maqsuma ” [ The Story of the Hidden Conflict Between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the Divided Zone ], Noon Post, November 5, 2018, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.noonpost.com/content/25410. Maintenance was announced for two weeks, but the field was left close for over four years. See Sky News Arabia, “ Saudi wal Kuwait tughliqan haql al-Wafra ” [ Saudi Arabia and Kuwait Close Wafra Oilfield ], Sky News Arabia, May 11, 2015, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.skynewsarabia.com/business/744615-السعودية-والكويت-تغلقان-حقل-الوفرة. To underscore the earnestness of shutting down an mathematical process of this size, a source reported to Reuters that this was “ the single biggest asset in the populace which was measuredly stopped and hasn ’ t been producing for three years. ” This was in 2018. production was stopped for four and a half years. See Rania el-Gamal and Dimitry Zhdannikov, “ Oil Output From Saudi, Kuwait Shared Zone on Hold as Relations Sour, ” Reuters, October 18, 2018, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-kuwait-oilfields-idUSKCN1MS1NN. The article title does not reflect an reason of Kuwait-Saudi relations and its elastic frame border on as relations did not sour, evening if they had their challenges .
38 Author interview with senior Foreign Ministry official, Kuwait, November 9, 2020 ; and “ Liqa ’ khass ” [ Special Interview ], YouTube video, 1:47:26, posted by “ Ekhbariya television, ” December 28, 2019, accessed January 24, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.youtube.com/watch ? v=gY13sknyyO0. This was an interview by Kuwaiti state television receiver with senior Foreign Ministry officials who represented the Kuwaiti side in the negotiations with the Saudi side .
39 Author interview with Dr. Mohammed Sabah al-Sabah, former deputy prime minister and extraneous minister of Kuwait, Kuwait, September 1, 2020 .
40 Ibid .
41 Author interview with Waleed al-Nisef, editor-in-chief of Al-Qabas newspaper, Kuwait, September 16, 2020 ; author consultation with senior Foreign Ministry official, Kuwait, November 9, 2020 ; and Saif al-Abdullah, “ Kuwait tanfi tafaqum al-khilaf master of arts ‘ al-Saudia hawl haqlay al-Khafji wal Wafra ” [ Kuwait Denies An escalation in the Conflict with Saudi Arabia over the Khafji and Wafra Fields ], Riyadh Post, December 16, 2018, hypertext transfer protocol : //riyadhpost.live/14290 .
42 The conflict solution clause in the 1965 agreement ( Article XXII ) is comprised of two steps : hire in amicable bilateral negotiations first, after which one may resort to the International Court of Justice in the Hague. At one detail, Kuwait alluded to this option after Saudi Arabia ’ s slow footstep in resolving the return, but because the strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia is an crucial one for Kuwait deoxyadenosine monophosphate well, it gave priority to a directly mediated solution .
43 Fahad al-Turki and Muhy Amir, “ Al-maqsuma tantalum ‘ abur bil-mudawalatain ” [ The Divided ( Zone Law ) Passes Both Votes ], Al-Jarida, January 23, 2020, 1, 6–9 ; Hamad al-Khalaf and Fahad al-Shammari, “ Jalsat tabdid al-hawajis ” [ Parliament Session Ends Concerns ( over Divided Zone Agreement ) ], Al-Qabas, January 23, 2020, 8–9. The speaker of parliament recalled Mohammed bin Salman siding with Kuwait against his team when the latter referred to Saudi Arabia bearing the cost of operating the Neutral Zone during Kuwait ’ randomness occupation. He noted that his grandfather was exiled to Kuwait and departed from it to reclaim his lands. besides, see “ Liqa ’ khass ” [ Special Interview ], YouTube video, 1:47:26, posted by “ Ekhbariya television receiver, ” December 28, 2019, accessed January 24, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.youtube.com/watch ? v=gY13sknyyO0 for setting narrative .
44 Author interview with a aged official, Kuwait, December 2, 2020 .
45 “ Al-Ghanim fi mudakhala lil-tarikh yadha ‘ al-nuqat ‘ ala al-huruf hawl ittifaqiyyat al-mantaqa al-maqsuma ” [ Al-Ghanim Relays Important Details About the Divided Zone Agreement ], YouTube television, 25:05, posted by “ Majles Al Ommah, ” January 9, 2020, accessed October 20, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.youtube.com/watch ? v=YYoWBIMD_iQ ; and Marzouq al-Ghanim, interview by Ali Khaja, Alrai television receiver, December 3, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.youtube.com/watch ? v=xqGSrrdprsE & list=UUurswD2w4wt1sWF0G-fZV2g & ab_channel=ALZIADIQ8BlogPlus2 .
46 Mubasher, “ Kuwait Has World ’ s Sixth Largest Oil Reserves of 104 bln Barrels, ” Mubasher, April 16, 2013, hypertext transfer protocol : //english.mubasher.info/news/2296423/Kuwait-has-world-s-sixth-largest-oil-reserves-of-104-bln-barrels ; and Reuters, “ Kuwait, Saudi Arabia Start Trial Oil Pumping From Divided zone : Kuwait Minister, ” Reuters, February 16, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.reuters.com/article/us-kuwait-saudi-oil/kuwait-saudi-arabia-start-trial-oil-pumping-from-divided-zone-kuwait-minister-idUSKBN20A0I9 .
47 Benoit Faucon and Summer Said, “ Saudi Arabia and Kuwait End Dispute Over Shared Oil Fields, ” Wall Street Journal, December 24, 2019, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-and-kuwait-end-dispute-over-shared-oil-fields-11577191072 ; Hartford Business, “ Trump Asks Saudi Arabia to Increase Oil Production, ” June 30, 2018, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.hartfordbusiness.com/article/trump-asks-saudi-arabia-to-increase-oil-production ; and DW, “ Kuwait Pumps Up Oil Output as Part of OPEC Russia Plan, ” June 30, 2018, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.dw.com/en/kuwait-pumps-up-oil-output-as-part-of-opec-russia-plan/a-44470829 .
48 Author consultation with senior Foreign Ministry official, Kuwait, November 9, 2020 ; and “ Liqa ’ khass ” [ Special Interview ], YouTube video recording, 1:47 : 26, posted by “ Ekhbariya television receiver, ” December 28, 2019, accessed January 24, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.youtube.com/watch ? v=gY13sknyyO0 .
49 Author interview with aged Foreign Ministry official, Kuwait, November 9, 2020 ; “ Liqa ’ khass ” [ Special Interview ], YouTube television, 1:47:26, posted by “ Ekhbariya television receiver, ” December 28, 2019, accessed January 24, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.youtube.com/watch ? v=gY13sknyyO0 ; and author interview with Dr. al-Fadhel, Kuwait, December 1, 2020 .
50 See Article III of Law No. 1 of 2020, Addendum to Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait on the partition of the neutral partition and Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait concerning the submerged sphere adjacent to the divided zone, Kuwait Alyoum, vol. 1482, February 2, 2020, pages 2–11 ; and Musallam Abdulwadud, “ Madha ya ‘ nickel ittifaq al-Kuwait wal Saudia hawl al-mantaqa al-maqsuma ” [ What is the Meaning of the Agreement between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia Over the Divided Zone ? ], Hafryat, December 25, 2019, hypertext transfer protocol : //hafryat.com/en/node/13801. A joint operation model refers to an evenly divided Kuwaiti-Saudi party set up to manage the oilfields in the separate partition. The onshore operation is managed by Wafra Joint Operations, equally fund and managed by Kuwait Gulf Oil Company ( KGOC ) and Saudi Arabian Chevron, representing the peer stakes of both states. This is the character ampere well with the offshore operations under Khafji Joint Operations, besides operated equally by KGOC ( Kuwait ) and Aramco Gulf Oil Company ( Saudi Arabia ). For more details on the operations, see NS Energy, “ Al-Khafji Field Development, Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone, ” NS Energy, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.nsenergybusiness.com/projects/khafji-field-saudi-kuwaiti-neutral-zone ; Kuwait Gulf Oil Company, “ Oil and Gas, ” hypertext transfer protocol : //www.kgoc.com/UI/oil-gas.aspx ; and OGJ editors, “ Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to Resume joint Oil Production, ” Oil & Gas Journal, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.ogj.com/general-interest/article/14074106/kuwait-saudi-arabia-to-resume-joint-oil-production .
51 In January 2021, Saudi Arabia supported the end of the Gulf rift and reassured the energy market by taking on the effect of the production cut in the latest OPEC+ meeting. This was preceded by ending the surround disagreement with Kuwait and followed by a commutation of the sentences of several human rights activists and a reduction in the numbers of executions in 2020. several observers trace elements of this shift to the holocene change in the U.S. administration, while others downplay this agent and cite the need to rebrand the crown prince as a more creditworthy statesman in light of an at hand succession and proceed alien exclaim against his former policies .
52 Author consultation with aged Foreign Ministry official, Kuwait, November 9, 2020 .
53 The MOU consists of eighteen articles. Articles 5–9 outline recompense. See “ Mashru ‘ qanun mudhakkirat tafahum bayn hukumat dawlat al-Kuwait washington hukumat al-mamlaka al-arabiya al-Saudia ” [ Draft Law for a Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of the State of Kuwait and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ], Council of Ministers, Kuwait, January 7, 2020 .
54 Article 3 of the Memorandum of Understanding Between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait notes that “ Saudi Arabian Chevron Inc. shall represent the interests of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the separate area and in the six-nautical-mile zone of the divided subaqueous area, in accord with the concession agreement concluded with the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that will expire on 3 Rabi ‘ I A.H. 1469, corresponding to 31 December A.D. 2046. ” See United Nations, “ Kuwait—Supplementary Agreement to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait on the partition of the Neutral Zone and to the Agreement Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait Concerning the Submerged Area Adjacent to the Divided Zone, 24 December 2019, ” United Nations, foliate final update December 1, 2020, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/KuwaitSaudiArabiaTreaty_English.pdf. The 2039 end date is the more long-familiar date and the one an petroleum official shared during an generator interview before hearing mention of the MOU article that states the ending year as 2046, after which he asked for the criminal record to stick to the date in the MOU. Author interview with oil official ( via telephone ), February 15, 2021. It may be either that the end date is 2046 after all or that it is 2039 per SAC but that the two parties are adding a layer of flexibility by leaving a few more years to negotiate the concession ’ mho condition after its 2039 end date.

55 National Assembly of Kuwait, “ Al-taqrir al-thalith li-lajnat al-shu ’ united nations al-kharijia bi-almuwafaqa ‘ ala ( 1 ) mashru ‘ qanun bi-almuwafaqa ‘ ala mudhakkirat tafahum bayn hukumat dawlat al-Kuwait washington hukumat al-mamlaka al- ‘ arabiya al-Sa ‘ udia ( 2 ) mashru ‘ qanun bi-almuwafaqa ‘ ala ittifaqiya mulhaqa bi-ittifaqiyat taqsim al-mantaqa al-muhayida wa-ittifaqiyat taqsim al-mantaqa al-maghmura al-muhadhiya lil-mantaqa al-maqsuma bayn hukumat dawlat al-Kuwait washington hukumat al-mamlaka al- ‘ arabiya al-Sa ‘ udia ” [ Third Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee on its agreement to ( 1 ) the Draft Law that Agrees to the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ; and to ( 2 ) the Draft Law that Agrees to the Addendum to the Agreement to Partition the Neutral Zone and Agreement to Partition the Submerged Area Adjacent to the Divided Zone Between the Governments of the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ], ” National Assembly, Kuwait, January 20, 2020 .
56 Krista E. Wiegand, “ Resolution of Border Disputes in the Arabian Gulf, ” The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies 1, no. 1 ( January 2014 ), 37 .
57 “ Al-Jubair yazur al-bilad li-tawqi ‘ sighat majlis al-tansiq al-Sa ‘ udi al-Kuwaiti ” [ Al-Jubair Visits the Country to Sign the Saudi-Kuwaiti Coordination Council Draft ], Al-Jarida, July 18, 2018, hypertext transfer protocol : //www.aljarida.com/articles/1531851501144790200 .